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ABSTRACT

ELITE CAPTURE, FREE RIDING, AND PROJECT
DESIGN: A CASE STUDY OF A COMMUNITY-DRIVEN
DEVELOPMENT PROJECT IN CEARÁ, BRAZIL
SEPTEMBER 2016
JESSICA CARRICK-HAGENBARTH
B.A., THE EVERGREEN STATE UNIVERSITY
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor J. Mohan Rao

This dissertation explores the successes and failures of a community-driven development project, São José Agrário (SJA), conducted in Northeastern Brazil. The
project was co-funded by the World Bank and the State of Ceará and co-directed by
a social movement (the Landless Workers Movement, MST) and the State of Ceará.
The dissertation employs a mixed methods approach based on eight case studies, a
census survey of six communities, and interviews with a wide variety of actors connected to the project.
I address the problem of elite capture, either by non-targeted communities or by
an elite within the targeted communities disproportionately benefiting from projects.
Case study communities met project targeting criteria. I found no evidence of elite
capture of project funds or subproject benefits in the case studies. I then evaluate the
vii

free rider problem. The settlers, for the most part, overcame problems of free riding
in both their collective work and in the SJA subprojects. Solving the challenges of
free riding depended on the community and collective work institutions, such as clear,
enforceable rules, monitoring, and graduated sanctions. Accompanying groups, such
as the Landless Workers’ Movement, agricultural workers’ unions, local and state
governments, and technical agencies assisted in preventing or resolving free riding
problems.
I found that even when the problems of elite capture and free riding were avoided,
three of the eight subprojects I studied had failed, and one had been suspended
for two years. I trace the source of subproject failure to problems of subproject
design. First, subprojects required a greater skill set and knowledge base than the
participants had. Power differentials between the participants and the private actors
created dependency and allowed for participants to be taken advantage of rather than
creating empowerment. Second, the duration of technical assistance for productive
subprojects was too short and private technical agencies sometimes provided lowquality subprojects. Third, participants had little ability to accurately forecast their
costs and benefits of subproject participation, resulting in subproject attrition.
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São José Agrário

SJI

São José I
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

1.1

Introduction

Participatory development is the active involvement of participants in the development process. The participatory approach gained popularity over the 1990s
and 2000s. Participatory development stresses bottom-up rather than top-down approaches, prioritizes the goal of empowerment, and gives priority to local or indigenous
knowledge (Henkel and Stirrat, 2001). Participatory development projects have been
widely adopted in many forms by the World Bank (WB), by national governments, by
other international development institutions, and by international non-governmental
organizations (Brett, 2003).
Some civil society, social movements, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
have adopted and developed a participatory approach as a way to attempt to alleviate poverty, in reaction to the reduction in state spending and provision of social
safety nets in the 1970s and 1980s. The neoliberal model welcomed the cost savings and decentralization of moving spending of social welfare from the state level to
the individual, civil society, and NGO level (Mayo and Craig, 1995). Additionally,
decentralization of political power, a common aspect of participatory approaches,
was harmonious with the framework of international institutions concerned with corruption and state failures. International institutions also embraced the emphasis on
empowerment and local indigenous knowledge, primarily in the context of how to
monetize that knowledge into commercial ventures (Finger and Schuler, 2004).

1

Participatory development encompasses a broad range of approaches, including
those that confront power inequities, and those that invite communities into the
design and implementation of development projects. I call these two classes of approaches radical participatory development and project-based participatory development.1 Over the 1980s and 1990s, frameworks such as Robert Chambers’ participatory rural appraisal method, as well as the analyses of Cornwall, Cernea, and Cohen
and Uphoff gave weight to the practice of project-based participatory development
by international institutions, particularly in rural areas (Cohen and Uphoff, 1980;
Chambers, 1983, 1999; Cornwall, 2000; Cernea, 1985).
The World Bank developed a project-based participatory development approach
it named community-driven development (CDD). This approach gives community
groups and local governments control over planning decisions and investment resources. In general, community groups will come together around a goal; they will
then apply for funds by submitting a proposal from the those administrating the
CDD project. Once they receive the funds they will assist in implementing the subproject and will be responsible for subproject maintenance. The World Bank has
dedicated a significant amount of money to this approach, $85 billion from 2002 to
2012 (Mansuri and Rao, 2012). This approach to participatory development posits
that community control of development projects and funds creates efficient outcomes
and empowered communities, while reducing corruption (Coirolo and Lammert, 2009;
Chambers, 1983; Craig and Mayo, 1995; World Bank Operations Evaluation Department, 2005).
While for many, the model of CDD is attractive; its application has encountered
serious obstacles (Cooke, 2001). The success of community-driven development depends on collective action: the ability of participants to organize themselves around
1

In Chapter 2 I go into more depth regarding this classification.

2

a specific goal, to decide on a particular subproject, and to work and maintain the
subproject collaboratively. Thus, criticisms of CDD tend to center on typical causes
of collective action failure: the elite capture of funds, clientelism (in which politicians
exchange subprojects for votes), and free-riding by members in the community.
My study explores how the goal of community involvement, input, and control over
a local-level development process played out in the specific institutional context of the
World Bank approach to participatory development (community-driven development)
deemed effective in the Brazilian Northeast. While this dissertation is primarily
studying a project-based approach to participatory development, the actual project
itself somewhat uniquely incorporates aspects of the radical approach to participatory
development as well. This CDD project is called São José Agrário (SJA). It is a
subcomponent of a larger CDD project, named São José II (SJII) locally, and named
the Rural Poverty Reduction Project by the World Bank. This project provided grants
for small-scale infrastructure and productive subprojects in agrarian settlements.2
Infrastructure subprojects included fences and reservoirs. These subprojects required
a significant amount of intensive labor over a short period, generally some months.
Productive subprojects included irrigation and beekeeping. Such subprojects require
long-term participation and labor as long as the subproject exists, generally years.
When, in 2007, the state of Ceará received additional financing for their São
José II Project (also known as the Rural Poverty Reduction Project), a grassroots
social movement occupied the state offices and demanded access to those funds for
their affiliated communities. This grassroots social movement was called the Landless
Workers Movement (Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra, MST) and the
funds they gained access to became the São José Agrário project. Working together
2

Project refers to the entire funds from both the World Bank and the State government dedicated
to the community-driven development program at the state level, as well as the spin-off program
São José Agrário that dedicated funds only to agrarian settlements. Subprojects refer to the funds
allocated to each participating group.

3

the MST and the project state technical unit provided funds to communities, assisted
them in planning subprojects, and provided some accompaniment.
This dissertation is based on eight case studies, a census survey of six communities, and interviews with a wide variety of actors connected to São José Agrário. The
purpose was to evaluate reasons for the success and failure of the subprojects in my
eight case studies. I inquired whether participants had experienced problems with
clientelism, elite capture, or free riding. Elite capture occurs when the subproject or
the subproject funds are controlled by an elite, often resulting in the funds or the
subproject benefits not reaching those for whom they are intended. Elite capture
can occur between communities or within a community. In the context of the Brazilian Northeast, elite capture that occurred when a non-targeted community received
a subproject, instead of a targeted community, was often a result of patron-client
relationships (clientelism). Free riding is a well-known problem which leads to the
under-provision of participation (often in terms of providing labor to the subproject)
or other inputs key for subproject success. I found that communities had mostly
overcome these problems of collective action. Yet, three of the subprojects had failed
outright and one was on hold. I examined the ways in which the communities were
able to solve traditional problems of collective action and I identified problems that
did lead to project failure.
Chapter one provides the introduction, background and methods. Chapter two
presents a literature review addressing types of participatory development and the
theory and evidence for elite capture and free riding in the context of communitydriven development.
In chapter three, I deal with the problem of elite capture. I explore first if clientelism resulted in non-targeted communities receiving subprojects. Secondly, I evaluated the differences in income, education, and background in the case study communities. My case studies, which encompasses all cases meeting a set of criteria (explained

4

below), showed no signs that non-targeted communities received subprojects and, as
such, showed no signs of clientelism. Within the community, elite capture could
have occurred through differences in power, along the lines of income, education,
and background. I found that there were significant differences in income, rooted in
the availability of off settlement work and pensions. Educational levels also varied
to a great extent with age for those over the age of eighteen. This was a result of
the state funding of public education, which penetrated farther into rural areas, and
conditional welfare payments, in which children had to be enrolled in school to be
accessed. These two factors lowered the opportunity cost of attending school and led
to higher educational attainment for the younger generations. Backgrounds, in terms
of previous work and origin of birth, were very similar for community members. Despite differences in income and educational levels, I found no evidence of elite capture
of project funds or subproject benefits in the case studies.
In chapter four, I address the free rider problem. While there is an abundance
of literature exploring free riding in the context of common pool resources, there has
been little analysis of free riding in CDD projects. This may be because, in the past,
many CDD projects have been dedicated to infrastructure. Once built, infrastructure
subprojects require minimal labor or monetary input from participants. Currently,
however, CDD projects are moving toward new livelihood activities (productive subprojects). As Mansuri and Rao note, many of the subprojects are nontraditional,
which typically means they are new to the communities. “Such projects tend to
encompass a broad array of productive activities, including crop production and nontraditional agricultural activities, such as aquaculture and medicinal plants, livestock,
agro-forestry, fishing, and fish farming” (Mansuri and Rao, 2012, emphasis mine, 213).
These livelihood projects require ongoing labor and occasionally monetary inputs. In
such cases, free riding would likely present as shirking or failure to contribute money.
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I identify the characteristics of free riding and the institutions used to solve free riding problems. Free riding presented challenges to settlement collective work and, to a
lesser extent the SJA subprojects. The settlers, for the most part, overcame problems
of free riding in both their collective work and in the SJA subprojects. Solving the
challenges of free riding depended on the institutions surrounding collective work in
the community, such as clear, enforceable rules, monitoring, and graduated sanctions.
In addition, accompanying groups, such as the Landless Workers’ Movement, agricultural workers’ unions, local and state governments, and technical agencies assisted in
preventing or resolving free riding problems. I found that the agrarian settlements
had robust institutions to deal with free riding but that the SJA subprojects did not.
As CDD projects move toward funding a greater percentage of productive subprojects
and these subprojects become more successful, free riding may begin to play a larger
role. Under such conditions, the lack of robust institutions to deal with free riding in
CDD projects may lead to subproject conflict and failure.
I found that even when the problems of elite capture and free-riding were avoided,
three of the eight subprojects I studied had failed, and one had been suspended for
two years. The remaining four were ongoing during my visits over 2012-2013, but
none had directly increased participants’ income, although two may have increased
participants’ production indirectly and one may potentially do so in the future. If
collective action failures were overcome, these results begged the question: why were
almost half the subprojects failing?
In my fifth chapter, I trace the source of project failure to problems of subproject
design. First, subprojects required a greater skill set and knowledge base than the
participants had. It was expected that the participants would be empowered via their
participation in the subprojects via learning by doing, and this would compensate for a
lack of skill or resources. The subproject design required that the participants interact
with a variety of private actors (technical agencies, suppliers of inputs, middlemen,
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as well as gain access to private markets and transport their goods to the market).
Many of these private actors have greater income, education, and knowledge about
their specific business. Consequently, the subproject participants entered into the
relationships at a disadvantage, being less-skilled, less-knowledgeable, less-educated,
and coming from low-incomes and rural areas. The power differential between the
participants and the private actors created dependency and allowed for them to be
taken advantage of rather than creating empowerment.
Second, subprojects often depended on private technical agencies instead of public
technical agencies. The private technical agencies, for the reasons mentioned above,
sometimes provided low-quality subprojects which failed. An additional reason for
subproject failure is that technical agencies under-provided technical assistance. This
was in part due to the low quantity of funds set aside in the subproject for technical
assistance and, in part because it was an easy place for the technical agencies to cut
costs. Communities needed a greater duration of technical assistance and a better
quality of technical assistance.
Third, the SJA project (and the greater SJII project) assumed participants could
make an accurate initial cost-benefit decision of whether or not to participate in the
subprojects. Yet, these subprojects often took on new crops and techniques of production, previously unknown to the participants. As a result, the participants had
little ability to accurately forecast their costs and benefits. They relied on advice
and opinions from the state government technicians, the Landless Workers Movement, community leaders, other participants, and largely on their own intuition.
New information or shocks to initial subproject costs and benefits caused individuals
to reevaluate their participation decision resulting in attrition from the subprojects.
The World Bank appeared to identify this attrition, at least partially, as the result
of moral hazard.
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In the appendix, I present a simple model of how this participation decision may
be revisited and how relatively small numbers of attrition from the subprojects can
result in complete subproject failure.
This dissertation provides a unique case study of a community-driven development
project funded by the World Bank that was co-directed by a social movement (the
Landless Workers Movement, MST) and the State of Ceará’s Department of Agrarian
Development. This case study is particularly interesting because it brings together
characteristics of a top-down project-oriented approach (the São José Agrário CDD
Project) to participatory development with a more bottom-up radical approach (the
demand of funds by the MST communities) to participatory development. In doing
so, the case studies in my sample overcame some of the traditionally identified problems of collective action in CDD projects. I demonstrated how accompaniment by a
social movement can make community-driven development projects more effective by
mitigating elite capture in general and clientelism in particular. Second, I provided
examples of institutional solutions to collective action problems. Third, I documented
case studies and provide an alternative explanation for the failure of projects, located
in project design. Lastly, I showed how misdiagnosing the problem results in design
flaws that will prevent the project from reaching those most in need.

1.2

Agriculture in Ceará, Brazil

My study is located in Ceará, a state located in northeastern of Brazil. I choose
Ceará because it has a relatively long history of CDD projects, beginning with pilot
projects in 1985 (Coirolo and Lammert, 2009), providing time for these projects to
develop and mature. Seven of my eight case studies are located in the municipalities of
Canindé and Quixeramobim — both host to a semi-arid microclimate. I also included
one settlement in Itapipoca along the coast. I chose to concentrate my study on cases
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in the sertão because of its history as an area of concentrated poverty and because of
the difficult conditions under which to farm.
Ceará was and continues to be an agricultural region with high levels of income
and land inequality. The land Gini increased from the 1980 level of 0.77 to 0.86 in
2006 (de Medieros et al., 2012). Income inequality has decreased, largely thanks to
Bolsa Familia, the nation-wide concessional welfare program in Brazil. The income
Gini for the state of Ceará decreased from 0.63 in 2000 to 0.57 in 2010 (Governo
do Estado do Ceara, 2011). Around 43% of workers in Ceará are employed in the
agricultural sector (Chimeli et al., 2002) and around 92% of family agriculturalists do
not have access to irrigation and, as such, depend entirely on rainfall (Lemos et al.,
2002).
The sertão is a semi-arid environment. Canindé saw 270.5 mm of rain in 2012
and 372.1 mm of rain in 2013, in which normal average is around 674 mm (Fundacao
Cearense de Meterologia e Recursos Hidricos, 2016). Quixeramobim saw 291.4 mm of
rain in 2012 and 620.8 mm of rain in 2013, in which the normal average is around 704
mm (Fundacao Cearense de Meterologia e Recursos Hidricos, 2016). Rainfall occurs
over a short season from January to April and tends to be erratic with frequent
droughts making subsistence production a risky endeavor.
Large landowners engage in livestock production, primarily cattle ranching (Leite
et al., 2004). Historically it was also a region of cotton production. As Cavalcante
et.al. write in their report on “Cotton Crops in the State of Ceará”, Ceará was one of
the major producers of cotton in Brazil but fell into decline following a trade opening
to the rest of the world, along with a boll weevil infestation (Cavalcante et al., 2007).
Although some parts of Brazil have seen a return of the cotton sector, Ceará has not.
The decline occurred from 1985 to 2005, with Ceará going from producing 5.7% of
the total cotton production in Brazil to around 0.2% (Cavalcante et al., 2007). One
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of the municipalities, Quixeramobim, in my study had historically been one of the
top five municipal producers of cotton in Ceará.
Smallholders and subsistence producers rely on corn, beans, and cassava, timing
production with the rainy season. As such, annual production is limited. Furthermore, the area is subject to cyclical droughts. Smallholders with more capital may also
engage in irrigated vegetable production for the market. In the past landless workers
and subsistence producers left the land when droughts endured too long, walking to
cities in search of work to prevent starvation. More recent policies providing Bolsa
Familia have largely made this course of action unnecessary.
Moradores and landless workers tend to reside on the poorest rung of the ladder,
often eking out a subsistence living and taking work as day laborers (boia-fria) named
after the cold lunches they carry with them to their work. Day laborers are often
picked up by a truck early in the morning; they engage in strenuous work under poor
conditions for low pay. Moradores are a type of sharecropping agricultural production system in Brazil. According to Jacquet, in Ceará, moradores historically came
into existence because of cotton production. While raising cattle required relatively
little labor, raising cotton crops was labor-intensive, but only over a short period
(Jacquet, 2000). She writes that during the 18th and 19th century this made relying
on slave labor costly. In response, landowners provided a cheap home and land to
raise subsistence crops and small animals to families via a verbal contract. In return,
the families were expected to help during harvest and provide several days of work
per week to do chores around the farm for which they were paid less than the daily
agricultural workers (Jacquet, 2000). In the 1960s, as mechanization decreased the
need for labor and livestock production became more attractive, and with the decline
of cotton production in the 1980s, moradores began to be kicked off the land becoming landless workers (Jacquet, 2000). Moradores and small-scale agriculturalists in
the sertão depend primarily on beans, cassava, and corn (Heredia, 1979). Those with
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a greater income might have access to funds for irrigation and grow vegetables for the
market, as well as have some livestock, ranging from pigs to goats to sheep to cattle.
The participants in my study were land reform recipients, living on agrarian settlements that had received a São José Agrário subproject (a CDD subproject). Many
of these recipients had previously been landless workers and moradores. As such, they
had worked for large landowners or had engaged in subsistence production.

1.3

Background

São José Agrário (SJA) emanated out of a line of almost continuous World Bank
projects in Brazil’s rural northeast commencing in 1974. The community-driven development approach was first implemented in the region during the 1980s, as a spin-off
of the larger WB project called the Northeast Rural Development Program (NRDP)
(Coirolo and Lammert, 2009). Deemed a success, the World Bank reformulated their
projects in Ceará around this approach in 1993. In 1995, the program was renewed
and expanded in the Northeast, and the states took on a larger role in providing
counterpart funding. The program was named the Rural Poverty Alleviation Project
and extended from 1995 to 2001. In the state of Ceará, it was called São José I (SJI).3
The WB provided loan funding of US$70 million and the state provided US$27.9 million (The World Bank, 2001). In 2001, the project was renewed. It was called the
Rural Poverty Reduction Project by the World Bank and called São José II (SJII)
by the State of Ceará. SJII was funded via a WB loan of US$70 million and State
counterpart funding of US$38.6 million and continued until 2009 (The World Bank,
2009). In 2012, the WB project was re-conceptualized and named the Ceará Rural
Sustainable Development and Competitiveness Project; locally it was called São José
3

The World Bank and the state of Ceara had different names for the same projects. The State of
Ceara used Sao Jose to refer to many of the projects co-funded by the WB and the State of Ceara.
Each new project was given a number, thus Sao Jose I, Sao Jose II, Sao Jose III.
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III (SJIII). SJIII has been approved and by its end date is expected to receive financing equal to US$100 million from the WB and the state is expected to provide
counterpart funding of US$50 million from 2012 to 2016 (The World Bank, 2012).
São José Agrário (SJA) was a subcomponent of the larger SJII project, originating in
the additional financing stage. In Ceará, the implementing agency is the Department
for Agrarian Development (SDA - Secretaria de Desenvolvimento Agrário).
Many agricultural productive subprojects require access to land. When the projects
above began to focus on rural communities rather than individual small producers,
the need for land became an important necessity to making productive projects viable
(Coirolo and Lammert, 2009, 91). The answer to the need for land was presented in
SJI. In 1997, a part of this project contained an experimental component called Projecto de Reforma Agrária Solidária (Agrarian Reform Solidarity Project) supported
by the WB, where land was obtained via a willing-buyer willing-seller framework
(Pereira, 2004). Periera notes that the Projecto de Reforma Agrária Solidária had
two parts: part one loaned money to community associations to buy land and part
two provided grants to community associations for productive agricultural projects.
The associations had 15 years to pay back the loan back with a five-year grace period.
The Projecto de Reforma Agrária Solidária provided a model for the Cedula da Terra
program, a pilot project for six northeastern states that was organized similarly, including both a loan for community associations to buy land and grants for productive
subprojects.
The WB considered Cedula da Terra a success, so the WB scaled it up creating the
Crédito Fundiário program. The WB classifies this program as community-based land
reform. Although it is possible for individual families to buy land through this program, it occurs infrequently. The program is targeted toward groups of families which
apply for funds through community associations to create settlements. Before the genesis of market-led land reform, much of Brazilian land reform was expropriation-based.
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Expropriation-based land reform was a result of the 1988 Brazilian Constitution. This
Constitution states that land which is not complying with its social function can be
expropriated (Brasil, 1988). Land’s social function is not fulfilled if the land is not
cultivated or used over a reasonable time period, and/or when the landowners do not
comply with legal labor practices, and/or if the landowners are not preserving the
environment (Brasil, 1988). Groups organize and occupy the land. The land then
comes under judicial review. If it is found not to be fulfilling its social function, the
land may be ceded to a settlement. Settlements arising through this type of land
reform are administered by the National Institute of Colonization and Agrarian Reform (INCRA, Instituto Nacional de Colonização e Reforma Agrária). The Landless
Workers Movement is most closely linked to these land reform settlements. Half of
my case studies fell under the classification of expropriation based land reform, and
half were market-led land reform settlements.
SJII was split into two components: the original loan that covered the period
from 2001 to mid-2006, and an additional financing loan that covered the period
from mid-2006 through 2009 (The World Bank, 2009). In 2007, soon after the additional financing loan was approved, the MST (Landless Workers Movement) occupied
the SDA (Secretário do Desenvolvimento Agrário, the state offices housing São José
II). The MST demanded project funds for agrarian reform settlements. The then
governor, Cid Gomes of the Partido Republicano da Ordem Social (Republican Party
of Social Order, PROS) and formerly of the Partido Socialista Brasileiro (Brazilian
Socialist Party, PSB), was sympathetic to their demands. He agreed that a portion of the money, around US$15 million would be dedicated to the settlements (Sao
Jose Agrario Technician B, 2013). The SDA called this component São José Agrário
(SJA) and the Landless Workers’ Movement named it 180 MST.4 The MST social
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Here on out I will use the name São José Agrário (SJA).
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movement played an active role in the project accompanying the projects from start
to finish and dialoguing with the SDA. São José Agrário was originally set to fund
180 subprojects on agrarian settlements, in the end, they were able to disburse funds
to 163 settlements, around a 91% disbursement rate which is considered satisfactory
(Sao Jose Agrario Technician B, 2013).
The SJII projects followed a particular set of steps specific to the CDD project
design. SJII began by attempting to adequately disseminate the project to the public.
Project dissemination was often done over the radio, through agricultural workers’
labor unions, among other avenues. Once an individual or group became aware
of the project, they formed a legally recognized association, called the community
association, with a bank account specific to the project. Community associations
were often formed around a particular need rather than a geographic focus. The
association was established via the creation of a legally recognized document. All
community association members signed or lend their fingerprint (the formal way to
sign if illiterate) to the document. The document included a record of the formation
meeting, the association’s officers, committees and committee members, including the
accounting committee. Once the document was complete, it was submitted to the
local registry. They then could open a bank account. This bank account could only
be used for funds for the community subproject, in which two association officers had
to sign off on all expenses.
The next step was for the community association to prepare a subproject proposal
and to submit it to the state technical unit (STU) housed in the Department of
Agrarian Development (SDA). Groups choose projects from a menu given by the
WB and the State agency. Table 1.1 shows that projects proposed under the SJA
Project. SJA funded primarily productive and infrastructure projects. Four of these
subprojects had yet to be implemented at the time of my visit, and seventeen had
not been funded.
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Table 1.1. Subproject Type
Project Type
Livestock
Mechanization (Tractors)
Irrigation
Piped water
Cashew Plantations
Reservoir
Bee-keeping
Poultry
Perimeter Fences
Sweets making
Fish farming
Cultural House
Productive Support
Artisanal Fishing
Flour mill
Handicrafts
Seaweed
Store
Trading Center
Bakery
Total

Number
27
26
21
21
16
11
10
10
9
6
6
5
3
3
1
1
1
1
1
1
180

Data from the MST. Only 163 of these were approved and implemented.

Once the state technical unit received the subproject proposal, they checked to
make sure the community and the subproject met a set of eligibility requirements: the
group must be part of a target group and all group members have to have participated
in choosing the subproject. Additionally, the community must have decided on the
cost of the subproject, must know how to obtain goods and services for the project,
and have planned the operations and maintenance phase of the project (Coirolo and
Lammert, 2009).
If the subproject proposal was approved, the state technical unit released money
from the state treasury to the associations in installments via the Bank of Brazil.
The process was as follows; they would release the first installment, the association
would provide documentation detailing how the money was used, and if this followed
the project protocol, the second installment would be released (Sao Jose Agrario
Technician A, 2013). The same method was followed for the third installment to be
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released. If the subproject was not implemented correctly, then the STU returned
the remaining money from the bank account back to the treasury.
In the SJA and SJII projects, once the community’s selected project was approved, they acted collectively to implement, operate, and maintain the project. The
community association was responsible for contracting the technical agency and for
acquiring the goods and services needed. Furthermore, the association had to provide
at least 10% of the project’s cost in labor, cash, or kind. Most often the settlers I
interviewed chose to provide labor. The rule for contracting a technical agency, or
for obtaining goods or services was to get at least three bids and then the community
association chose the least-cost bid meeting the minimum quality standards. Once
the technical agency, services, and goods were chosen the state technical unit checks
that the provider is certified and passed the money to the association to pay the
provider. The community associations were also required to keep financial records of
their payments, such as invoices to contractors and for goods and services.
Once the subproject has been completed, the community was responsible for keeping it running. The subproject stated that the community should charge a user’s fee
to provide funds for both infrastructure and productive subprojects. Those that were
infrastructure tended to look to the municipal level for funds to help with maintenance.
São José Agrário had some important differences from the SJII, due to extensive
collaboration with and involvement by the MST. First and foremost the MST choose
which settlements would participate based on their participation in the occupation
of the SDA in 2007 in order to get access to SJII project funds, the desire to carry
out a project, and their connection with the MST. The state did not intervene in this
unless there were problems with the eligibility of the associations or of the subproject
proposals. Additionally, the settlements already had legally recognized community
associations, as an association is a requirement of settlement creation. These asso-
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ciations had been established originally with the goal of gaining access to land. In
SJA, at least in the smaller settlements, the same association was used for the subproject as well. Participation in the CDD subproject was voluntary and it was not
required that participants be registered settlement members. Thus, some registered
settlement members did not participate, and some unregistered settlement members
did participate.5
After settlements were chosen, teams of state technicians and MST representatives
went to each settlement and discussed the subproject with them. The teams spent
between one day and five days in each settlement. If the settlement had not chosen a
subproject, they facilitated subproject choice, which included settlers voting on which
project they wanted. Once the settlement had chosen a subproject, they evaluated the
viability of the subproject and made sure it fit SJII guidelines, which had restrictions
related to the amount of money per project, and type of subproject. Once a subproject
was chosen, and the state technical unit approved the subproject the settlers followed
the SJII project process with one difference. This was that the MST tended to
accompany these settlements, at least to some extent, through much of the subproject
process.

1.4

Data and Methods

In order to investigate the success and failure of the SJA subprojects, I used
a mixed methods approach combining in-depth interviews, participant observation,
and a survey I implemented in six settlements. My study is based on 14 months of
fieldwork; July and August of 2011 and July 2012 through June 2013. I conducted
formal interviews with over 60 government officials, project technicians, academics,
5

Unregistered settlement members are often family members living in the settlement. They have
no rights to the land for animal husbandry and are not officially part of the association representing
the settlement. They have had a small plot of land on which they grow corn and beans, but their
primary employment is off the settlement.

17

social movement leaders, labor union leaders, and CDD participants. In addition, I
conducted 8 case studies of agrarian settlements, which had received SJA subprojects,
and conducted a census survey of six of the settlements.
During the pilot phase of my study, I gathered information via informal interviews
and gained permission to access the settlements that participated in the SJA project
from the Landless Workers Movement and the State Technical Unit housed in the
Department of Agrarian Development in charge of the SJII and the SJA projects.
SJA provided funds for 180 subprojects to be implemented in agrarian settlements
affiliated with the MST, 163 of which were approved and implemented. The maximum value of a project was USD 50,000. There was a total available funding for the
SJA project of 15 million which covered both the subprojects, training, and overhead
administration. The MST made available to me a list of the SJA subprojects, by subproject type, subproject cost, settlement, and the number of participants. I matched
this with official lists of agrarian settlements in the state by number of households,
date of officially becoming a settlement, and municipality.
Of the 163 subprojects, using the information above I choose eight to be part of
my sample. The settlements were chosen for minimum variation due to geographic location (including micro-climate and political factors), year of becoming a settlement,
and number of settlement families. Thus, I chose two municipalities, Canindé and
Quixeramobim, that had a large number of subprojects with a similar micro-climate
— the sertão. I then choose only settlements that had been established between 1998
and 2002. This criterion allowed me to look at settlements that were constructed
under similar land reform policies, either Crédito Fundiário or national land reform
settlements.6 In addition, it meant they were of similar ages and that they had been
functioning for at least ten years giving them time to experiment with and establish
6

Crédito Fundiário is a statewide land reform program co-developed and co-funded by the State
government and the World Bank. It is a willing buyer willing seller program.
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a set of institutions. For those settlements that had to pay a loan back (Crédito
Fundı́ario), this ensured that they had reached the stage where they were expected
to begin paying on the loan (indicating the maturity of the settlement). My third
requirement was that there be between 10 to 30 families to ensure I compared settlements of similar size. I choose settlements that were smaller because I administered
a survey to all settlement members and would have been unable to do a census survey if the settlements had more than 30 families. In the two municipalities, seven
settlements met this criterion. Thus, I included all seven settlements. I had originally planned to include the additional criteria of maximum variation in subproject
outcomes but since I had already included all subprojects that met the above requirements it made this criteria moot. I included one additional settlement (the first
settlement) in another municipality which had a strong affiliation with the MST. This
settlement assisted my analysis of the relationship between the settlements and the
MST. In this settlement, Settlement 1, and in Settlement 2, I conducted interviews
but not the survey.
The SJA subprojects in my study included beekeeping (apiculture), irrigation
projects for fruit trees and vegetable crops, growing capim (a grass feed for livestock),
and a cashew plantation. Infrastructure projects mainly dealt with water storage and
fences around the settlement (see Table 1.2).7
The settlements were difficult to access. I had the name of the settlement, but
not its location. They tended to be quite remote and they were not official towns and
thus, not on the map. They were a collection of houses, occasionally accompanied
by a school. The settlement members often had cell phones, but rarely had service.
To access these communities, I requested assistance from the municipal agricultural
workers unions and the Landless Workers Movement. As such, these two entities
7

The WB and the SDA classify a particular project as infrastructure or productive. I use their
classification.
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Table 1.2. São José Agrário Subprojects
Municipality

Subproject

Type

Year

Settlement

Cost

Existing

Itapipoca
Cashew
Productive
2008
1
R$70,000
Yes
Quixeramobim Fence
Infrastructure 2008
2
R$46,000
Yes
Canindé
Irrigation
Productive
2009
3
R$9,700
No
Quixeramobim Capim/Shed/Fence Prod/Infra
2010
4
R$50,000
Yes
Canindé
Apiculture
Productive
2008
5
R$58,800 On Hold
Canindé
Reservoir
Infrastructure 2009
6
R$90,000
No
Canindé
Irrigation
Productive
2010
7
R$82,000
No
Quixeramobim Tractor
Productive
2010
8
R$80,000
Yes
Author’s Data. Municpality is the location of the settlement. Subproject describes the subproject
received for the community. Subprojects can be classified as either productive or infrastructure
subprojects. Year is the year the subproject was implemented. Settlement is the identity of the
settlement (order of visitation). Cost describes the total grant given for the subproject. Existing
describes if the subproject was still in existence a the time of my visit. On hold describes a subproject
that was not currently functional when I visited but which some of the settlers expected to start again
sometime in the future. Settlement 4’s subprojects were a combination of three smaller subprojects
- including capim (a feed for cattle), a storage shed and a fence. These composed both productive
and infrastructure subprojects.

served as gatekeepers to the settlements. It took significant time to meet and establish
the relationships necessary to visit the settlements. A municipal agricultural workers
union representative or a representative of the MST would take me to the community
and introduce me or have contacted the community in advance to let them know
who I was. Occasionally, I got detailed instructions on how to get to a community
and I would take the bus or a truck and introduce myself. I would then stay in
the community for around one week, generally spending nights at the association
president’s home.
I conducted a variety of interviews with many different actors associated with the
settlements and with the SJA subprojects. Interviews conducted in the settlements
with subproject participants were structured. In the first two settlements, I interviewed 12 and 14 people, respectively. According to the literature on the method
of interview saturation, between 12 and 15 people is the point at which redundancy
is reached (Guest et al., 2006; Trotter et al., 2001). Interviewees were purposively
sampled for variation in age, gender, and leadership roles within each settlement
(Ritchie and Lewis, 2003). All subproject participant interviewees were asked the
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same questions, but follow-up probes could differ. These interviews covered the SJA
subprojects, their participation in these, as well as their crops and animals, other
projects they may have received, access to health and education, income, and participation in community work.
Interviews with technicians, government officials, MST representatives, agricultural union representatives and other actors were semi-structured and varied depending on the role of the interviewee to the subproject communities. Interviewees were
non-randomly chosen. These interviews covered the subprojects, questions regarding
the viability of the settlements, agricultural techniques, land reform, and access to
health and education of the settlement members.
Using this information I created a survey instrument that I applied to all households in six settlements, for a total of 93 households. The surveys lasted between 45
minutes and one hour and a half. They covered each households’, education, literacy,
access to health care, income, assets, types of work they were engaged in, questions
on participation and subproject outcomes, collective settlement work, participation
in settlement and subproject governance, as well as questions about their agricultural
work. Most interviews took place outside on the participants porch or occasionally
just inside the home in the living room. Given the lack of privacy in these communities, these were rarely private one-on-one interviews and often family members or
neighbors were present. In addition, frequently someone from the community would
accompany me in order to introduce me to each household (generally an adolescent
or a woman). I almost always included the head of household in the survey as this
person frequently was able to best answer many of my questions, but I was often also
able to include the spouse in my questions as well.8 Regularly, it required both the
8

In the northeast there is a clear division of labor between men and women with regards to
agricultural work. The norm is for the men to do the majority of the work in the fields while the
women care for the gardens. They will work in the fields at times of harvest and planting if needed.
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head of household and the spouse together to answer all the survey questions. My
survey information provided almost all of the empirical data I use for analysis. I occasionally check my empirical data against the national, state, and rural components of
the Brazilian household survey of 2012 (Fundacao Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia E
Estatistica, 2012). I had over a ninety percent response rate. Very rarely did anyone
decline to participate (once) but occasionally settlement members were traveling or
sick, and as such were unable to participate in my survey.
The week I spent in each settlement, attending meetings, social events, and sometimes helping with household work provided additional insight into the settlements
and the subprojects. In particular, variations in income became more apparent as
did relationships and fissures within the communities. It also allowed me to observe
general assembly meetings and meetings about other projects that were currently
being implemented. Additionally, I was able to observe collective settlement work.
This information was a valuable check against my interview and survey results, both
for understanding them, and for clues as to what the participants left out of their
responses. As well as to answer questions I had not thought to ask.
All interviews were recorded, transcribed and coded. I used a combination of
descriptive coding and hypothesis coding. While I went into my study with some
background and several hypotheses, I sought to hear what the participants said beyond what I expected. For this reason, I began with descriptive coding in Nvivo.
Descriptive coding codes for topics and is generally used as a first round, somewhat
broad brush approach to coding (Saldana, 2012). I went through each interview and
coded based on topic. I then broke relevant topics down into subtopics and subsubtopics. This allowed me to use Nvivo to run queries (Bazeley and Jackson, 2013).
Two examples of the most important types of queries I used are the following. In
the first example, I began by coding interviews for when they addressed the topics of
SJA and SJII. Then, I coded for when the interviewees brought up particular problems
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within SJA and SJII. I then broke down these problems under particular types and
coded again for problem type. This allowed me to query by “SJA Problem” and “SJII
Problem” and “Problem Type”. Thus, I had as columns SJII and SJA problems and
as rows the type of problem identified by the interviewee, each cell identified the
number of times the problem was identified. This allowed me to determine technical
assistance and administration as the most common problems identified by interviewees
in both SJII and SJA. In the second example, I was able to query for interviewee as the
row and list in the columns items coded as “SJA problems and Technical Assistance”,
then I could fill in the table with a summary of what each interviewee said for the
overlapping codes “SJA Problems” and “Technical Assistance.” As such, I was able to
refine further what the interviewees identified as the specific problems with technical
assistance. My analysis of how the subprojects fail was primarily based on descriptive
coding and the resulting themes.
Hypothesis coding assumes I expect particular answers from the questions I ask,
and I am testing to see if those hypotheses are correct (Saldana, 2012). In particular,
I used this method to explore problems with elite capture, free riding, and literacy. I
also brought in the themes I had created to enrich further my understanding of their
responses to free riding and failure.
By including all settlements with subprojects which met my above criteria in the
two municipalities and by conducting a census survey in six of these settlements, I
was able to obtain comprehensive and complete descriptive statistics at the individual
settlement level. This data is representative of the settlements that met my criteria
in these two municipalities. Since the size of the settlements in my sample were all
between 10 and 30 households they are not representative of the experience one might
find in larger settlements.
My study design maintains the confidentiality of all interviewees and survey participants. I rely on confidentiality to protect participants from any negative repercus-
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sions their interviews could have on their current status and future project eligibility.
I also keep interviewees that represented the SDA, the social movement, the agricultural workers’ labor unions, and the technical agencies confidential as the project is
ongoing and many interviewees are involved its newest incarnation. Thus, I hope to
ensure there are no adverse outcomes stemming from study participation.
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CHAPTER 2
PARTICIPATORY DEVELOPMENT AND PROBLEMS
OF COLLECTIVE ACTION

2.1

Participatory Development

The concept of participatory development appealed to the development community during the 1990s, gaining the support of development scholars and development
agencies (including the World Bank and the United Nations) (Rahman, 1995). As
Sirrat and Henkel point out, “Such is their popularity that by the early 1990s every
major bilateral development agency emphasized participatory policies” (Henkel and
Stirrat, 2001, 168). For example the UNDP’s 1993 Human Development Report made
participation it’s main topic and the opening sentence states, “People’s participation
is becoming the central issue of our time”(United Nations Development Programme,
1993, 1). In 1998, the WB president also emphasized the importance of participatory
development,
“Participation matters - not only as a means of improving development effectiveness as we know from our recent studies, but as the key to
long-term sustainability and to leverage. We must never stop reminding
ourselves that it is up to the government and its people to decide what
their priorities should be. We must never stop reminding ourselves that
we cannot and should not impose development by fiat from above - or
from abroad” (Wolfensohn, 1998).
Despite the enthusiasm international institutions have shown for participatory development, there is surprisingly little data confirming the efficacy of the participatory
development approach (Dill, 2009; Mansuri and Rao, 2004; Platteau, 2004; Prokopy,
2009).
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Participatory development is a term used to refer to many different approaches to
development by a range of actors. One (rather uninformative) definition of participatory development is the participation of regular citizens in the development process
(Tufte and Mefalopulos, 2009). Another definition is popular participation in development (Rahman, 1995). While there are many ways one can parse the concept of
participatory development, I focus on one which is driven by the goals of the actors
advocating for participatory development. This lens causes the approaches to fall
into two categories, which I refer to as the radical approach and the project-based
approach. I borrow the term project-based approach from Tufte and Mefalopulus
(Tufte and Mefalopulos, 2009).
The radical approach to participatory development emphasizes the use of participation to confront power, knowledge, and income inequalities. This approach
emphasizes explicitly political collective action to increase the power of the participants. The radical approach understands power as a zero sum game and envisions
a process in which those with less power actively confront those with more power
to shift the balance of power towards those with less power. In this way, the less
powerful can gain the power necessary to change the conditions of their existence
(Rahman, 1995). The approach builds on the work of Paulo Freire. Freire advocated
for “conscientization” in his writings on popular education that the oppressed become
actors in change rather than passive followers of their oppressors (Freire, 1970). Action is facilitated through an education process realizing self-awareness which creates
the conditions for collective action to achieve the goals of transforming the oppressed
peoples’ reality (Freire, 1970). Thus, empowerment occurs through taking power.
In the 1970s some development theorists, practitioners, and participants incorporated these ideas into their views of development. They placed much less emphasis on
economic growth as the ultimate goal than did the conventional approach to development. Instead, their approach to development weighted more heavily the importance

26

of class and power in the development process and the resulting inequities (Rahman,
1995). As a result, this group emphasized confronting these issues through local
bottom-up participation.
The project-based approach to participatory development posits that community control of development projects and funds creates efficient outcomes, empowered
communities, and reduces corruption (Mansuri and Rao, 2012). The project-based
approach relies not only on the peoples’ participation but also the importance of incorporating peoples’ knowledge (often spoken of as indigenous knowledge) (Rapley,
2007). Efficient outcomes are expected to stem from two sources. First, the community’s intimate knowledge will result in the specialized direction of funds toward the
community’s highest priority in each local case (Chambers, 1983). Chambers (1983)
popularized the idea of rural peoples’ knowledge and proposed a model for how international agencies, government agencies, and practitioners should and could interact
with communities to improve their well-being by giving them the voice and the means
to direct development. Secondly, the local knowledge facilitates the targeting of the
project to the poorest in the most cost-effective way (Paul, 1987; Mayo and Craig,
1995).
Next, this approach assumes, empowerment will result through the deed of putting
the community in charge of defining their needs and priorities and acting upon them
through received funds, increasing members’ capabilities, political voice, and control
over the development project. “Furthermore, the fundamental aim of empowering
people to handle challenges and influence the direction of their own lives is inherent
in participation” (Tufte and Mefalopulos, 2009, 4). According to the authors, this
occurs because participation increases people’s own capacities and ability to influence
governance. In this approach, power is not seen as a zero-sum game and does not
detract from the power of the powerful. To some extent, empowerment is given
through the development project. The development project opens a circumscribed
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space for rural communities to voice priorities and control funds, often facilitated by
the staff of the development institution or its (state, regional, etc.) partners. While
empowerment, in this case, is domesticated — it is understood by these projects to
be a base from which the community members can build toward collective action and
political voice.
There is also an assumption in the case of the World Bank that project-based
participatory development can be an avenue to restrict corruption by avoiding the
state and working through local community governance. This fits well with the WB’s
historical move away from state intervention in the 1980s and 1990s.
An outcome of the WB participatory projects is that through project design,
which requires that the community provides some portion of the cost of the project
(communities often choose to provide labor), the costs of the projects are reduced
(Mayo and Craig, 1995). “Cost-sharing” is helpful to the WB which has limited
development funds, and to the state which provides counterpart funding as it reduces
the amount of money they must provide. It must be mentioned the communities
targeted are often some of the poorest. Thus, one could evaluate the cost sharing
that the communities partake in as a transfer from the poorest to the state and the
World Bank.
“Community participation in this context is thus part of a wider strategy to promote savings, target services only towards those who have been
identified as being most desperately needed them, and to shift the burden
of resource provision way from the public sector towards communities, including communities in greatest need themselves” (Mayo and Craig, 1995,
4).
Such cost-sharing is particularly regressive when the project is for basic infrastructure,
something one would hope would be financed by the state and national government
via taxes on richer segments of the population.
My particular division of radical versus project-based approaches to participatory
development is not unique. In fact, several other authors have followed a similar line of
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logic. For example, Tufte and Mefalopulos divide approaches into the social movement
perspective and the project-based1 or institutional perspective. Their definition of
the social movement perspective is similar to my conception of the radical approach.
They write, “Some stakeholders define participation as the mobilization of people to
eliminate unjust hierarchies of knowledge, power, and economic distribution” (Tufte
and Mefalopulos, 2009, 4). They go on to define the project-based or institutional
perspective as “...the reach and inclusion of inputs by relevant groups in the design
and implementation of a development project” (Tufte and Mefalopulos, 2009, 4). The
rest of their working paper goes on to explore the institutional perspective as both a
tool for development agencies in which “participation can be used as a tool to achieve
a pre-established goal defined by someone external to the community involved” (Tufte
and Mefalopulos, 2009, 4).
Mansuri and Rao, who work with the World Bank, divide participatory development between organic participation and induced participation (Mansuri and Rao,
2012). Organic participation covers social movements and other forms of civic action.
“Induced participation ... refers to participation promoted through policy actions of
the state and implemented by bureaucracies (the “state” can include external governments working through bilateral and multilateral agencies, which usually operate with
the consent of the sovereign state)” (Mansuri and Rao, 2012, 32). The authors go on
to explain induced participation requires the intervention of “powerful” institutions
that provide extrinsic motivation. In the case of organic participation, participants
are assumed to be intrinsically motivated (Mansuri and Rao, 2012).
Oakley posited one way (among others) to define participation depends on whether
it is a means or an ends.
1

I borrowed their name project-based above for the lack of a better term (Tufte and Mefalopulos,
2009).
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“Participation as a means implies the use of participation to achieve
some predetermined goal or objective. ... Participation as a means stresses
the results of participation in that achievement of predetermined targets is
more important than the act of participation. ... Participation as an end
is ... a process which unfolds over time and whose purpose is to develop
and strengthen the capabilities of rural people to intervene more directly
in the development process. Such a process may not have predetermined
measurable objectives or even direction. As an end in itself, participation should be a permanent feature of any rural development project, an
intrinsic part which grows and strengthens as the project develops. Participation as an end is an active and dynamic form or participation which
enable rural people to play an increasing role in development activities”
(Oakley, 1991, 7-8).
Oakley explains that participation as a means is based on reaching a predetermined objective, reaching said objective is more important than the participation
itself (Oakley, 1991). Tufte and Mefalopulos show that the pre-established goal is
often defined by people outside the community (Tufte and Mefalopulos, 2009). As
such, this type of participatory development needs the community only in so much
as they agree to take on and work toward the outside objective. Such objectives,
decided on by development agencies and state governments outside of the community
and imposed to some extent on the communities, are less likely to result in collective
action that would challenge power hierarchies.
Parfitt takes on the means ends separation of participatory approaches and looks
at the contradictory nature of participation seen through this lens (Parfitt, 2004). His
shorthand for means-based participation is efficiency, and for ends-based participation
it is empowerment. Parfitt argues that there is an important difference between these
two approaches in terms of power. In means-based participation power relations
between the community/group, development agencies, and governmental agencies
mostly remain the same. The hierarchical nature of the projects will remain with
the design and management in the hands of the development/government agencies,
and the community will participate largely through work. Participation as an ends
is expected to change power relations between the community and the development
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agency, in which the community gains greater power creating greater equality between
the two and thus is empowered. “Whereas participation as a means is politically
neutral insofar as it does not address such power differentials, participation as an end
has an emancipatory, politically radical component in that it seeks to redress unequal
power relations” (Parfitt, 2004, 539). This distinction between means and ends-based
participation is not entirely clear cut, in that means-based participation is not always
neutral, in fact, it can reinforce existing power differentials.
Some authors argue project-based participatory development has co-opted radical
participatory development. For example, Parfitt writes,
“‘Participation’ in development activities has been translated into a
managerial exercise based on ‘toolboxes’ of procedures and techniques. It
has been turned away from its radical roots: we now talk of problemsolving through participation rather than problematization, critical engagement and class ... This limited approach to participation gives rise to
a number of critical tensions or paradoxes. While we emphasize the desirability of empowerment, project approaches remain largely concerned with
efficiency. While we recognize the importance of institutions, we focus attention only on the highly visible, formal, local organizations, overlooking
the numerous communal activities that occur through daily interactions
and socially embedded arrangements. A strong emphasis on the participation of individuals and their potential empowerment is not supported
by convincing analyses of individual positions, of the variability of the
costs and benefits of participation, of the opportunities and constraints
experienced by potential participants” (Parfitt, 2004, 22).
The World Bank approach to participatory development is called communitydriven development(CDD) and community-based development (CBD). The project
I studied was a community-driven development project. This type of project is
characterized by giving community groups and local governments choice of a menu
of possible subprojects, control over planning decisions and investment resources.
Community-based development is similar to community-driven development but with
less community control of project funds and implementation. These are both projectbased approaches. The World Bank would most likely categorize it as induced participation.
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The popularity of the project-based participatory approach has resulted in a
plethora of such projects. As Banerjee and Duflo write,
“The new ideology and a lot of international institutions is that we
should hand the beneficiaries the responsibility for making sure that schools,
clinics, and local roads work well. This is usually done without asking the
poor whether they really want to take on this responsibility. In the face of
the states clear failure to deliver public services to the poor ... the logic of
handing anti-poverty policy back to the poor is superficially irresistible.
The beneficiaries are directly hurt by bad services, and they should therefore care the most; moreover, they have better information, both on what
they want and on what is happening on the ground. Giving them the
power to control the service providers (teachers, doctors, engineers) —
either the ability to hire and fire them or, at least, the power to complain
about them — ensures that those who have the right incentives and the
right information are the ones making the decisions (Banerjee and Duflo,
2011, 247-248).”
They go on to note that operationalizing such an approach is steeped in complexity.
Institutions, culture, and historical context frame the projects and even small changes
in project design can greatly influence outcomes.
The project-based approach to participatory development has encountered obstacles to achieving project goals. One obstacle that emerged early on dealt with the
realization that communities are not homogeneous and are host to conflicting wants
and abilities to influence those wants (Cleaver, 1999, 2001). Beard found in her case
studies in Indonesia it was female-headed households and recent migrants who participated least in a community development initiatives (Beard, 2007). Often these are
some of the more vulnerable groups these projects would hope to help. Beard writes,
“If a household is, for example, outside familial and dominant social networks, its
members may have difficulty in establishing membership in community organizations
and gaining access to the goods and services they deliver” (Beard, 2007).
Another challenge dealt with how to scale-up community-driven development
projects to increase efficiency and reach greater numbers of people. Indeed the CDD
approach touts loads of manuals, reports, and rules, frequently attempting to draw
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lessons as to how CDD can be scaled up (Binswanger-Mkhize et al., 2010; Conforti
and Pica-Ciamarra, 2007). The formalization of a process of empowerment into a
series of similar steps may feel to participants as learning how to jump through hoops
(a top-down approach) rather than meaningful engagement in creating development
(Cleaver, 1999; Mosse, 2001; Parfitt, 2004). Additionally, a project may be successful
in one context, but the same project could be unsuccessful in another context, due
to the historical, cultural, political, and community characteristics.
In addition, the literature has identified the collective action problems of elite
capture, clientelism and free riding as particularly grave problems facing CDD. These
are the topics of the following sections.

2.2

Collective Action

Collective action is defined in terms of a group of people acting in their own
interests. In the Dictionary of Sociology, Marshall defines it as “action taken by a
group (either directly or on its behalf through an organization) in pursuit of members’
perceived shared interests” (Marshall, 1998). Peetz identifies three factors that must
be present for there to be collectivism; collective needs or interest “needs that are
common to a potential group and that, therefore, help define that group”, collectivist
attitudes, and coordinating capacity (Peetz, 2005, 2). Collective action often also has
a political dimension in that it can arise in opposition to perceived injustice or as a
way to deal with power inequities.
The relationship between participatory development and collective action differs
between radical and project-based approaches. A radical approach to participatory
development is an act of collective action originating organically out of the collective
and confronting hierarchies of power. In the project-based approach, the relationship
between participatory development and collective action is less clear. Community-
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driven development recognizes collective action as both an input and an outcome, as
well as being a project goal.
São José Agrário subprojects, like most community-driven development subprojects, rely on collective action from their initial stages of formation onward. The need
for the prior ability to organize collectively is integral to obtaining a CDD subproject in the first place. In fact, to compete successfully for subproject funds, a group
must coalesce around a particular goal, create a governing structure, and gain legal
recognition. Only once this has been accomplished can a group apply for subproject
funding.
CDD also has the desired goal of fostering the “capacity for collective action”
(Mansuri and Rao, 2004). Once a community group is granted a subproject it must
act collectively to implement, operate, and maintain that subproject. As Mansuri and
Rao write: “Individuals have to believe that collective mobilization is worth the effort
and be willing to participate; civic groups have to solve the collective action problem
and exploit political opportunities to effect change; the nexus of accommodation in
government has to be disrupted by the rising cost of ignoring citizens’ interests, so
that politicians and bureaucrats change their actions; and their new actions have to
result in changes in outcomes” (Mansuri and Rao, 2012, 110).
Elite capture and free riding are two common problems of collective action that
are particularly relevant to my case studies. Elite capture is defined broadly as the
control and use of subproject funds by an individual or a group of individuals who are
not defined as the primary target beneficiaries of a subproject (Platteau et al., 2014).
When elite capture occurs the elite subset of subproject beneficiaries that has wrested
control of the subproject may direct them toward their best interests, interests that
may not represent those of the target group as a whole.
Free riding occurs when an individual either under-provides effort or inputs, or
over-consumes resources to the detriment of the group, that would be better off if all
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provided more or consumed less. Successful participation in collective action relies
on the participants having the needed skills, receiving an adequate payoff, and the
institutions to limit free riding to manageable levels (Brett, 2003).

2.3

The Problem of Elite Capture

Elite capture is a pervasive criticism of participatory development and decentralization. Elite capture can be defined broadly as the control and use of project funds
by an individual or a group of individuals who were not the primary target of the
project (Platteau et al., 2014). When this occurs, those controlling the funds may
direct them toward projects in their best interest, which may not represent the best
interests of the targeted group. Mansuri and Rao who have conducted exhaustive
literature reviews into the realm of CDD write,“The studies that have looked at who
participates in CDD projects have found that on average participants are wealthier,
better educated, more politically connected, and from higher status ethnic and tribal
groups” (Mansuri and Rao, 2012, 128). Elite capture can be understood as a problem
of collective action, in which the intended actions of the collective are captured by
an elite. Community-driven development depends on the fruits of collective action
reaching the targeted.
The elite can be defined along many parameters, such as income, education, power,
gender, religion, and caste, among others (Dasgupta and Beard, 2007; Platteau et al.,
2014; Rigon, 2014). Sources of elite power depend on the cultural context and the
local conditions in which the project is embedded. In addition, since the elite is
defined in comparison with the targeted beneficiaries, the definition of the former
is dependent on the characteristics and constitution of the latter. The variety of
factors possible for defining the elite presents an empirical challenge for those who
wish to measure elite capture, both in choosing which factors are most important in
identifying the elite, as well as in choosing what proxies could be used for elite status
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(Fritzen, 2007). In the simplest interpretation, the elite are most often defined as
those with the most money (Araujo et al., 2008).
One critique of community-driven development centers around the naive and
overly simplistic view of the community (Cleaver, 2001; Mosse, 2001). At its simplest,
community was conceptualized as a “unified organic whole” (World Bank Operations
Evaluation Department, 2005, 177), wherein members share aligned priorities and
“latent and unlimited capacities” (Cleaver, 1999, 604) which only require access to
funds and the proper set of institutions to achieve full potential for development
(Dill, 2009). The WB, while acknowledging the problem of making such an assumption of community, still posits that community members will act in solidarity and will
have the same goals (World Bank Operations Evaluation Department, 2005; Platteau
et al., 2014; Cleaver, 2001). Such an assumption allows for elite actors to manipulate
the CDD process. Elites are able to take on the role of representatives of a unified
community, giving them the ability to influence the process (even if they were not
part of the targeted group). This simplification of a community hides both power
differences and internal fractions.
The model of community-based and -driven development, used by the World Bank,
relies on access to information and a range of skills the poorest may not possess.
First, the community must become aware of the project. Second, a collection of
individuals must become legally recognized as a group - called an association. Third,
the association must apply for a project, by submitting a project proposal. In order to
accomplish these steps, the community requires a medley of resources. For example,
the greater the individuals’ and community’s connections the better their chance to
learn of projects. Individuals must be able to organize, access, and pay for legal
services in order to become an association. The projects also require literacy in the
application process and, increasingly, computer literacy, as these processes go online.
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Lastly, the projects require political know-how in order to navigate local and state
government bureaucracies.
This host of needed knowledge and skills lends itself to co-option by those with
more power, and sometimes precludes projects reaching those most in need. One of
the main criticisms that the World Bank acknowledges of the CDD model is that
it often fails to reach the poorest (World Bank Operations Evaluation Department,
2005). The WB frames this as a problem of targeting, but it may also be that the
poorest do not have the minimum resources necessary to access such programs. Even
in those communities that do access CDD projects, there seems to be a mismatch
between community development methods/project setup and community capabilities.
Some of these problems are reviewed in the World Bank CDD review,
“Even in Brazil, a middle-income country that has had a CDD program for decade, while over two-thirds of the municipal government officials interviewed in the state of Rio Grande do Norte said that most
communities are capable of identifying and prioritizing their needs, the
majority stated that most communities are not capable of preparing development plans, implementing and maintaining community projects, or
mobilizing resources either within or from outside the community. Half of
the municipal government officials interviewed also said that most communities are not capable of managing financial resources” (World Bank
Operations Evaluation Department, 2005, 14).
The MST and labor unions assist the settlers in identifying possible projects. The
MST was integral in bringing funds from São José Agrário into the settlements, as well
as assisting the settlers in developing their projects, and maneuvering and pressuring
state agencies for the timely release of funds.
Studies that have found significant evidence of elite capture have also attempted to
analyze under what circumstances this occurs (Fritzen, 2007; Platteau, 2004; Platteau
and Gaspart, 2003). There is a body of evidence suggesting a community’s ability to
minimize elite capture and thereby to maximize the effectiveness of collective action is
facilitated by group homogeneity, either ethnic, social, or economic (Okten and Osili,
2004; Alesina et al., 1999; Araujo et al., 2008). An extremely simplified example of
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this is that as people tend to be more similar in their circumstances they may also be
more similar in their preferences. If they are similar in their preferences, it is easier
to come to a consensus around the type of project they may wish to support.
Mansuri and Rao have found that elite dominance in CDD projects depends on
wealth and power inequalities, as well as ethnic heterogeneity and geographic isolation
(Mansuri and Rao, 2012, 146). The authors further identified characteristics of elite
capture which made the targeted groups worse off. Communities can be heterogeneous and unequal, not only in income but also in power, which is often understated
(Mohan and Stokke, 2000). Fritzen found that while there was wide variation in
project implementation and quality, those communities in which project boards were
chosen in a more democratic manner, and in which there was significant investment
in capacity building, there was less elite capture (Fritzen, 2007). Platteau describes a
case study where attempting to discipline elite capture was impossible due to patronclient relationships, in which it was overly costly for the poorer members to discipline
the elite (Platteau and Gaspart, 2003). In another paper, Platteau shows that releasing money in tranches also fails to eliminate elite capture, and he calls for greater
monitoring of fraud (Platteau and Gaspart, 2003). This implies that elite capture
may indeed be under-measured in CDD projects.
When collective action is an act of the majority of the community or of the targeted beneficiaries the likelihood of elite capture is diminished. Collective action
reinforces a more even distribution of power within a community preventing elite
capture (Das Gupta et al., 2004; Chebil and Haque, 2003). A group which has built
strong ‘social capital’ can also use this power to limit elite capture (Manssouri and
Sparacino, 2009). While much of the econometric evidence has found social fractionalization does indeed limit collective action, there is some qualitative evidence that
points to the reverse (Dasgupta and Beard, 2007). As such, the inverse relationship
between community homogeneity and elite capture has been questioned, and indeed,
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it has been posited that the relationship is more complex. While community and
economic homogeneity are helpful, they are not the only way in which to limit elite
capture.

2.3.1

Clientelism and the Role of Civil Society Organizations

Clientelism is a relationship based on either bribery or reciprocity between a person, group or community, and a political actor. The same aspects which make CDD
projects vulnerable to elite capture also make them susceptible to clientelism. Most
often clientelism has been criticized because it co-opts the supposed desires of the poor
by trading bribes or the promise of future goods and services for votes, participation
in rallies, or other events. The community is often assumed to be receiving something
of unequal and lesser value in return for selling their voice. In such cases, decentralization and participation can reinforce unequal power relations rather than increase
democracy. In the WB projects I will review, this would most likely occur through
the community association, in which the leaders of the community association have
some relation to local politicians.
Benit-Gbaffou argues that the relationship is more complex: clientelism, participation, and democracy are intertwined and cannot be separated into good democratic
relationships, and bad clientelistic relationships (Benit-Gbaffou, 2011). Furthermore,
the rural poor receive very little in the average political process and, in fact, the
patron-client relationship has been one of the few ways the poor are heard.
Northeastern Brazil has historically depended on patron-client relationships, which
has been reproduced to some extent in the WB local land development projects
(Pereira, 2004, 28). According to a study by the WB in Northeastern Brazil (including Ceará) of Rural Poverty Alleviation Projects community leaders had more
contacts with influential people an average of 76% of the time (Binswanger et al.,
2009). The MST and FETRAECE, by consciously creating democratic institutions,

39

work to combat these inequalities. These entities work in two arenas. One is demanding land for landless workers and the creation of settlements, with a goal of extensive
agrarian reform. The other is demanding the provision of healthcare, education, and
technical assistance.
Activism by the settlements and the MST won them the projects and in many
occasions assisted the settlements throughout the project process. Historically the
Agricultural Workers’ Union had also been politically active in terms of land reform. At the time of my fieldwork, they had moved away from this line and were
concentrated on assisting the settlers and all agricultural workers’ in gaining access
to government services, such as retirement, health care, drought assistance, water
storage, etc.
Authors’ writings indicate that an investigation into the role of accompaniment
by social movements and labor unions is worthwhile in the analysis of CDD project
outcomes and in confronting clientelism. In a meta-case study Das Gupta, Grandvoinnet, and Romani found that an important component of successful CDD projects was
demand from communities for services that should be available to them so that they
would pressure the staff of their local agencies to provide them (Das Gupta et al.,
2004). Social movements and labor unions can also provide advocacy, accompaniment, training, and even technical assistance. CDD projects often fail to reach and
maintain projects with the poorest groups (Classen et al., 2008). Social movements
and labor unions can assist the project managers in reaching these communities. It
has been posited that external agencies play a critical role in helping communities to
access information, resources, and organizational experience (Baird et al., 2011; Brett,
2003). Ability to access information can be improved by having social movements
and labor unions capacitated to advocate for the community.
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2.4

The Free Rider Problem

The free rider problem can be traced back at least as far as David Hume (McMillan,
1979). In a Treatise on Human Nature Hume wrote:
Two neighbours may agree to drain a meadow, which they possess in
common; because ’tis easy for them to know each other’s mind; and each
must perceive, that the immediate consequence of his failing in his part,
is, the abandoning the whole project. But ’tis very difficult, and indeed
impossible, that a thousand persons shou’d agree in any such action, it
being difficult for them to concert so complicated a design, and still more
difficult for them to execute it; while each seeks a pretext to free himself
of the trouble and expence, and wou’d lay the whole burden on others”
(Hume, 2005, 345).
Samuelson formalized the theory of public goods2 in the 1950s and pointed out the
free rider problem which emerges when attempting to provide public goods at the
optimal level (Samuelson, 1954).
Mancur Olson deepened the analysis of the free rider problem in collective action
in the 1960s leading to greater scrutiny of collective action (Olson, 1965). Olson
theorized that in a situation in which there was no outside coercion rational selfinterested individuals would fail to provide the sufficient inputs to achieve the optimal
outcome in a group setting, even if they all would have been better off (Olson, 1965).
Public goods in particular fall prey to this problem, such as limiting pollution. As a
total, everyone would be better off if pollution was limited but individuals or firms
trying to maximize their well-being may over-pollute to reduce costs or effort. Olson
went on to theorize that smaller groups may be more able to overcome this problem,
but their provision of inputs toward the optimal outcome will still fall short (Olson,
1965).3

2

Although he originally called them collective consumption goods.

3

Interestingly Olson posited this theory, in which it would be almost impossible to sustain collective action due to the model of human behavior, during the 1960s — a period of intense, widespread,
and successful collective action (Edelman, 2001). Even more interesting, this theory resonated to
such an extent within the economics profession that it eclipsed other challenges to collective action
and came to be understood as the primary challenge facing successful collective action.
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In 1968, Garrett Hardin adapted the free rider problem to that of open access
common pool resources (Hardin, 1968).4 Common pool resources are those belonging
to a group in which it is difficult to exclude group members from use and the resources
are subtractable (rivalrous) (Cox et al., 2014). As such use by one group member
diminishes that available to other potential users. For Hardin, the problem was not
that people would not contribute sufficiently, thereby free riding on the inputs of
others, but rather that people would over-consume the natural resource leading to
its degradation. Garrett Hardin used commonly held grazing land as an example: It
would be in the best interest of the group to manage the grazing land sustainably so
it would be available for long-term use (Hardin, 1968). Yet individuals will overgraze
the common land as they get the total benefit to their animals but only share in a
portion of the costs (the degradation of land limiting future grass production). Garrett Hardin named this the “Tragedy of the Commons” (Hardin, 1968). Solving this
problem requires the intervention of a coercive (mutually agreed upon by the majority) administrative system or the privatization of common pool resources (Hardin,
1968).
In the 1980s, Russell Hardin expanded on Olson’s free rider problem (Hardin,
1971). He conceptualized it as a prisoner’s dilemma, in which again the optimal
outcome would not be achieved, even though it would be best for the collective. He
formally showed in a two person game how the individual maximizing his or her wellbeing would be better off by not contributing when the other (being the collective)
contributed. Thus, all self-interested rational individuals would fail to contribute
leading to the Pareto inferior position. The prisoner’s dilemma model has also been
used to model the tragedy of the commons in which the players make a decision either
to restrain (or not) their consumption of a common resource.

4

In fact, he uses the example of pollution as the “reverse” of the “tragedy of the commons”
(Hardin, 1968, 1245).
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These theories assume the free rider problem cannot be solved by individuals.
Coase made the argument that in the context of complete property rights, problems
of overuse of resources could be solved (Coase, 1960). If there are just two parties
each with complete rights over their property than the one which stands the most
to lose can come to an agreement with the other, for example by paying the other
not to produce, in which the party still receives a profit greater than no production
or limited production and the other receives a payment equal to the party’s lost
production (Coase, 1960). North came to a similar conclusion, advocating for state
institutional oversight or privatization as a way to correct problems of free riding and
the tragedy of the commons (North, 1990).
Elinor Ostrom challenged the critiques of the viability of collective group action
in the absence of state intervention and private property rights. In particular, she
rejected the idea that the only solutions to free riding and overuse of resources were
either privatization of the resource or strong government regulation. Instead, Ostrom
argues persuasively using extensive case studies to show that solutions via collective
action have been achieved at the local level to successfully manage the commons
(Ostrom, 1990). Ostrom builds a theory of successful collective action in relation to
the commons which proposes that solutions to collective action problems are context specific to the institutions, rules, and norms of the community (Ostrom, 1990).
While the particular rules of the cases Ostrom studied vary greatly, she identifies a
set of “design principles” or categories within which the rules of successful groups
fall (Ostrom, 1990). In addition she identified a set of characteristics that predict
a communities ability to create and enforce rules which pertain to her previously
established design principles (Ostrom, 1990).
Solving the free rider problem generally requires creating successful governance
institutions which create what Ostrom calls a “secondary” free rider problems. That is
the governance institutions created to manage the original collective action problems
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become a common good that is also subject to free riding, which then must also be
solved.
Apart from the problems of collective action already mentioned, theorists have
identified some others specific to small group collective action. These problems include group size, group heterogeneity, differential power relationships, the problem of
supplying necessary institutions, appropriation, and provision (Beard, 2007; Ostrom,
1990, 2000). Solutions to both the problems of free riding and those just mentioned
revolve around the ability to create local rules and norms that allow for monitoring
and punishment (Baland and Platteau, 1996; Ostrom, 1990). These theories have
been very influential in the field of participatory development and have been used as
a basis around which to formulate participatory development projects as they give
the tools for overcoming problems of trust and misconduct through the use of social
institutions (Cleaver, 1999).
Olson theorized free riding would be a greater problem in larger groups as no
individual would be able to significantly influence the outcome (for example voting
in a national election). He acknowledges that smaller groups may be more able to
overcome this problem, but their provision of inputs toward the optimal outcome will
still fall short (Olson, 1965). Kyriacou argues that large groups face greater challenges
to collective action because it is easier to be immoral (Kyriacou, 2011). First, because
the cost of doing so is less due to their relatively more anonymous position within a
large group, which loosens the constraints of group moral or ethical norms (Kyriacou,
2011). Second, the relative impact one individual has on the group outcome in large
groups allows members to assign lesser importance to participation (Kyriacou, 2011).
Third, large groups also make reciprocity between members less effective (Kyriacou,
2011).
The literature on common pool resource management and community development has found case study evidence to support the theory that large groups will
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have more problems with free riding (Baland and Platteau, 1996; Prokopy, 2009). In
Prokopy’s study of two World Bank assisted projects located in India in which 1,523
households from across 45 villagers were surveyed it was found that participants in
larger villages were less likely to contribute to capital costs and, in one of the projects,
less likely to participate in meetings (Prokopy, 2009).5
Certainly, some large groups have been able to overcome the free rider problem.
For example, there exist large associations, such as the American Association for Retired People (AARP) and World Wildlife Fund (WWF), which lobby successfully for
their members (Barbieri and Mattozzi, 2009). Members pay dues, but non-members
also reap the rewards of their work. Yet, these associations do not fall apart. Why?
Benefits of lobbying are non-excludable thus the group has to provide incentives to its
members who are excludable to non-members - such as advocacy work, information,
or hold some inherent value (belonging — social action) or reputation (Barbieri and
Mattozzi, 2009). Other research has found in the case of lobbies, those which are
smaller and more geographically concentrated do better (The International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development, The World Bank, 2007).
Poteete and Ostrom argue that the inconsistent findings regarding group size and
the extent of free riding may represent specific group characteristics and institutions,
which either compensate for or aggravate particular group weaknesses (Poteete and
Ostrom, 2004). For example, large groups may face greater enforcement costs, but
they also have access to more resources (Poteete and Ostrom, 2004).
Another factor that is expected to make collective action more difficult is group
heterogeneity, either social, economic, or ethnic. Mancur Olson was primarily concerned with the exploitation of “the great by the small”, by which he meant those
5

Like the World Bank projects in my study the participating villages were required to provide
ten percent of the cost of the subproject. Unlike my the projects in my study these two projects
were dedicated solely to improving rural water supplies and sanitation (Prokopy, 2009).
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with lesser interest would free ride on those with greater interest in the collective action (Olson, 1965). Others argue that group homogeneity makes for more predictable
interactions leading to greater trust among participants promoting collective action
(Poteete and Ostrom, 2004). Some have argued that when great interest coincides
with wealth, free riding by the poor on those with more resources would not be a negative problem for collective action, particularly in the case of the provision of public
goods (Mansuri and Rao, 2004). While group heterogeneity can challenge collective
action, group institutions can be developed which can compensate for this challenge
up to a point (Poteete and Ostrom, 2004).6
Other challenges to the idea that collective action will fail due to free riding and
the tragedy of the commons have to do with the fact that collective action is often a repeated game. Game theory has shown that in infinitely repeated Prisoner’s
Dilemma games, in which the participants have perfect information instead of cheating, people cooperate (Platteau and Abraham, 2002). Common sense confirms this
logic. In a small community, people generally have good information regarding the
actions of others; community members interact repeatedly, and reputation and the
ability to sanction members matter greatly. For example in one village in rural Karnataka, India in which festivals took on the characteristic of a public good, members
contributed generously (about 15 percent of their annual income) and as such the
festivals were much larger than what would be predicted by traditional theory (Rao,
2002). It turned out that those who contributed more toward the festival not only
gained by enjoying the festival but they also received benefits in terms of lower food
prices, invitations to eat at other community member’s homes and an elevated social
status.
6

Group heterogeneity also comes up as an aggravating problem in elite capture.
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Sen provides another challenge to the idea that group members will most likely
default to free riding due to an attempt to maximize their gain (Sen, 1977). In fact,
people may hold other values along with that of maximizing their personal gain (and
with respect to public goods, some might find that maximizing their personal gain
and acting upon their other values go hand in hand). These other values Sen calls
commitments (Sen, 1977). The idea of commitments, or in economic terms, some
degree of altruism is not present in the new institutionalist conception of collective
action.
Free riding can be theorized in terms of consumption or production activities (Olson and Cook, 2006). In the example of public goods or of common pool resources,
the free rider problem is understood as a consumption activity. Here members will
overuse the good or resource to maximize their personal gain and is framed in terms of
excludability of the good or resource. On the other hand, in collective work in cooperatives or in livelihood projects, the free rider problem is one of productive activity.
In this case, the problem presents itself in terms of shirking, due to the difficulty of
monitoring effort and measuring the marginal contribution of each individual (Olson
and Cook, 2006).
In terms of productive goods, the excludability of production varies by the institutions of the group. In groups with fewer formalized institutions the ability to monitor
marginal effort/contribution may be reduced to either classifying the member as a
participator or as a non-participator. The participator is recognized by the group as
such and by themselves. They may shirk or even fail to show up for the collective
work to varying degrees. The production is then divided among the participators
regardless of the total effort they contributed to the production.
Free riding in CDD subprojects can be observed in both consumption and production activities. In the example of public goods or of common pool resources, the
free rider problem is understood as a consumption activity. In this case, members
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overuse a good or resource in order to maximize personal gain and is framed in terms
of excludability of the good or resource.
Interestingly in the literature on CDD, free riding as an issue to be overcome
is rarely broached unless we turn to common pool resource management, in which
it plays a central role. This can be understood because free riding is thought of
as a problem of the excludability of a good. Common pool resources function as a
public good and, while rivalrous, they are almost purely non-excludable and thus the
problem of free-riding is obvious. Yet, in CDD activities, which require extensive
collective action, both free riding and community institutions to address free riding
should plausibly exist. This dissertation documents such existence.
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CHAPTER 3
ELITE CAPTURE: SOURCES OF POWER

3.1

Introduction

Elite capture is a pervasive problem confronting CDD projects (Mansuri and Rao,
2012). Elite capture occurs when project funds are controlled by an elite, often not
reaching those for whom they are intended. Elites can be defined along a variety of
lines including income, power, and education.
Agrarian culture in Brazil has and continues to depend on extensive land and
power inequalities between large landowners, small-holders, and landless workers leading to a history of patron-client relationships in rural areas. Interviews and technical
documents provide evidence that the SJII subprojects were influenced by local-level
politicians. As the SJA subprojects follow similar rules and processes, it raises the
question of whether clientelism or other sources of power also resulted in elite capture. In the context of the SJA subprojects, clientelism can occur when politicians
trade projects for votes — sometimes resulting in non-targeted communities receiving
projects.
Was elite capture a problem for the subprojects in my case studies? My hypotheses
were the following:
1. Elite capture would not occur via clientelism, in which politicians assisted nontargetted communities in receiving subprojects, due to the involvement of the
MST in the process of choosing the communities.
2. An elite would not exist in the communities based on income, or power stemming from education, background or leadership position because these were
49

agrarian settlements. As there was little inequality, such elite capture within
the communities would not occur.
In order to test these hypotheses, I first identify if the communities that were
the official targets of the program were the ones that received the projects. I then
evaluate other potential sources of elite capture: power differences stemming from
inequalities in income, education, background, or access to leadership positions. To
answer these questions, I implemented a census survey in six of the settlements. The
survey measured income, assets, and collected information on education, leadership
opportunities, and the backgrounds of the settlers.
I found that the targeted communities did receive the subprojects. In addition,
clientelism was mitigated by the settlers and the MST. Almost all settlers come from
an agricultural background, and the majority are from the same municipalities as
the settlements, and almost all are from the state of Ceará. Furthermore, most
settlers have the opportunity to participate in leadership positions. However, I did
find moderate income and asset inequality, and generational differences in education
within the communities.
Even given moderate income and education inequality, I found no evidence of elite
capture in my case studies. Most settlers had participated in the subproject meetings,
the creation of the subproject, and work on the subproject. The majority of those
who had decided not be part of the subproject did so because of time constraints
or entering the settlement after the subproject was implemented. The majority of
the settlers affirmed that the subproject was good for the community and made no
comments indicating elite capture.
This chapter is organized as follows. The background section gives a theoretical
overview of elite capture and the typology I use. The third section examines the
existence of elite capture via clientelism. The fourth section evaluates the existence of
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inequality of income, education, and background. The fifth section evaluates whether
elite capture may have occurred. The sixth section concludes.

3.2

Inter-community Elite Capture and Intra-community Elite
Capture

Elite capture can occur between communities or within a community. I refer
to these as inter-community elite capture and intra-community elite capture. Intercommunity elite capture occurs between communities when funds are diverted from
a targeted community to a non-targeted community because of interference by an
elite.1 Inter-community elite capture can often be a result of clientelism. Elite capture
would be apparent if non-targeted communities received projects. Intra-community
elite capture occurs when members of the community, generally an elite, take funds
or the results of the subproject disproportionately from others within the community,
particularly from the targeted. Elite capture would be apparent if a subgroup of the
community were to appropriate the benefits of the subproject based on their relatively
greater income, education, or power. In the SJII project, communities were targeted
on the basis of poverty, rural livelihoods, and access to land to implement an infrastructure or productive subproject. SJA further restricted targeting to only agrarian
settlements. In the SJA project, all settlement members were equally targeted.
CDD projects emphasize a devolution of power from central government to the
local government (in my case studies this was from the central to the state government). Optimally, decentralization creates local spaces that are more responsive to
local constituencies’ demands. Yet, it can also foment local level clientelism. Characteristics of clientelism include inequality between the patron and client (which allows

1

Of course, there are many reasons why funds may be diverted to a non-targeted community.
These include being located closer to the funder, being off roads that are more accessible, and being
a community that is already networked into a funding agency (Chambers, 1983).
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for threats of coercion), reciprocal exchange, and a personal relationship (Mainwaring,
1999). Brazil has a long history of deeply entwined practices of clientelism (Mainwaring, 1999). As such CDD projects in Brazil are particularly susceptible to clientelism.
While inter-community elite capture could occur for a number of reasons, in the
context of Brazil, a very likely source is clientelism.2
The ability to influence one’s support based on subproject provision allows politicians to exchange subprojects for votes. Manacorda et al. studying a Uruguayan
randomly targeted social transfer program (Plan de Atención Nacional a la Emergencia Social, PANES), found that those who received the transfer were more likely to
support the incumbent party at the national level by 11 to 13% (Manacorda et al.,
2011). Schady studies the Peruvian Social Fund, FONCODES (Fondo de Cooperación para el Desarrollo Social), and finds that FONCODES expenditures went up
before national elections and were directed toward provinces where it was expected
to have the most impact on the elections, although it did go to the poorest districts
(Schady, 2000). Several studies have also found a similar effect at the local level leading to the predictable conclusion that decentralization emphasizes the importance of
local elections (de Janvry et al., 2009; Chamussy, 2001). For example, de Janvry et
al. found that greater decentralization of a social investment fund (which became a
CDD project) in Zambia led to greater participation in voting, where the majority
candidates who received more votes were able to bring more projects to their wards,
and the incumbent party councilor from those wards that received more projects also
received more votes (de Janvry et al., 2009). This decentralization had the positive
result in that it was pro-poor at both the national and the local level, although it had
a greater impact at the local level (de Janvry et al., 2009).

2

Of course, clientelism is not restricted to inter-community elite capture and can also occur within
communities (intra-community), but in my case studies the settlements are small enough and equal
enough that there is no one within the settlements with sufficient power to be considered a patron.
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Clientelism becomes problematic when the exchange of subprojects for votes results in the non-targeted receiving subprojects, which can contribute to both greater
inequality and greater inefficiency as resources are used for the short-term goal of
(re)election (Mansuri and Rao, 2012; Camacho and Conover, 2011). Camacho et al.
found a targeting instrument, the Census of the Poor, used by a variety of Colombian social welfare programs was being manipulated around local mayoral elections
(2011). At the outset, local politicians surveyed more people around election time
than other times as many people thought that being surveyed qualified them to receive the program. As time went on people discovered this was not the case. The
algorithm for how people were chosen was released and, as a result, Camacho et al.
identified an increase in false entries at the threshold aimed at including more people
in the program. This occurred more often when there were close elections. The authors estimate that three million people (of a country of 40 million), or 33 percent of
the beneficiaries, had their scores changed. This has significant consequences for the
poorest portion of the population who may have been displaced from the program
(Camacho and Conover, 2011).
Additionally, clientelism can be seen post-election when programs or services are
awarded to those who most support the political candidates. For example, Finan
studying clientelism in Brazil, created a database of both political and municipal
variables spanning the years 1996 to 2000. He finds that those municipalities that
were supportive of an elected deputy (for example, had a 10 percent increase in vote
shares) were (44 percent) more likely to receive public works (Finan, 2004).3 These
examples intertwine clientelism, elite capture, and corruption.
Intra-community elite capture has also been well documented in the CDD literature. Yet, the literature is not conclusive on whether intra-community elite capture is
3

Deputies can request amended budgets in their municipality for public works (Finan, 2004).
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entirely negative. While some studies have found that it makes those targeted by the
project worse off, other studies have found the effects to be neutral or even positive.
One of the main factors that creates the space for elite capture to occur is the level
of intra-community inequality. Communities can be heterogeneous and unequal, not
only in income but also in power, which is often understated (Mohan and Stokke,
2000). In addition to intra-community inequality, the design of CDD projects also
makes them vulnerable to elite capture, as it relies on access to information and a
range of skills the poorest may not possess (Dill, 2009). This host of needed knowledge and skills lends itself to co-option by those with more power, and sometimes
precludes projects reaching those most in need.
A study of community-based participation in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania found
that the structure of decentralized participatory development projects had further
marginalized the poor (Dill, 2009, 17). Dill contends that these projects dis-empower
the poor rather than empower them by legitimizing locally exclusive or captured
organizations and presenting them as serving the poor (Dill, 2009, 17). Rigon presents
a case study of a slum upgrading project in Nairobi, in which the elite was able to
dominate the process in a way that excluded the poor from many of the benefits
(Rigon, 2014). In a meta-case study of more than six African countries, Crook finds
that local elites often control decentralization funds and do not direct these funds in
the interests of the poor (Crook, 2003).
Platteau and Gaspart conducted an interesting case study in West Africa where an
NGO was working with a local community association funding investments through
the association (Platteau and Gaspart, 2003). They saw there was a redirection of
resources toward the leader of the association, including through falsifying accounts.
When the leader was brought before the community, they did not punish him and
re-elected him in opposition to the NGO’s demands. According to the authors, the
community accepted such corruption on the basis that they were better off than if

54

they had never received the funds and that they would not have received the funds
without the leader (Platteau and Gaspart, 2003).4
The qualifiers preceding and following the term, elite capture, reflect the difficulty
in categorizing elite capture as entirely negative. Mansuri and Rao write of pernicious
elite capture and benevolent elite capture reflecting the fact that elite capture does
not always have a bad outcome (Mansuri and Rao, 2004). Dasgupta and Beard divide
elite capture into elite control of funds versus elite capture of funds (Dasgupta and
Beard, 2007). In elite control of funds, the funds benefit the targeted group. In the
elite capture of funds, the funds do little to benefit the targeted group. Fritzen also
adopts this division after finding that elite capture does not necessarily have negative
effects (Fritzen, 2007, 21).
Studies showing beneficial elite capture have found that, although the process of
community development was heavily infiltrated by elites, the results were approved
of by the community at large (Mansuri and Rao, 2004; Dasgupta and Beard, 2007).
For example, in a case study of the Jamaican Social Fund it was found that, although
there was evidence of elite capture by educated connected groups for projects that
had not been ranked as a priority by the majority of the community, after the fact
80% of the people were satisfied with the project and wouldn’t change the project
(Rao and Ibanez, 2005, 33). Interestingly, it seems in some cases either what is good
for the elite is good for the community, or in some cases the elite are community
leaders and prioritize the needs of the community.
Dasgupta and Beard divided collective action into two types: collective action
which is good at creating and delivering public goods and services, and collective
action which challenges elite power (Dasgupta and Beard, 2007). Their first type
of collective action depends on community homogeneity, small size, and stability,
4

This is an example of intracommunity clientelism leading to elite capture.
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which allows the community to work more easily together and come to a consensus.
Dasgupta and Beard find that these characteristics facilitate elite capture and increase
the community’s difficulty in escaping elite capture. The second type of collective
action relies on the dispersion of power, a diverse community, as well as active social
and political processes. In Dasgupta and Beard’s analysis, this type of collective
action can challenge and redefine power relationships, as well as create structural
change and make elite capture harder. A group which has built strong ‘social capital’
can also use this power to limit elite capture (Manssouri and Sparacino, 2009).

3.3

Intercommunity Elite Capture

Clientelism is the main avenue through which inter-community elite capture would
occur in the Brazilian context. Interviews at the state level with representatives of
the SDA, MST, and FETRAECE revealed that the wider SJII project had encountered considerable difficulties with clientelism, but it was less of a problem in the
SJA project. In fact, the newest incarnation of the São José project, SJIII, has
been redesigned in an attempt to eliminate the problem of clientelism. SJII required
that communities submit a written pre-proposal in order to apply for a subproject.
According to one interview, clientelism occurred in the following way: Often the communities, in which only the youngest generations were literate, had difficulty writing
the pre-proposal; they frequently also lacked access to a computer necessary to prepare the subproject proposal; politicians would then offer to help communities develop
the subprojects in exchange for votes (FETRAECE Representative B, 2013).
At the settlement level in the SJA project clientelism was less of a problem.
In part, clientelism was mitigated by the accompaniment of the Landless Workers
Movement and by the settlers themselves. First, the settlements that received the
subprojects were those who had members who had participated in demonstrations to
receive SJII funds. In some cases upon the release of the SJA subprojects, politicians
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would show up and attempt to take credit for the subprojects. The settlers, with
the backing of the Landless Workers Movement, refused to accept that the politicians
deserved credit (and votes) for these subprojects. One Landless Workers Movement
representative described it this way.
In order for you to note the magnitude of the
norm [clientelism], how deep-seated it is, many
politicians and municipal administrations went
to the radios to say that the [sub]projects that
had arrived in the municipalities, the São José
[Sub]Projects, had been an achievement of the
politicians, of their policies. But the people respond[ed]. We had rallies in the inauguration
of the [sub]projects to raise awareness that they
had been the workers’ achievement. [We raised
awareness] that the struggle [for the subprojects]
was worth it, that we struggled and that you
could see the result. On those occasions, the
workers would say:“Look, this work here, this
project here is the result of the organization of
the worker. The only power here is the power
of the struggle. Nobody did this for us” (Landless Workers Movement Representative A, 2013,
Author’s Translation).

... Para ver como o costume é tão grande,
estava arraigado,chegou muitos polı́ticos, alguns
municı́pios irem para as rádios dizerem que os
[sub]projetos chegados nos municı́pios, o Projeto
São José, teria sido conquista dos polı́ticos, de algumas das polı́ticas. Mas, enfim, o povo responde
a isso. Então, na inauguração dos [sub]projetos,
porque a gente fazia ato polı́tico para garantir a
conquista dos trabalhadores, fazer essa divulgação.
Que a luta vale a pena, a gente luta e vê o resultado. Enfim, e aı́ os trabalhadores, nos momentos, diziam “ó, esse trabalho aqui, esse [sub]projeto
aqui é a força dos trabalhadores organizados. A
única força que teve aqui foi a força da luta. Não
teve ninguém para fazer isso” (Landless Workers
Movement Representative A, 2013).

An interview with a representative of the FETRAECE also mentioned another
factor, which prevented clientelism in the SJA project. He stated that the settlements
are difficult to penetrate for the politicians, he described them as “more closed off,
more independent” (FETRAECE Representative A, 2013). In each settlement, I
asked the settlers if they had a relationship with local level politicians or the state
level politicians. Invariably they said no. When asked if politicians came to visit the
settlement several mentioned that they might come right before elections, and then
they would not see them again until the next election four years later. One settlement
member told me the following parable, which he said illustrated the relationship
between the settlers and the politicians.
Once there was a senator campaigning in the
interior. He was struggling with his popularity,
so he said “For me to get [re]elected, I need to
campaign everywhere”. He arrived at a woman’s
home in the middle of nowhere. He introduced
himself, and while talking with the woman, noticed he was hungry. So he asked her if there was

Que uma vez andava um senador no interior atrás de voto, porque ele se achou assim já
um tanto é quanto caı́do. Ele disse, “Agora para
eu me eleger vou andar por todo canto”. Aı́ foi
chegou numa casa de uma moradora no meio da
mata. Aı́ conversando com ela, se identificou, aı́
já vinha com necessidade de fome, já. Aı́ foi per-
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anything to eat. She said, “No, we have already
eaten lunch”. [The senator asked] “Don’t you
have anything? You must have some eggs, right?
At least cook [some eggs] for us to eat because
we are hungry.” She said,“We have eggs.” [He responded] “Then put a half dozen on the fire.”
So she cooked some eggs over the fire, and when
it was time for the senator to pay he asked how
much they were. She charged him quite a bit for
the eggs. The senator found it expensive. So he
said, “Ma’am, tell me, is it very difficult to produce eggs here? Why is it so expensive?” And she
responded, “No, what is difficult is to get a senator to come around.” [The interviewee explaining]
This is true. When the locals are in need, “it is
difficult to get a senator to come around” (Settlement 7, Member 1 , 2013, Author’s Translation).

guntou se ela não tinha alguma coisa para comer.
Ela disse, “Não, a gente já almoçou”. [O senador
pergentou,] “E tem alguma coisa, “mas não tem
uns ovos, não? Pelo menos cozinha por aı́ para
a gente comer que a gente está com fome.” Ela
disse, “tem”. Aı́ “pois bote aı́ uma meia dúzia
no fogo aı́”. Aı́ ela botou uns ovos lá no fogo,
aı́ quando foi cobrar ele perguntou quanto era.
Ela cobrou lá e cobrou uma quantia boa pelos
ovos. Aı́ foi, aı́ ele ficou assim achando que estava caro. O senador, aı́ disse assim “dona uai
diz, é muito difı́cil o ovo aqui? Porque está caro
desse jeito”. Aı́ disse, “não, difı́cil é um senador
aparecer”. Porque é que nem ela aı́ quando eles
estão precisando, “é difı́cil é um senador aparecer
por aqui” (Settlement 7, Member 1 , 2013).

This story illustrates the difficulty the rural agricultural poor in Ceará have in
accessing politicians and highlights their lack of a personal relationship with them. It
also indicates a certain frustration with trying to rally politicians attention for basic
public services, such as decent roads, schools, water storage facilities, and education.
Instead, the politicians rarely appear except before elections. When the participants
came together under the banner of the Landless Workers Movement and won state
investment in their settlements, the discontent expressed when the politicians attempted to take credit for this is easily understood. The participants in the SJA
project challenged the politicians from a position of asymmetric power, in order to
prevent the co-option of the projects into an exchange for votes. As such, it is clear
that while clientelism is an embedded norm of the region, the SJA subproject participants in my study with the assistance of the Landless Workers Movement overcame
this problem.

3.4

Intracommunity Elite Capture

How do we define the elite? As mentioned before the elite are generally defined
against the targeted. The São José Agrário project was under the umbrella of the
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World Bank Rural Poverty Reduction Project, which stated its targets as the following,
“The primary target population was the same for both projects. The
original project targeted 120,000 poor rural families living mostly in remote, low-density areas with scarce infrastructure and services, deriving
their main income from farming and/or agricultural wage labor as smallholders, tenants, share-croppers and landless laborers. The Additional
Financing targeted an incremental 68,000 families with the same profile”
(The World Bank, 2009, 2).
The main targets of this project were low-income, rural people. Thus, an elite would
be middle- or high-income people living in an urban area. Other possible sources of
elite power could include education, background, and access to leadership positions.
3.4.1

Income

The settlers enter into the settlements with few worldly possessions. In the past
they have been agricultural wage workers, moradores (a type of share-cropper), or
worked on their families’ land — often a small piece supporting many family members.
They generally enter the settlement with little income. The settlements are divided
in such a way that everyone gets access to an equal amount of land for their home
and garden, as well as for their crops and livestock. Yet, differences in household
income still appear, largely because the settlers or the settlers’ children take jobs off
the settlement. Another source of income differences emerges from a household which
receives two pension payments from the national government. Differences in income
are largely apparent in the material goods the family owns — motorcycles, TVs, or
cell phones. The close living quarters and the homogeneity of the settlements make
a family’s lesser or greater income apparent.
I gathered income data for each family, including crops and animals sold over the
2012 year, transfer payments — including Bolsa Familia, and retirement payments for
agricultural workers, and crop insurance, as well as any wage or salary labor on or off
the settlement and donations from other family members not living in the settlement.
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I then calculated the yearly income for the households. I compare this yearly household income with the household income data collected by the Brazilian government’s
2011 household survey (PNAD, Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicı́lios). The
Brazilian government divides income groups into five classes based on household (assuming a family size of four) average monthly income (which I converted to yearly
income for ease of comparison): Class A (equal to or above R$116,940), Class B
(from R$89,700 to R$116,940), Class C (from R$20,808 to R$89,700), Class D (from
R$13,020 to R$20,808), and Class E (from R$0 to R$13,020) (Centro de Politicas
Sociais, 2011). Class C covers a huge range of almost 70,000 reais per year.5
Although the World Bank’s Implementation Completion and Results Report of
the SJII project does not explicitly list the incomes of those targeted, it does describe
them throughout the report as the poor and very poor (The World Bank, 2009).
Several studies of the WB project do list the beneficiary income. For example, a
study conducted by FECAMP and financed by the World Bank attempted to measure
income outcomes. This report stated the project had reached the very poor in that
average household monthly income prior to the project was R$499 per month (R$6,000
yearly), and the average adult education was very low in that 77% had not received
any instruction (The World Bank, 2009, 57). Another study conducted independently
by the Federal University of Ceará, calculated annual beneficiary income before the
SJII subprojects at R$2,685 to R$7,160 (The World Bank, 2009, 64). According to
5

While the Real has recently depreciated, in the period of 2011-2013 the average exchange rate
was around R$2:USD1. As such the income classes (based on annual income) would be Class A
(equal to or above USD 58,470), Class B (from USD 44,850 to USD 58,470), Class C (from USD
10,404 to USD 44,850), Class D (from USD 6,510 to USD 10,404), and Class E (from USD 0 to USD
6,510). The World Bank sets the poverty line at 1.90 per day in 2011 PPP terms (The World Bank
Data, 2013), which is equal to 2.793 Reais per day or an annual per capita income of 983.14 Reais.
For a household of four, this would be an annual income of 3,932.54 Reais. The poverty line for
Bolsa Familia, the Brazilian government’s welfare program, a family of four is considered very poor
if they make 3,696 Reais or less per year and considered poor if they make between 3,697 Reais and
7,392 Reais per year (Camara Noticias, 2015). Nationally 13% of households fall into classes A and
B combined, Class C makes up about 56% of households and Classes D and E combined make up
approximately 31% of households (Assuntos Estrategicos, 2014).

60

these studies, on average the SJII project beneficiary households fall into the Class E
designation.
In Table 3.1 I classify all the households from my survey implement in 6 settlements
into each of the classes. I then compare the settlements by class. No settlement
households fell into the A or B classes. The class with the most households from
my survey was the E class (also the poorest class) with 55 households (59%). There
was also a sizable portion that fell into the D class, 21 households (23%) and the
C class, 17 households (18%). There is greater variation between classes in some
settlements than others. For example Settlement 3 and 8 have members from all
three classes, whereas Settlement 5 only has households in Class D and E. Table
3.1 indicates moderate income inequality in the settlements. The breakdown shows
that eighty-two percent of the beneficiaries fell into class D and class E and may be
considered poor or very poor. For the most part, the SJA subprojects in my case
studies did reach those targeted by the greater SJII project as poor and very poor.
I compare this distribution with that of rural Ceará. I also use the Brazilian
government’s household survey, the PNAD survey, to get a measure of the income
classes in rural Ceará, which includes a total of 3,532 households. Interestingly,
Table 3.1 shows that if I take all households in my survey and classify them into the
Brazilian government’s income classes, the percentage in each income class of C, D,
and E, reflects that of the rural Ceará.
I also calculated Ginis for both individuals and households. I find that the per
capita Gini is between .33 and .47. Household Ginis fall between .32 and .57. These
Ginis are useful in understanding the level of income inequality in these settlements.6
Overall the Ginis as compared with country level Ginis would indicate a moderate
6

Compared with the overall inequality in Brazil as measured by the Gini, falling from .6 in 1993
to .53 in 2013 (The World Bank Data, 2013), the level of inequality found in the settlements is not
particularly high.
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Table 3.1. Income by Class
Class
Settlement 3
Settlement 4
Settlement 5
Settlement 6
Settlement 7
Settlement 8
All Settlements
Rural Ceará

A
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
7

B
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
3

Number
C
D
1
1
1
5
0
4
2
1
7
6
6
4
17
21
607 853

E
10
4
15
7
12
7
55
2062

A
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
.2

B
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
.08

Percent
C
D
8.3 8.3
10 50
0
21
20 10
28 24
35 24
18 23
17 24

E
83 .3
40
79
70
48
41
59
58

Author’s Data and PNAD 2011 (Brazilian government’s Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de
Domicı́lios).

to high level of income-inequality. Yet, if we refer to Table 3.1 above, we see that all
household incomes fall into classes C, D and E. Those that did fall into the rather
large range of class C, did so at the lower end. Thus, the income inequality in the
settlements reflects levels of poverty, ranging from very poor to moderately poor/lower
middle income. It can be misleading to compare these Ginis to country-level Ginis
which measure income inequality between extreme wealth and extreme poverty. Yet,
these Ginis are useful in identifying the variation in poverty within the settlements,
which could potentially be a source of power.
Table 3.2. Per Capita Income Inequality by Settlement
Settlement
All
3
4
5
6
7
8

Min
92
92
881
680
559
668
1010

Max
16077
3683
15476
3770
15750
10515
16077

Median
1741
630
2109
1610
1647
3103
2770

Gini
.47
.47
.42
.33
.47
.39
.41

Author’s Data. Reais per year per capita. Over 2013, the exchange
rate was roughly two Reais to one US Dollar.

There has been criticism of using income collected by surveys as a measure of
poverty, particularly in rural households. The problems range from issues of recall,
seasonality, to the challenges rural households face, in that they often supplement
their consumption through subsistence production, as well as relying on forests and
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Table 3.3. Household Income Inequality by Settlement
Settlement
All
3
4
5
6
7
8

Min
918
918
3523
2416
2794
1690
5540

Max
48232
29468
30951
18850
22927
29930
48232

Median
10776
2994
1398
7973
9018
15586
15667

Gini
.42
.57
.32
.34
.34
.36
.33

Author’s Data. Reais per year per household. Over 2013, the exchange rate was roughly two Reais to one US Dollar.

bodies of water to supplement consumption (Deaton, 1997, 29). In addition, people
are often less willing to reveal income data as opposed to consumption data (Deaton,
1997, 29). Furthermore, survey data understates inequality as wealthier households
are less willing to reveal their income as compared with lower-income households. Surveys that measure income via consumption will also under report wealthier households’ income, as such households tend to save a greater portion of their incomes,
which may not be recorded in such surveys. Also, wealthier households will save a
greater portion of their incomes, and as such will not be reflected in consumption
surveys.
For these reasons, I also collected data on assets. In particular, I concentrated
on durable household goods as a check on my income data. Table 3.4 presents a
breakdown of the number and percent of households from my survey that have a
particular good. Some households have more than one of a good, for example, cell
phones, fans, televisions, bicycles, and motorcycles. I list the number of families that
have more than one in the table notes. Those assets that are of greater value and only
held by a subset of the families indicate income inequality; cars, sewing machines,
and washing machines. The main form of transportation was by motorcycle and
bicycle. Around forty percent of my sample had a motorcycle. Together these make
up some of the most expensive goods (excluding bicycles). It might seem that a
freezer should also be included here, but many households who have a freezer do
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not have a refrigerator and vice versa. Thus the freezer and refrigerator function as
substitutes. The existence of some goods that only between six and thirty percent of
households own indicates some asset inequality. In addition, there are some families
that had more than one motorcycle (seven households have two motorcycles, and one
household had three), also reinforcing my finding of some asset inequality.
Table 3.4. Durable Household Assets
Household Assets
Cell Phone*
Stove
Refrigerator
Freezer
Blender
Fan*
Washing Machine
Sewing Machine
Satellite
Television*
DVD Player
Radio
Stereo
Bicycle*
Motorcycle*
Car
Truck

Frequency
62
82
86
13
79
59
15
25
66
86
66
81
47
72
56
6
0

Percent
67
88
92
14
85
63
16
27
71
92
71
87
51
77
40
6
0

Author’s Data. * Indicates that some households had more than one.
Cell phones: 36 households had 1, 16 households had 2, 9 households
had 3, 1 household had 5. Fan: 57 households had 1, 2 households
had 2. Television: 84 households had 1, 2 households had 2. Bicycle:
48 households had 1, 15 households had 2, 5 households had 3, 4
households had 4. Motorcycle: 48 households had 1, 7 households
had 2, 1 household had 3. I also asked about landlines and VHS
players, but since no one had these, I eliminate them from the table.

My data paints a picture of the settlements as a place of moderate income and
asset inequality. A significant portion of the moderate inequality of settler’s income
can be attributed to two factors. First, settlers who acquired jobs off of the settlement
(particularly full-time non-agricultural positions) tended to have higher incomes. This
is particularly true in the case of a drought. The second factor that increased some
adults’ incomes was receiving monthly pension payments from the government. The
government sets this transfer payment at the minimum monthly salary for the region.
In the case of the settlers in my study, often this minimum monthly salary was
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significantly greater than what they were earning during the drought via agricultural
production. These factors indicate that rather than a social or class-based hierarchy
creating these differences in income in the settlements, what appears is demographic
differentiation related to age and availability of off-settlement work.

3.4.2

Education

Education can also engender elite power, and as such, provide an avenue for elite
capture. In the settlements I visited, education differed across generations. In general,
schooling was correlated with age. I exclude all those under eighteen. Historically, in
rural areas due to lack of transportation and a lack of rural schools, it was challenging
to attend school. Over time, and particularly due to policies post-1995, access to education has increased. Brazil has implemented a variety of public policies supporting
primary and secondary education. One of these policies, Bolsa Familia, provides a
conditional cash transfer payment to families for each school aged child attending
school. Additionally, there has been an emphasis toward expanding primary education in rural areas. These factors are exogenous to my study. Those with greater
education are the younger generations, with a negative correlation between age and
education. In Table 3.5 it is clear that the older generations were significantly less educated than the younger generations, in fact, many are illiterate. On the other hand,
the youngest generations have much more education, including some post-secondary
schooling. Most households are composed of several generations, as such, many households would include both adults who had achieved a primary education along with
young adults with a secondary education.
I argue age, once we exclude those under eighteen, is a main determinant of
education, and thus, should be a consistent explanatory variable across settlements. If
this is true then even though there are differences in education, often these differences
will be found within households. It would make little sense for the younger generations
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Table 3.5. Education Differences by Generation: Years of Education
Age
18-27
28-37
38-47
48-57
58-67
68-77
78-87
Total

0 years
0
2
6
11
11
9
5
44

1-4 years
10
26
33
18
12
7
0
106

5-8 years
18
11
17
2
1
1
0
50

9-11 years
42
5
2
1
0
0
0
50

Post-Secondary
6
2
0
0
1
0
0
9

Total
76
46
58
32
25
17
5
259

Author’s Data. Number of people in each age group with the given level of education, for those 18
and older.

to exclude the older generations from project benefits (as the older generations may
be their family members).
Below I run two OLS regressions to check that age is indeed an explanatory
variable controlling for gender, settlement in which the individual resides, and the
education level of the head of household. My survey included questions on education,
age, and gender for all household members, resulting in a total of 420 observations
(in 93 households). Once I drop all people under the age of 18, I am left with 259
observations.
I drop those younger than eighteen, because in this group age will be structurally
correlated with education. Individuals older than eighteen, but continuing in school
either because they took longer or because they are attending post-secondary school
would not drive my results. The hypothesis I test is increased age will predict less
education. Those who continue in school would weaken support for my hypothesis.
My regression is the following

EDi = β1 + β2 Ai + θ1 Fi + δ4 S4i + δ5 S5i + δ6 S6i + δ7 S7i + δ8 S8i + µi
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(3.1)

where ED is education, A is age, F is a dummy variable for female, and S is
a dummy variable for Settlements 4 through 8, with Settlement 3 as a baseline, i
indexes individuals.
Table 3.6. OLS Regression Results Dependent Variable Education
Variables
Age

Education (1)

Education (2)

-0.154***
(0.011)

0.938***
(0.351)
0.806
(0.677)
0.506
(0.592)
1.670**
(0.714)
-0.399
(0.567)
2.083***
(0.587)
10.03***
(0.579)

-0.199***
(0.030)
0.115
(0.138)
-0.020
(0.606)
0.009
(1.098)
1.952*
(0.996)
1.758
(1.150)
-1.185
(0.924)
2.601***
(0.801)
11.907***
(0.912)

259
0.526

90
0.539

HOH Education
Female
Settlement 4
Settlement 5
Settlement 6
Settlement 7
Settlement 8
Constant

Observations
R-squared

Model 1 is an OLS regression estimating the effect of age on educational
achievements of adults (age>17)with dummy variables for gender and settlement on which the person lives. Model 2 presents an OLS regression estimating the same as Model 1 but also controlling for the impact of the education of
the head of household on educational achievements of individuals. Standard
errors in parentheses, *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant
at 10%.

I find that age is significant at the one percent level confirming my hypothesis
that adult age and number of years of education are correlated (see Table 3.6). One
additional year of age is correlated with 0.15 years less of education holding gender
and settlement fixed. This is a particularly strong result as some young adults may
still be in school increasing their education, which would weaken this relation. In
addition, I find that being female results in 0.938 years more of education. Lastly, I
find that being a member of Settlement 8 results in 2.083 more years of education and
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being a member of Settlement 6 is correlated with 1.67 additional years of education
relative to being in Settlement 3.
Belonging to a particular household may affect the results. In particular, the
educational levels of the head of household may be positively correlated with the
educational outcomes as parents with greater education may place a higher value on
the education. In the second model, column two, I control for the head of household’s
educational level. I drop all people that are ten years younger than the head of
household or older. This way I exclude the majority of extended family members
such as aunts, uncles, or grandparents. I also drop all individuals younger than
eighteen for the same reason as above. I am left with a significantly reduced and
younger sample size of 90.
Overall, I find that the effect of the education level of the head of household has
a positive but not significant effect on the educational levels of younger household
members. The age of the individual continues to be strongly significant in predicting
educational outcomes, one additional year of age is correlated with almost .2 years
less of education. The coefficient for being female has changed signs. For women in
this sample, gender has a negative but not statistically significant effect on education.
There could be a qualitative difference between the education of older generations and
that of younger generations. For older generations going to school and working in the
fields were competing activities, in which male children spent more time working in
the fields, and female children may have found it feasible to attend school for longer.
Currently, education has expanded, and conditional cash transfers require children
to attend school. As such, being female may not have a large effect on educational
outcomes.
I find that differences in education are by age, gender, and occasionally by settlement. In particular, belonging to Settlement 8 had a robust statistically significant
impact on educational outcomes. Settlement 8 had a strong affiliation with the lo-
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cal municipal agricultural workers union and the Dom Helder project. The youth in
this settlement had been particularly active, and some had either already had postsecondary education or were involved in post-secondary education. The municipal
agricultural worker’s union had also hired several of these young educated adults in
various positions.

3.4.3

Background and Leadership Positions

Elite power can also originate from one’s background or the ability to occupy leadership positions. In my case studies, most people came from similar backgrounds and
almost all were involved in agriculture prior to the settlement. This is to be expected
as an agricultural background is a requirement to join the settlement. Only one of
the settlers previously worked as a small rural producer, who owned his own land.
Five worked with their families on their families’ land. All others were permanent or
temporary agricultural workers, or were moradores on a landlord’s land. In addition,
the majority (79 of 93 who completed the survey) came from the same municipality
as the settlement location.
Table 3.7. Types of Work
Type of Work
Temporary Rural Wage Worker
Permanent Rural Worker
Small Rural Producer (less than 50 ha)
Worked as a relative of a Small Rural Producer
Morador
Other
NA
Total

Number
20
18
1
5
43
4
2
93

Percent
22
19
1
5
46
4
2
100

Author’s Data. Types of work people did. Moradores could be translated as
a dweller on land they do not own with the right to produce a small amount
of subsistence crops and to raise some small animals such as chickens. NA
signifies not applicable, these were young people whose first jobs were being
settlers.

The small size of the settlements, from 10 to 30 registered members, necessitates
that almost everyone occupy a leadership position. In fact, 35% of the 93 surveyed
currently held a leadership position. Positions are rotated every two to four years.
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In many settlements, the president cannot hold the position for more than two terms
consecutively. As such, the ability for an elite to occupy and hold leadership positions is difficult. While, those with more literacy, often the younger members, are
more comfortable as president, vice president, and secretary, many people who are
illiterate or who have a fourth grade or less education have also been successful at
carrying out these jobs. In addition, the treasurer was often a position occupied by
someone with little traditional literacy, but with numerical literacy. My data showed
no evidence that background or leadership positions were sources of elite power in
the settlements.

3.5

Discussion

The question remains, does the inequality in income or education indicate the
possibility of elite capture?
Did the subprojects reach their intended targets? The main target of the SJA
project were settlement members. Such a target implicitly assumes these settlement
members will also meet the targeting objectives of the SJII project, which targeted the
rural poor. In summary, the targets of the SJA projects were rural poor settlement
members.
For the most part, the SJA subprojects in my sample met these targets. Only
settlers received the projects. The settlers are by definition rural. The majority of
recipient settlers were from Class D and E. The median income for four of the six
settlements in which I conducted my survey falls into Class E. The median income for
the other two settlements falls into Class D. Thus one could argue that on average the
SJA subprojects in my study also met the income targets of the greater SJII project.
Yet, it must be noted that my section on income shows that there was moderate
income inequality in the settlements, including households from the Classes C, D, and
E. I posit this moderate income inequality represents a relative income elite and could
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result in the power to manipulate the subprojects. The question remains whether the
potential power was a source of actual power used to influence subprojects.
While there were significant differences in education, these were by gender and
generation, characteristics that are present within most families, rather than being
differences between families. Many households contain several generations. In my
case studies, frequently families were related. It seems unlikely that those with more
education would use that against those with less education in order to capture a
subproject.
So we arrive a the question: Were the income elite within the communities able
to ‘capture’ the project? Did the greater income of some members of the settlement
allow them to benefit from the project more than other settlement members?
Ninety percent (63/70) of the households that were currently living on the settlement when the SJA subprojects were chosen wanted and voted for the chosen
subproject. Of the seven households that wanted a different SJA subproject, six of
them occurred in Settlement 5 which received an apiculture subproject.
Table 3.8. Participation in SJA Subprojects
Settlement
Settlement
Settlement
Settlement
Settlement
Settlement
Settlement
Total

3
4
5
6
7
8

Number Participating/Total Households
10/12
10/10
11/19
7/10
11/25
17/17
66/93

Author’s Data.

Seventy-one percent (66/93) of the households were participating in the SJA subproject during my fieldwork or had been participating when the subproject ended.
Almost all eligible households began by participating in the subprojects. Table 3.8
shows the number of participating households of the total number of eligible households.
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Settlement 5 had the highest portion of members who wanted a different subproject and one of the lowest participation rates.
Settlement 5 had initially wanted a different project while the majority had voted
for the apiculture subproject. When the subproject was confirmed as an apiculture
subproject, eight households left the subproject. The change of subproject was a
result of a technician who heavily favored apiculture subprojects and convinced the
settlement members to try this subproject.7 Further refuting that this might be a case
of an inside settlement elite directing project choice in their best interests, Settlement
5 had very little income inequality. In fact, all households in this settlement fell into
the income classes D and E (4 and 15 households respectively), the per capita income
Gini was 0.33 and the household income Gini was 0.34, both at the low end for the
settlements.
Settlement 7 had less than half the households participating in its subproject
when it ended. This settlement did face moderate income inequality. But the high
level of non-participation was in part a result of a high turnover of households in
this settlement. In fact, fourteen households had joined the settlement after the
subproject was put in place. This and the fact that the subproject was both shortlived and subject to many problems meant new households were not quick to join the
subproject.
There were two main reasons the majority of the twenty-seven non-participating
households gave for either their non-participation or attrition from the subproject.
First, the household had joined the settlement after the subproject had been put in
place and did not want to or were unable to join the subproject. Second, the household
7

The technician may have greater education, income, and power than the community but it
is helpful to separate out his influence from that of an elite. This technician did not direct the
subproject to a non-targeted group, nor did he contribute to within group capture of the subproject.
I present a further investigation into the roles and effects of the technicians in Chapter 5.
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prioritized their production in crops and livestock over that of participation in the
subproject. Table 3.9 details the reasons given.
Table 3.9. Reasons for Non-Participation in SJA Subprojects
Reasons for Non-Participation
Entered the settlement after the project was put in place and did not want to join
Did not want to participate in the project due to time constraints
Did not want to participate in project because of collective nature
Did not want to participate in project because of distance
Did not want to participate in project because of fear of project
Not allowed to by rules of the project
Wanted a different project
Other
Total

Frequency
9
7
3
1
1
2
1
3
27

Author’s Data.

I also asked the question of whether subproject participants felt the subproject
was good for the community. Of the seventy-three settlers who answered the question,
sixty-one (84%) said that it was good for the community, and twenty (27%) said they
did not know. When I asked the settlers to comment on their answer, many said
that it was useful to the communities to gain access to such subprojects and that
the subprojects began well. The many criticisms of the subprojects did not include
any evidence of elite capture and mostly pointed toward technical failures.8 Of the
twelve that did not feel the subproject was good for the community; half came from
Settlement 6. Settlement 6’s subproject was never implemented.
I do not find evidence to support the elite capture of the subprojects. The targeted
communities received the SJA subprojects. Most settlement members voted for and
participated in the subprojects. There were few differences in background and access
to leadership positions within settlements. Differences in education were strongly
correlated with age. Younger generations did not appear to be using their greater
education levels against the older generations. Subproject outcomes also did not
appear to be disproportionately benefiting one group over another. In the productive
8

I explore this in Chapter 5.

73

SJA subprojects, as of yet, there had been little increase in production or output that
could be appropriated by an income elite. In the case of infrastructure subprojects,
the good is non-excludable. In my case studies, these were either reservoirs or fences
surrounding the settlements. Within the settlements in my case studies, only the
fences were completed, and all settlers had access to the fences.

3.6

Conclusion

In summary, I found communities to be moderately unequal in terms of income
and assets. The income inequality that existed could be attributed to life-cycle deviations of household economic positions, based on permanent off-settlement jobs and
pensions.
There were generational differences in education, controlling for gender and settlement. Education was valued, but not over practical and social knowledge. Democratic
institutions of governance, open to all settlers, fomented participation. Many of the
settlements had found ways for illiterate people to serve leadership roles, including the
presidency. A common cultural background, ability to participate in leadership positions and decision-making, and a lack of political connections resulted in a fairly even
distribution of power within the settlement. Educational differences did not exclude
those with less education from leadership positions, participation in the subproject,
or the ability to vote for the subproject.
Almost all settlers come from an agricultural background. Before joining the
settlement, most had worked for others either as permanent or temporary laborers,
moradores, or, occasionally, worked for their extended family who owned or who had
access to a small piece of land. Additionally, most are from the same municipality as
their settlement, and almost all are from the state of Ceará.
The SJA subprojects are embedded in much the same context as those of the SJII
subprojects. The SJII subprojects experienced problems with elite capture, primarily
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via clientelism (FETRAECE Representative B, 2013; Landless Workers Movement
Representative A, 2013; Sao Jose Agrario Technician A, 2013). However, in the
six settlements in which I conducted the census survey, each of which had one SJA
subproject, I encountered no elite capture of funds. This outcome was the result of two
factors. First, the subprojects were implemented in settlements, communities with a
great deal of experience organizing themselves and a sense of internal leadership and
independence. Second, the SJA project worked closely with the Landless Workers
Social Movement. The MST assisted the settlers in rejecting local-level politician
influence.
Elite capture is presented as a primary problem in the literature on CDD projects.
As such, further investigation into these factors — community experience with organization and accompaniment by social movements — may be a fruitful avenue for
creating and implementing CDD projects while preventing elite capture. The SJA
project and the case studies here are of particular importance because they embody
a particular set of characteristics that made them more likely to succeed. It would be
inaccurate to generalize from these case studies to the larger SJII project (or perhaps
even those SJA subprojects implemented on the larger settlements) because these
experiences and institutions were specific to these settlements and framed their SJA
subproject process and outcomes. Instead, the lesson provided is how these settlers
overcame problems of elite capture, prevalent in the greater SJII subprojects, and
according to the literature, in many other CDD projects.
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CHAPTER 4
FREE RIDING: A QUESTION OF INSTITUTIONS

4.1

Introduction

The community-driven development literature has been primarily concerned with
elite capture and the over-use of resources in common pool resource (CPR) projects.
There has been little analysis of the free rider problem with respect to productive
and infrastructure subprojects, which do not require the management of common
pool resources (CPRs). Yet, the fact that community-driven development projects
are products of collective action necessitates the evaluation of if and how problems
of free riding may affect these projects.
Theories of public goods provision led to Mancur Olson’s in-depth analysis of
collective action, identifying mechanisms by which collective action could fail (Olson,
1965). Free riding (or in Olson’s words “the exploitation of the great by the small”)
was identified as a main challenge to successful collective action (Olson, 1965, 3). The
free riding problem can be defined as a situation in which individuals of a population
either consume more than their share of a resource or pay less than their share of
the cost of a resource. Elinor Ostrom showed in her Nobel prize-winning work on
common pool resources that there are a variety of ways in which communities can
overcome the free riding problem (Ostrom, 1990).
My case studies indicate that free riding may challenge CDD project success. For
example, the overall settlement structure, which relies heavily on collective action, has
repeatedly struggled with free riding. As CDD projects continue their trend toward
supporting productive subprojects over infrastructure subprojects they will encounter
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a greater need for collective action over longer time horizons, creating more openings
for free riding to occur.
The São José Agrário project occurred within a specific institutional environment,
that of a land reform settlement. The settlements in my case studies have continuously
carried out collective work on multiple levels for at least ten years. This experience
has allowed the communities to face problems, create institutions and refine these
institutions to deal with those problems. These institutions can also benefit SJA
subprojects. As a result, it is useful to evaluate the existence of free riding in the
settlement’s collective work to cast light on the experiences of the SJA subprojects,
particularly since the SJA subprojects are young and many have failed.
São José Agrário subprojects have encompassed both infrastructure and productive subprojects. Infrastructure subprojects require intensive labor during their implementation but thereafter the labor required for maintenance often falls under the
settlement’s collective work and therefore becomes subject to the settlement collective
work rules. When free riding is present in the established settlement collective work
it will also be present for the SJA infrastructure subproject work in the Operations &
Maintenance Stage.1 Since infrastructure subprojects are primarily non-excludable,
for example, a reservoir for the settlement or fencing the boundary of the settlement,
shirking could occur either in the implementation or the maintenance stage.
Productive SJA subprojects require years of ongoing labor following the implementation stage and often this labor does not occur during the settlements’ collective
work. This ongoing SJA labor opens space for free riding to exist in the SJA projects.
Participation in the productive SJA subprojects is voluntary. Participants can decide
to leave the subproject, or they can be excluded from the subproject if they do not
do the work. Yet, there is still space for people to shirk, the magnitude of which
1

See Table 4.4 and 5.4.
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depends on the enforcement of the rules and the strength of the institutions of the
settlement.
These considerations led me to the following question. Was free riding a problem
for the São José Agrário subprojects? My hypotheses were the following:
1. If free riding presented a problem in settlement collective work it would also do
so in the SJA subprojects.
2. The bottom-up characteristics of the SJA subprojects would facilitate the creation of strong, locally specific institutions to preclude free riding.
3. Free riding would be mitigated by the presence of the Landless Workers Social
Movement and the Agricultural Workers’ Union because they would further
support strong institutions preventing free riding.
I found evidence that free riding presented a challenge to the settlements’ collective
work and, to a lesser extent, the SJA subproject work. All settlements in my study
had dealt with free riding to some extent. Of the eight settlements in my study,
seven had, to a greater or lesser extent, effectively dealt with free riding in settlement
collective work. By contrast, free riding was present and unresolved in several of
the productive SJA subprojects. Still, my data indicated that in settlements where
the settlement collective work operated well, it was more likely SJA subproject work
functioned well for both productive and infrastructure subprojects. Solving problems
of free riding depended on the collective institutions of the community, such as the
association and collective settlement work. Free riding was also alleviated by the
accompaniment of the settlements by the MST, municipal agricultural workers labor
unions, and state and national government.
This chapter is organized as follows. In the next section, I review the relevant
literature and provide background for the chapter. In the third section, I present an
overview of collective work on the settlements. In the fourth section, I review the
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extent and the characteristics of free riding present in the settlement collective work.
In the fifth section, I provide an overview of collective work in the SJA subprojects,
and in the sixth section, I review how free riding existed. In the seventh section, I
discuss the results and in the eighth section, I conclude.

4.2

Background

Free riding is rarely broached in the literature on community-driven development
unless we turn to common pool resource (CPR) management, in which it plays a central role. This can be understood because perhaps the primary problem of managing
CPRs is The Tragedy of the Commons, a type of free riding problem. Common pool
resources, while rivalrous (subtractable), are almost purely non-excludable and thus
the problem of free-riding is obvious. In addition, Elinor Ostrom’s acclaimed theoretical work, built on extensive case studies of common pool resource management,
paved the way for other scholars to take up the free riding question in the context of
CPRs (Ostrom, 1990).
Free riding can be theorized in terms of consumption or production activities
(Olson and Cook, 2006). In the context of public goods and common pool resources,
the free rider problem can be thought of as a consumption activity, in which the
challenge is in either providing an optimal amount of the public good for public
consumption needs or preventing the over-consumption of common pool resources.
Public goods are both non-excludable and non-rivalrous (not subtractable). The
free riding problem for public goods is first, obtaining the necessary revenues from
consumers to provide the public good‘ at a sufficient (optimal) level. Consumers
consume the entirety of the public good regardless of how much they contribute
toward the public good, for example breathing air, visiting a park, or benefiting
from national security. Thus, their incentive is to minimize their contribution and to
understate their ‘true’ preference for the quantity and quality of the public good so
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as to reduce their tax burden (McMillan, 1979). Consumers maximizing their wellbeing assume the good will only be slightly deteriorated by their free riding on the
contributions of others (McMillan, 1979).
Common pool resources are non-excludable, but they are rivalrous. As Hardin
mentioned, this is the reverse of the problem with public goods (Hardin, 1968). Members share only in a portion of the cost of the overuse to the CPR but receive the total
benefit. Thus, members have an incentive to over-use (over-consume) the good for
their short term gain resulting in the degradation of the resource (called The Tragedy
of the Commons).
On the other hand, employees and managers in capitalist firms and collective
workers in cooperatives face a free rider problem based in productive activity. Here
people may shirk by under-providing effort in the firm or cooperative. This occurs
because of the difficulty of monitoring effort due to the challenge of measuring the
marginal contribution of each individual (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972).
In the eight cases I studied, the subprojects had the goal of either the production
of a local-level public good, common pool resource, or a shared private good. The
subprojects were defined by the Department for Agrarian Development and the World
Bank as either infrastructure subprojects or productive subprojects. Infrastructure
subprojects included reservoirs and perimeter fences for settlements. Both perimeter
fences and reservoirs are non-excludable. A perimeter fence surrounds the whole
community keeping all settlement livestock in and all other livestock out. Similarly,
reservoir water is available to all settlement members. The fence is also clearly nonrival, use by some settlement members does not preclude use by others. The water
existing in the reservoir is rival. The quantity and quality of the water depend on the
size of the settlement, and on additional factors outside the control of the settlement,
such as other populations’ access to the reservoir, pollution from nearby towns, and
the severity of drought. Thus, the perimeter fence has the characteristics of a local-

80

level public good, and the reservoir has the characteristics of a common pool resource.
Free riding challenges to collective action in the context of these two goods could
potentially occur in their construction and in their maintenance, both of which the
whole community was expected to take part in and of which it would be very difficult
to exclude members (Mansuri and Rao, 2012). As such, it is important that everyone
affected by the subproject participates in the subprojects’ creation, implementation,
and maintenance in order to prevent community members from benefiting from the
subproject without bearing their share of the costs.
Productive subprojects included irrigation, bee-keeping, tractors and crops. These
goods are both rival and excludable; as such they have the characteristics of a private
good. The good is excludable in that the community can exclude members from
receiving either the physical good or the money from the good in the event of nonparticipation. The good is also rival: if one person received a part of the money
or good, the next person would receive that much less. Subproject rules allow for
subproject members to freely exit subprojects, but they are not allowed to rejoin.
Subproject rules also allow the group to exclude members from a subproject if they
fail to participate. While seemingly this would eliminate the possibility of free riding,
these rules rely on the group institutions, leadership, and cohesion. As these private
goods are produced, appropriated, and distributed collectively, the excludability of
the outcome of production (either the good itself or the money derived from the good)
varies by group institutions. In groups with institutions that do not have graduated
sanctions, a person may fall into only one of two classifications: a participant or a
non-participant. The production is then divided among the participants regardless
of total effort contributed to the production. Yet, participants may shirk or even
fail to show up for collective work in varying amounts, free riding on the labor of
others. In the absence of graduated sanctions, it may seem overly strong to exclude
a participant for small transgressions. In addition, it might be politically costly to
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exclude free riding participants from the subproject. Lastly, the method by which
to exclude participating members may not have been defined prior to the subproject
adequately to enable the community to enforce such exclusion.
Ostrom in her seminal book Governing the Commons has listed important design
principles for successful collective management of common pool resources. First, it
must be clear who has access to the resource and who has a right to use the resource.
Second, the rules regarding the appropriation of the resource, and the rules outlining
who and how much is provided by the members when there is a need, must reflect
local conditions and means. Third, the majority of the people participating in the use
of the resource can affect the rules. Fourth, the community must have active monitors
who are accountable to the community that uses the resource. Fifth, there should be
graduated sanctions so the gravity of the offense can be taken into account. Sixth,
there must be conflict-resolution mechanisms that are both accessible, rapid, and lowcost. Seventh, the external government must recognize the rights of the community
to create and implement rules, as well as to monitor and sanction members, and
must not challenge the community’s rules. Eighth, all design principles must exist
as ‘nested enterprises’ in that these rules are nested within the local, regional and
national governments to some extent, as well as within the community itself (Ostrom,
1990, p.90).2
Perhaps two of the above design principles that seem most important for restricting free riding in my case studies are those of monitoring and sanctions (or
punishment). Game theory has found that when participants are given the means
to punish free riders they will do so even at cost to themselves (Bowles and Gintis,
2006). Experimental evidence has found reciprocity and fairness to be present in pub-

2

Interestingly, many of the institutions Ostrom lists to confront free riding seem to reproduce
those of a central, state, and municipal government, just at the increasingly more local level. As
Cleaver writes, “A paradox surely, when part of the justification for participatory approaches is that
they avoid the shortcomings of development delivered by state bureaucracies” (Cleaver, 1999, 601).
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lic goods games, in which players (in the absence of the ability to punish other players
for non-contribution) will reduce their own contributions in either disappointment or
retaliation (Andreoni, 1995; Ostrom, 2000). Thus, free riding begets free riding and,
in the context of a community-driven development project, could lead to complete
attrition from subprojects. This is particularly the case when systems of punishment
are not working sufficiently well or are absent.

4.3

Settlement Collective Work

The São José Agrário subprojects occur within a specific institutional environment, that of a land reform settlement. The settlements in my case studies have
carried out collective work continuously on multiple levels for at least ten years. The
longevity of the settlements’ collective work underlies the institutions of the SJA subprojects. Often work done on the SJA subproject is completed during the settlement
collective work time, and as such, is subject to the settlement collective work rules. At
other times, SJA subproject work is completed separately from settlement collective
work.
Collective work occurs in many areas of the settlement. It occurs in the association
that manages the settlement. It also exists as a set period of time per week with
the directive of maintaining the basic infrastructure of the settlement. In addition,
settlements may have collective crops and livestock, and collective projects, such as
the SJA subprojects.
I concentrate the discussion of collective work and free riding into two main areas: the collective work mandatory to the SJA subprojects, and the collective work
on the settlement mandatory to being a registered settlement member. Both the
infrastructure and the productive SJA subprojects are a labor of collective action
and collective work from beginning to end. All work done on the SJA subprojects
is collective work, for this reason, I call it SJA subproject work instead of SJA col-
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lective subproject work.3 Settlements also require mandatory collective work of the
settlers — primarily around maintenance of the settlement. For example, settlement
collective work includes repairing roads, fences, and community buildings. I call the
former, SJA subproject work, and the latter, settlement collective work. SJA
subproject work sometimes overlaps with settlement collective work, making it important to study settlement collective work when evaluating SJA subproject work. Such
overlap primarily occurs in the case of an infrastructure subproject. For example,
once the SJA fence was finished in Settlement 2, repairs on the fence occurred during
the work time set aside for settlement maintenance work, rather than in addition to
such work. The institutions of the settlement collective work frame those of the SJA
subproject work. Settlement collective work institutions have been around for longer
than SJA subproject work institutions. They are often formalized in the settlement
documentation, and they show greater robustness to problems than do SJA subproject work institutions. Registered settlement members are required to participate in
settlement collective work but are not required to participate in the SJA subproject
work. Some participants in the SJA subprojects are not registered members of the
settlement.4 They are required to participate in the SJA subproject work if they are
subproject members but not the settlement maintenance work.
When settlements are established, settlers meet in a general assembly and decide
on the format for collective work. An association formalizes the rules for collective
3

The exception to this is SJA subprojects which have been essentially privatized. For example,
Settlement 4 decided to produce capim, a feed for cattle, as one of their SJA subprojects. They
dedicated one field to capim production. They then divided up the field among all participating
members, such that each member was responsible for their portion of capim production. If a member
did not have cattle, they could sell their production to another member. If they decided not to
continue producing, they could leave the subproject with no repercussion on the other members.
4

They may live on the settlement as relatives of the settlement members, accepted by the community, but officially squatters. They do not have the ability to participate in the settlement general
assemblies, vote, hold office, or run livestock. They do not have the same rights and obligations
of the registered settlement members. They were allowed to participate in the SJA subprojects
because the subprojects, although they targeted land reform settlements, were not restricted to only
registered settlement members.
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work in a written set of guidelines, put forth in the settlement bylaws (Regimento
Interno). The bylaws outline the frequency of collective work, what type of work
is included, and the sanctions for non-participation in collective work. Generally,
settlement collective work is mandatory. The design of the settlements, in which the
land is held in common, necessitates collective work in order to maintain infrastructure
that is not specific to any one individual.5
An association is legally recognized by the state and represents the registered settlement members. It has a directorship with a president, vice president, secretary, vice
secretary, treasurer, vice treasurer, several community member advisers, and committees. All registered members have a chance to be elected to serve on the association’s
directorship. Generally, voting rights are allocated to the registered members — the
head of household and the spouse. There are general assembly meetings at least once
a month, and additional meetings as necessary, at which decisions are voted on by all
registered members.
We have settlements that have families who
enjoy participating in the collective, but in all,
almost 100 percent of the settlements, the bylaws are needed for the [collective] work. They
have bylaws ... and the bylaws delineate the [collective] work, and the punishments for the people
who do not participate, etc. We have settlers who
do not participate, who can be punished by losing
the right to participate in the projects. It is their
[settler’s] right not to participate, but the question of responsibility exists. ... We have work
today that depends on the collective, for example, the fences. ... So we have work that has to be
collective, you can’t deny the need for collective
work (Landless Workers Movement Representative C, 2013, Author’s Translation).

Nós temos assentamentos que tem famı́lias
que gostam de participar do coletivo, mas todos,
quase 100 por cento dos assentamentos, o trabalho é junto ao regimento interno. Tem o regimento ... e é o regimento que diz como é que
é o trabalho, quem não participa, como é que ele
é punido, e assim por diante. Nós temos assentados que não participam que podem ser punidos
até para não ter direito aos próprios projetos. É
direito dele, não é obrigado a participar, mas existe a questão de responsabilidade ... temos hoje
trabalhos que necessitam do coletivo, por exemplo, as cercas. ... Então tem trabalho que tem que
ser coletivo mesmo, não pode correr do coletivo
(Landless Workers Movement Representative C,
2013).

The type of work considered collective and the amount of time dedicated to it vary
from settlement to settlement. Even so, there are commonalities between settlements.
5

Further accentuating the need for collective work is the absence of the government (municipal,
state, or federal) in providing or maintaining services.
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Collective work is primarily male and targeted toward settlement maintenance, such
as fixing fences, maintaining roads and collective buildings, as well as dealing with any
emergent problems. Additionally, collective work on crops, livestock, or subprojects
can be included in the settlement collective work time. The amount of time dedicated
toward settlement collective work varies but is often decided in terms of a certain
number of hours per week. If a person cannot participate in settlement collective
work because of illness or another reasonable excuse, as decided on by the community,
they are excused. For all other reasons, when a person is unable to participate in
settlement collective work, the first option is to send a family member in their stead,
or, occasionally a paid worker. Lastly, if they do not have a sanctioned excuse, a
family member, or a paid worker to fill in for them, they must pay a fine equal to the
missed day’s work.
Table 4.1. Settlement Collective Work Rules
Settlement

Settlement Collective Work

Sanction

Settlement 1

One 8 hour day per week, includes work in cashew
fields. During the cashew harvest they work more
hours.
When needed, no set day or time.
One 8 hour day per week. When there are no
maintenance problems, they do not have a collective work day.
One 4 hour morning per week, includes collective
crops.
One 8 hour day per week.
None
One 8 hour day per week during summer, includes
collective crops and cattle.
One 8 hour day per week during summer, includes collective crops. Cattle care is rotated
daily through the families.

Fine R$20

Settlement 2
Settlement 3

Settlement 4
Settlement 5
Settlement 6
Settlement 7
Settlement 8

Fine R$20
Fine R$20
Fine R$20
Fine R$25
None
Fine R$25
Fine R$15

Author’s Data. Settlement Collective Work Rules describe the guidelines for settlement collective
work. Sanction is the official association response if a household misses a collective work day without
an accepted excuse.

Of the eight settlements in my study, seven had established collective work. One,
Settlement 6 had never established collective work. All seven settlements that had
collective work included settlement maintenance under its purview. The guidelines
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for when settlement collective work should occur can be divided into three groups.
In the first group, Settlements 1, 4, and 5 set aside a specific amount of time, either
4 or 8 hours per week year around. In the second group, Settlements 7 and 8 only
conducted collective maintenance work in the summer (when there is no rain and
they are not planting individual household crops). In the third group, Settlements 2
and 3 only had collective work as needed. In all cases, the fine for non-participation
was similar, from R$15 to R$25, roughly what an agricultural laborer would get paid
for a day’s labor.

4.4

Free Riding in Collective Settlement Work

Free-riding is an ongoing but not insurmountable obstacle to collective work on
the settlement. The extensive set of rules and practices settlements have created for
collective work provide evidence of the threat of free riding. Formalized institutions,
such as settlement bylaws (Regimento Interno) outline rules for collective work and
sanctions for non-participation, exemplify the expertise settlements have in designing
collective work. This expertise is born out of over ten years of experience in each
of the settlements, dealing with and resolving problems that have arisen through
collective work.
In addition, there are a variety of other means by which the settlers have dealt with
free riding. When there is an issue with shirking, most settlements begin by calling
a meeting to discuss problems of non-participation. Here they state the importance
of collective work, fairness, and the repercussion for non-participation. Additionally,
leadership occasionally speaks individually with those who fail to participate. If the
person is still unwilling to show up and does not have an acceptable excuse, they are
charged one day’s labor. This is around R$15/25 (US$7.50/12.50); occasionally it
can be paid in material as well.
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Frequently, people are charged the day’s labor but do not pay. When this happens
leadership will again pressure the non-players to pay through one-on-one meetings or
through group meetings. If the settlement continues to confront shirking or nonparticipation, the association can ask other institutions to intervene. Occasionally,
the Landless Workers Movement or the Agricultural Workers’ Union will come in
at the leadership’s invitation to reinforce the importance of collective work within
the settlement context. Federal settlements can also appeal to the national land
reform agency (Instituto Nacional de Colonização e Reforma Agráriam, INCRA) to
come to the settlement and talk with those who will not participate. As a last
recourse, if settlers reach a consensus, they can expel those who do not participate.
My interviews showed no evidence of serious consideration of this last sanction for
non-participation in the eight settlements I visited, but many settlements had expelled
members that had transgressed other settlement rules (such as, stealing from others on
the settlement, acting violently against other members, or conducting illegal activities
that threatened state or national recognition of the settlement).

4.4.1

Case Study Evidence of Free Riding in Settlement Work

Settlements 1, 2 and 3 had experienced very minimal problems with free riding in
their collective work. In these settlements when collective work is needed everyone
participates. The settlers understand the necessity of collective work to the functioning of the settlement. Here the settlers use the collective as a resource to deal
with new problems. They call a meeting to discuss, problem-solve, and when there
is an emergent need they add extra collective work days to address the problem. In
addition, there is an understanding of the efficiency collective work provides for the
group, rather than leaving problems to individuals to solve.
If we need to make a fence because the cattle
Se precisar fazer uma cerca por que o gado
are getting in, the whole settlement participates. ta entrando lá. Ai vai a turma toda, vai o pesA group together could make that fence in half an soal lá, faz aquela cerca, onde um podia fazer em
hour to an hour, whereas it might take one person tres ou quatro dias, vai o grupo la e faz em meia
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three or four days. ... We have collective work
every week on Monday, ... as well as whenever
there is an emergency. ... If the work requires
two days, then we work for two days (Settlement
1, Member 6, 2012, Author’s Translation).

hora ou em uma hora, né? ... O coletivo ele é
semanalmente, toda segunda feira é dia de trabalho coletivo, ... se surge qualquer outra emergencia, o grupo vai fazer. ... Se precisa trabalhar
dois dias, vai trabalhar os dois dias, mas segunda
feira, segunda feira sempre é o dia (Settlement 1,
Member 6, 2012).

Settlements 4, 5, 7, and 8 had experienced problems with free riding. When
shirking occurred these settlements undertook a variety of methods to resolve the
issue. Often they began by calling a meeting to discuss problems of non-participation.
In Settlements 4 and 5 they identified obstacles inhibiting the participation of settlers
in the collective work and restructured the work to deal with those obstacles. They
also stated the importance of collective work, fairness, and the repercussions of not
participating according to the bylaws in meetings. In Settlements 4, 5, and 8 the
leadership spoke individually with those who failed to participate. If the person is
still unwilling to participate and does not have an acceptable excuse, they are charged
one day’s labor. In Settlement 8, they also have the option of paying by providing
additional work. Settlements 4 and 5 called on the Landless Workers Movement to
help them resolve issues of free riding.
Settlements 4 and 8 had completely resolved their free riding problems. Settlement
4 accomplished this by restructuring the settlement collective work. In Settlement 4
some adolescents represented their families in the collective work. They often missed
days or hours of work because they had to go to school. Since school occurs in the
afternoon, the settlers restructured the collective work to begin earlier from 7 am to 10
or 11 am, so that the boys had time to shower, eat, and catch the bus to high school.
Settlement 8 has mainly solved the collective work problems by pressuring those
who do not participate via one-on-one meetings and group meetings. Additionally,
Settlement 8 had implemented a rule that the settlers can only pay someone to take
their place in collective work once a month; after that they are required to pay any
additional days missed with labor done outside of collective work time.
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Settlement 5 is an example of a settlement that used settlement bylaws, as well
as creative solutions in order to navigate free riding, although they were unable to
eliminate the problem. Settlement 5 was created in 1998 and by 2005 they had reached
an impasse with respect to collective work. Many people were refusing to participate
and the collective work was in disarray.6 The main problem according to settler
interviews was that some settlement members had to walk too far to participate in
settlement collective work. The settlement is large and the households are located
in two distinct areas, rather than being consolidated in one area. As such, some
settlement members saw participation in collective work as too costly. The settlers
had been unable to address the problem internally, so they invited a militant with the
Landless Workers Movement to serve as president of the settlement in 2005. With his
assistance, the settlement was able to resolve some of their conflicts and recuperate
the collective work. First, they began having settlement meetings to persuade settlers
to participate. They also asked the MST to visit, which representative members did,
and conducted meetings reinforcing the importance of collective work to settlement
success. Moreover, the settlers identified the distance between households and the
collective settlement work as a barrier to participation. Consequently, they divided
collective workers into two groups depending on geographic area. In addition, they
imposed the agreed-upon sanctions for missed work. They decided that people could
either pay the R$20 for each day they missed or they could contribute fence staples
for building material. Together these efforts have resolved some of their conflicts and
revived participation in collective work. Yet, even with this effort they have still
been unable to convince several members to participate adequately in the settlement
collective work. As a last recourse, the settlers have appealed to INCRA to come to
6

The ineffective original organization of collective work could be thought of as a problem of
coordination, rather than a failure of cooperation. Before the free riding problem could be solved, a
coordination problem — organizing the work effectively — had to be solved.
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the settlement and serve as a threat to non-participants. Unfortunately, it has been
difficult to get INCRA to come to talk to members who do not want to participate. In
fact, INCRA has only visited the settlement one time in the past five years. Despite
the non-participation of several households, a great majority of the settlers participate
with seventeen of nineteen (89%) households participating (see Table 4.2).
If, for example, we need to build a fence or
complete some other work we hold a meeting and
organize the work. Sometimes no one disagrees
and everyone agrees. But sometimes people do
not participate in the [collective] work on the correct day, they always take that day off from collective work. ... There are many people who do
not comply with the obligation. The collective is
central to the settlement. There are around three
[families] that do not participate. There are others as well, that will work one day, skip the next,
and then work again (Settlement 5, Member 1,
2013, Author’s Translation).

R1: É, se é, por exemplo, da gente fazer
uma cerca ou qualquer outro serviço. Aı́ combina
na reunião para fazer aquele serviço. Às vezes
nunca niguém discordou, sempre concordam. Às
vezes não vai é trabalhar no dia certo, tem alguns
que sempre “folgam” naquele dia do coletivo. ...
Tem muita gente que não tá cumprindo aquela
obrigação. Que é o coletivo é o mais principal
do assentamento, né. ... Tem aı́ uns 3 que tá
um bom tempo que não frequenta. E os outros é
assim, trabalha um dia, e vai sempre salteando,
passa um dia sem trabalhar, volta de novo. Mas
para dizer assim, tá com muito tempo que não
trabalha, 5, 10 famı́lias. Não tem assim (Settlement 5, Member 1, 2013).

Settlement 7’s collective work was on hold when I conducted my field work. This
settlement had been experiencing challenges in keeping settlement presidents. The
past five years had seen one resignation due to pregnancy replaced by a president too
ill to carry out his presidential duties.
While Table 4.2 is suggestive rather than conclusive, it is apparent that a great
majority of settlers participate in collective work. As I noted above, Settlement 5 and
7 have not been able to completely eliminate free riding. These are also the settlements in which the fewest people are paying the fines charged for non-participation.
Settlement 7’s responses correspond to the previous season. Most settlement members feel that collective work is divided fairly. The majority of the settlements charge
people when they do not show up. Payment by settlement members varies but enough
people are paying the sanction such that it remains a credible threat.
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Table 4.2. Participation in Settlement Collective Work
Settlement
3
4
5
7
8

Collective

Divide

Charge

Pay

100%
100%
89%
92%
100%

83%
90%
95%
88%
71%

92%
50%
89%
96%
100%

75%
50%
32%
32%
53%

The survey questions were as follows: Collective — Do you
participate in settlement collective work?; Divide — Do you
feel settlement collective work is divided fairly?; Charge —
When members miss settlement collective work days are they
charged the missed days work?; Pay — When members are
charged the missed day’s work, do they pay? Settlement 6
does not have collective work. Settlements 1 and 2 are not
included in the table because they were not surveyed. In these
two settlements I only conducted interviews.

4.4.2

Collective Crops and Livestock

Three of the eight settlements had collective crops or livestock in addition to their
SJA subproject. Some of the work necessary for maintaining the collective crops and
livestock was conducted during the time set aside for collective work and some was
conducted outside of it. Settlements 4 and 8 tended their collective crops during
the hours set aside for collective work. They grow these crops to pay the yearly
installments on their land loan.
Settlement 4’s collective crops include beans, corn, and papayas. Although there is
minimal investment in the communal land, the proceeds are kept in the association’s
bank account. Most settlers use some form of pesticide control, tractor cultivation,
and sometimes fertilizer on their own land. On the collective land, they do not use
tractors, pesticides, or fertilizer. The proceeds from the collective land go into the
association’s bank account and are used to pay the land loan. Only eight of the ten
families are willing to work on the productive cultivation. The two families who refuse
to participate do not believe they should have to pay the land loan back. Thus, the
other settlers have required these families to pay their part of the land loan out of their
own income, something they either can’t or have been unwilling to do many years.

92

This has resulted in loan delinquency most years for all members of the settlement
as the land title is held collectively.7
Settlement 7 had established an area of fruit tree cultivation, mostly bananas, as
a collective crop prior to receiving their SJA project. However, most households had
stopped participating in the collective crop cultivation. At the time of my visit, only
three families continued to work on the collective crop, collecting fruit for their own
homes. Although there seemed to be sufficient water, there was little maintenance of
the area. In addition, Settlement 7 had attempted to plant corn and beans collectively,
but this had lasted only one year. Settlement 8 produced feed for its cattle collectively.
The feed crops were corn, sorghum and capim (a grass produced as livestock feed).
They stored the harvested crops collectively and settlement members bought the feed
for their animals. The money received goes to the settlement association.
Settlements 7 and 8 also have collective livestock. These are cattle that were
bought through a government credit program called PRONAF A (Programa Nacional
de Fortalecimento da Agricultura Familiar – National Program to Strengthen Family
Agriculture. “A” refers to loans given to those living in settlements). In settlement 7
only around five families take care of the collective cattle. The following is an excerpt
from an interview in settlement 7 with a household that cares for the collective cattle.
Q: Does everyone participate in caring for the
collective livestock? A: Yes, the cattle need someone to look after them. In order to see if they are
weak. Some members are not very interested in
helping but there are some who always take care
of the cattle. Those [people] usually take care of
the cattle in the winter when the cattle are left
loose [inside the settlement]. When it is winter
all we do is check on them to see if they are sick.
[When they are sick] We gather two or three of
them, put them in corral, [and] cure them. Q:
Do those who care for the cattle feel it is unfair
that they end up caring for them when others do
not? A: Yes, they complain a little. Q: A little?
A: Yes. [They say,] “Hey that guy could do it.”
Because when the time comes to kill and divide
the kilos of meat for each to make a lunch [they
say,] “That guy only comes when it is time to re-

P: Todos trabalham com o gado, o gado coletivo? R: É. O gado tem momentos em que
ele precisa de estar olhado. Para ver se algum
está enfraquecido. Alguns não são muito interessados não, mas tem umas pessoas que sempre
cuida. Eles [que sempre cuidam] também tira
maior [parte do] tempo nas soltas mesmo, perı́odo
do inverno né. Quando é inverno é tudo solto,
a gente só olha, muitas vezes vai olhar lá se tem
alguma bicheira. [Quando tiver] junta por ali uns
2 ou 3, bota no curral, cura. P: E as pessoas que
cuidam do gado sentem que é injusto que eles têm
que cuidar, e os outros não? R: É eles reclamam
um pouco. P: Um pouco? R: É. “Eh fulano podia coisa”. Porque quando chega a hora de matar
e dividir quilo né para cada um fazer um almoço
aı́, “fulano só vem quando é para receber o quilo”.
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ceive his kilo of meat.” But in any case we have to Eh mais aı́, que também não pode esmorecer tudo
push forward. If we don’t the whole thing fails. né. Se esmorecer e acaba com tudo a situação.

Settlement 8 also has collective cattle. They keep the cattle in a corral instead
of unrestrained as in Settlement 7. The responsibility for feeding the cattle rotates
daily through the families. The settlement occasionally sells cattle to cover settlement
costs. Originally the settlement was expected to begin paying back the PRONAF A
loan in 2013, but due to an extensive drought, loan repayments were pushed back to
2014.

4.4.3

Women and Collective Work

Work conducted on the settlements was gender divided. Most work on crops, with
livestock, or in settlement maintenance was conducted by men. Women took care
of housework and cared for gardens. Occasionally women would assist men during
harvest. There were households in which the women worked alongside the men in
cultivating their crops, but these were not the norm. Women did not participate
in the collective settlement work dedicated toward maintaining the settlement. In
four of the eight settlements women had organized their own collective work at some
point over the settlements’ histories. Generally, they took on the tasks of cleaning the
settlement’s collective buildings, although in Settlement 1 they also participated in
the SJA subproject. The settlement collective buildings are often a larger home, what
was previously the manager’s or the landlord’s home. In most settlements this home
had been set aside for the settlers as a collective area, often serving as a meeting place
or a school for adult education. At the time I conducted my fieldwork only Settlement
5 continued to have scheduled women’s collective work in which the majority of the
women participated. Settlement 8 has had some women’s collective work but at the
time of the interviews only two women participated. In Settlement 1, the women join
7

This settlement received it’s land loan through Crédito Fundı́ario.
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the men’s collective work but only for the task of harvesting cashews. In most of the
settlements, it had been hard to organize and maintain women’s collective work.
Table 4.3. Women’s Collective Work
Settlement

Women’s Collective Work

Settlement 1
Settlement 2
Settlement 3

Participate in Cashew Harvesting.
No Women’s Collective Work.
Originally one 8 hour day per week cleaning collective buildings. Currently
No Women’s Collective Work.
No Women’s Collective Work.
One 8 hour day per month. Cleaning collective buildings.
No Women’s Collective Work
No Women’s Collective Work
One 4 hour morning a month is allocated to keeping settlement buildings
clean. Only two women participate.

Settlement
Settlement
Settlement
Settlement
Settlement

4
5
6
7
8

Author’s Data.

4.5

São José Agrário Subprojects

The institutions governing the São José Agrário subprojects often overlap with
those of the collective settlement work, particularly in the case of infrastructure subprojects. Infrastructure subproject work is often conducted during the time set aside
for the settlement collective work and follows the same rules. One reason for this
is that infrastructure subprojects create either a public good or a common pool resource. In either case, these goods are non-excludable. As such, it is important that
all settlement households participate in providing these goods to prevent free riding.
SJA productive projects, on the other hand, often have different institutions.
While some of the work in productive SJA subprojects can occur during the settlement
collective work time, often work on these subprojects occurs outside of the settlement
collective work time. This occurs as productive SJA subprojects require long-term,
ongoing, frequent work. Thus, productive SJA projects often require additional work
to that of the settlement collective work time. The organization and work on the
productive subproject are collective but the output is a private, excludable good.
For example, the irrigation subprojects in my case studies were small, covering one
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field. The work and payments for the electricity to run the pumps for irrigation
were contributed (mostly) equally by the subproject participants. The output of the
subproject was then sold, and income was divided among the participants. As such,
non-participants can be excluded from using the irrigation equipment or sharing in
the income produced from the subproject.
As the SJA project members decrease, it is less likely the settlement collective
work time will be dedicated to SJA subproject work since the SJA subproject does
not represent the whole settlement at that point. Those who participate divide the
outcome among themselves. Typically free riding in SJA productive subprojects is
observable primarily as shirking. When subproject rules are unclear, it can be quite
difficult to sanction or exclude shirking members. Typically there is no fine if a participating member does not show up for SJA productive or infrastructure subproject
work unless that work falls under the time dedicated to collective settlement work. In
that case, the rules governing settlement collective work come into play. Each settlement creates its own rules for its SJA subprojects. In my case studies, I found these
rules to be less formalized than those for the collective settlement work. As such,
dealing with free riding problems poses a challenge to the SJA subproject success.
There are differences in the potential for free riding in SJA subprojects depending
on the type of subproject and the stage of the subproject (see Table 4.4). All SJA
subprojects include a design phase and need to be administered throughout their life
span, requiring participant input in SJA subproject organization. All SJA subprojects
including those providing public goods, common pool resources, and private goods
face free riding in terms of shirking subproject work or by not providing the necessary monetary contributions to implement and maintain the subproject. Common
pool resource subprojects can potentially face overuse of the resource. Productive
subprojects primarily face free riding as shirking or non-contribution of inputs.
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Free riding occurs depending on the stage of the subproject (see Table 4.4). During
Stage 1 the settlements organized and submitted proposals for the SJA subprojects.
This necessitated participation of all households in this organizational activity. During Stage 2, technical agencies came to the settlements, and, with the assistance of the
settlement households, built the SJA subprojects. In this stage, it was possible that
the settlers would need to provide further organizational activities, monetary contributions, and provide labor for the implementation process. In Stage 3 and thereafter,
the technical agencies associated with SJA subproject have left the communities to
administer the productive or the infrastructure subproject on their own. Stage 3 for
infrastructure subprojects is the Operations and Maintenance (O&M) Stage. It can
include organizational activities to deal with unforeseen problems, monetary contributions, and labor to provide maintenance. In addition, stage 3 of the common pool
resource subproject faces the potential problem of overuse. Stage 3 of the productive
subproject is the Incubation Stage in which the subproject has been built, but has yet
to produce enough to be sold on the market or to provide a significant source of income for the settlement. This stage can include organizational activities to deal with
unforeseen problems. It is also quite important in this stage that the member households provide ongoing and continual labor to the subproject. Often the households are
also responsible for paying bills related to the subproject (a monetary contribution).
Stage 4, the Output Stage, only exists in the productive SJA subproject. Here the
settlers may need to organize transportation and access to a market in which to sell
their output. Then they must distribute the resulting income or production among
the subproject members. In addition, there are often ongoing costs associated with
bringing the production to market as well as with the ongoing production. Similarly,
there is an ongoing need for labor in production, sales, and distribution.
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Table 4.4 provides a breakdown of the types of free riding and when they can
potentially occur. Boxed numbers indicate that this type of free riding affected my
case studies.
Table 4.4. Types of Free Riding
Stage 2
Implementation
1,2,3
1,2,3

Stage 3
O&M
1, 2 ,3
1, 2 ,3,4

Stage 4
None

Public Goods
CPR

Stage 1
Approval
1
1

Private Goods

Approval
1

Implementation
1,2,3

Incubation
1,2,3

Output
—, —, —

Infrastructure

Productive

Author’s typology. 1,2,3,4 indicate different types of free riding that could occur in the projects included
in my case studies.
1 = Failure to participate in organizational activities
2 = Failure to provide monetary contributions
3 = Shirking subproject work
4 = Overuse of resource
A box around the numbers indicates I observed this type of free riding in my case studies.
— Indicates that none of the productive projects in my study had reached the Output Stage and as such
I could not observe or interview settlers about free riding. I would assume that free riding could occur
here as either 1, 2 or 3.

4.5.1

Technical Assistance

In the cases of both SJA and SJII, once a community receives a subproject they
act collectively to implement, operate, and maintain the subproject. The level of
assistance settlers receive in each of these stages varies widely. Subproject implementation is designed and carried out by technical agencies working with the communities,
which generally provide labor. Technical agencies can be either public or private. Implementation is an intensive stage that most often requires significant daily labor over
a certain period by the participants. In two of my cases, that of building a fence and
planting cashew trees, participants worked collectively every day for several months
until the subproject was finished. The presence of the technical agency in the settlement, in addition to monitoring the collective work, also generates optimism and
motivation, further limiting free riding. Following the implementation stage, communities are largely left to themselves to carry out the subproject O&M Stage in
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the infrastructure subproject, or the Incubation and Output Stages in productive
subprojects.

4.6

Free Riding in São José Agrário Subprojects

Did free riding exist in my case studies of the SJA subprojects? Of the eight
subprojects, one showed clear evidence of free riding, Settlement 5. São José Agrário
subprojects in Settlements 3 and 7 showed group and individual attrition respectively from productive SJA subprojects. Overall settlers seemed to overcome most
free riding problems in the SJA subprojects. It is difficult to draw strong conclusion
regarding free riding in the SJA subprojects because of the newness of the SJA productive subprojects, the fact that many of them had already failed, and that, for the
most part, the subprojects had yet to contribute significant production or increases
in income (and, as such, may not have been particularly desirable to the community).
Table 4.5. Participation and Free Riding in Sao Jose Agrario
Settlement
Settlement
Settlement
Settlement
Settlement
Settlement
Settlement
Settlement
Settlement
Settlement
Settlement

1
2
3
4
4
4
6
5
7
8

SJA

Subproject
Type

Cashew
Fence
Irrigation
Capim
Fence
Storage Shed
Reservoir
Apiculture
Irrigation
Tractor

Private Good
Public Good
Private Good
Private Good
Public Good
Public Good
CPR
Private Good
Private Good
Private Good

No.Fam.
At Start
42
25
16
10
10
10
12
22
27
23

Part/Inter
Fams

10/12 = 83%
10/10 = 100%
10/10 = 100%
10/10 = 100%
7/10 = 70%
11/19 = 58%
11/25 = 44%
17/17 = 100%

Existing
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
On Hold
No
Yes

Number of Families at the start is the number of families officially registered in the project
by the government/MST statistics in 2007/2008. I only conducted interviews in Settlements
1 and 2, so I don’t have the statistics on the total number of families currently participating.
In Settlements 3 through 8, I conducted a census survey, and the number of surveyed families
is the denominator, the number who said they are currently participating in the subproject
or were participating when the subproject failed is the numerator. Settlement 4 had split the
funds for the SJA subproject into three subprojects: capim, fence, storage shed. I categorize the
subprojects into private goods, public goods, and common pool resources. What I am referring
to here is the outcome of the subproject. For example, irrigation subprojects produce fruits and
vegetables which can be sold in the market. This money is the private good which is shared
among the participants.
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The Implementation Stage of both the infrastructure and the productive subprojects had very few problems with free riding. During this stage, there are two
factors which prevent free riding. First, technical agencies assist the settlers in constructing the subprojects. Often the settlers work alongside the technical agencies.
In my case studies, settlements provided the required ten percent of subproject cost
in labor rather than in cash. Technical assistance serves as an outside monitor of
non-participation during the implementation period, serving as a complement to internal institutional structures that limit free riding. Second, generally, the settlers
are excited about the subproject prospects resulting in high levels of motivation and
participation. The following quote illuminates how “servants” (community members)
assisted the mason, rotating the jobs among the families each day.
We all worked collectively. ... It took a long
time [to finish]. Because we spent nearly a month
just on the shed. ... It was the whole week [we
worked]. When we were working [on the shed]
during the week, one day two people would come,
or sometimes three. It was more or less like this.
We worked there with two masons and three servants every day, the whole week. There were days
that there were up to four people here, four servants helping the mason, and the mason, altogether this was six people (Settlement 4, Member
2, 2013, Author’s Translation).

A gente tudo trabalhou coletivo. ... Levou
bastante tempo. Porque só no salão, a gente passou quase um mês. ... Foi a semana todinha.
Quando a gente estava trabalhando aı́, a gente...
uma semana era assim, um dia vinha dois, um
dia vinha dois, três, um dia vinha... era mais
ou menos assim, não é? A gente trabalhava aı́,
era dois pedreiros, três serventes todo dia. A semana todinha. Tinha dia de ter até quatro pessoas aqui, quatro serventes ajudante do pedreiro,
e com o pedreiro era seis pessoas (Settlement 4,
Member 2, 2013).

Once the Implementation Stage is complete, the technical agency leaves the settlement and the project transitions into an Operations and Maintenance Stage (O&M).
In this stage, much of the collective work in the infrastructure subprojects is completed during the time set aside for settlement collective work. Thus, if shirking is
present in the settlement collective work, it will also affect the SJA subproject work.
The infrastructure subprojects in my case studies occurred in Settlements 2, 4, and
6. Settlements 2 and 4 had few problems with collective settlement work (as we saw
in the last section). Settlement 6’s subproject failed but not for reasons of free riding.
A further characteristic of infrastructure subprojects during the O&M stage is that
the settlement is expected (by the WB and SDA subproject designers) to charge a fee
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to each member for the use of the good. Settlement 2 and 4 were unable to charge a
fee to its members for the use of the fence (Settlement 6’s project was never built).
Since the good — the fence — is non-excludable, it becomes difficult to enforce a fee
for use. In fact, in the communities I visited there were several which had previous
São José I and II subprojects that included reservoirs. In several cases reservoir dams
had broken, and because communities had not collected a usage fee, they had been
unable to repair the reservoirs. In the case of Settlement 2, repairs to the fence are
much less expensive than those to a reservoir. Thus, it is probable that in the case of
fence damage the association could raise enough money via one-time donations from
settlement members.
Productive subprojects need ongoing and continual collective work. Free riding
in productive subprojects presents either as a failure to contribute equally in terms
of labor — shirking — or monetary requirements. For example, in an irrigation subproject, a household is in charge of turning on and off the water each day. While
infrastructure subprojects require the majority of the collective work during the implementation stage, productive subprojects tend to have ongoing significant labor
requirements and often, monetary costs. Thus, free riding becomes a more persistent
problem. The strength of these subprojects is their excludable nature. Thus, if participants free ride to the extent that others find it objectionable they can be excluded
from the subproject.
M1: Those that don’t want to participate in
the collective [SJA subproject] work. ... no one
is going to force them, right? The person stays
on the sidelines, and we go and take care of the
collective work.
M2: For example now in the cashew gathering, we have the cashew harvest, and then we
gather all of the harvest, and we sell the cashews
and those who don’t want to participate for whatever reason, he will lose a certain percent of the
production, right? We will take out forty percent
of the collective, that leaves sixty percent, he is
left out of that sixty percent. He is not participating in that income.

M1: Aquele que não quer participar do coletivo. ... ninguém vai forçar, né? H1: Ele fica la
prum ladozinho e a gente vai cuidar do coletivo.
M2: Por exemplo agora na coleta da castanha, tem a colheita da castanha, e dai quando
junta toda a colheita, faz a venda da castanha e
dai aquele que não quiz participar por um motivo qualquer , ele vai perder uma certa porcentagem da produçao né? Vai se tirar o quarenta por
cento coletivo, vai ficar os sessenta por cento, ele
vai ficar fora daqueles sessenta. Não esta participando dessa renda.
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M1: Because if he is not participating, he
M1: Por que não esta participando não será
won’t be a beneficiary either, right (Settlement 2, beneficiado também, né (Settlement 2, Members
Members 1 and 2, 2012, Author’s Translation)? 1 and 2, 2012)?

For the most part, the settlers were able to overcome free riding in their SJA
subprojects. Of the six settlements with subprojects, only Settlement 5 presented
clear evidence of free riding. This was also one of the settlements that had encountered
difficulties with settlement collective work. Settlements 3 and 7 also presented some
indications that free riding may have been a problem prior to subproject failure.
Settlement 5 was careful to institute rules dealing with free riding in their apiculture project by creating a document outlining the rules of the subproject. This
was the only settlement to have a written document outlining subproject rules. For
example, if a person misses more than two days in a row without a reasonable excuse
it is brought to the attention of the group (Assentamento 5, Associacao do Projecto
de Assentamento 5, 2008). If they continue missing work, then it will be brought
up in an administrative meeting and the person can be excluded from the subproject (Assentamento 5, Associacao do Projecto de Assentamento 5, 2008). There is
a problem with this rule because it does not delineate practical guidelines, such as
after how many missed days would there be a meeting held. Furthermore, although
a document outlining the rules exists, none of the interviewees mentioned it except
the president.
Unfortunately, the drought that had persisted in the region for the two years
preceding the period of my investigation had weakened Settlement 5’s subproject.
The drought had contributed to a lack of flowers and subproject participants were
feeding the bees in order to keep them alive. Of the eleven households who considered
themselves current members of the project, only four households were contributing
money to buy the sugar and contributing labor to feed the bees. Those who were not
contributing were not expelled from the subproject. Invariably, they said they were
waiting for good rains (and thus flowers) to start working on the subproject again,
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once the bees were producing honey. In this case, even though they had a list of rules
for the subproject, the settlement members were not using them to exclude members
from the subproject who were free riding.
Settlements 1, 2, 4, and 8 showed no evidence of free riding in their subprojects
and they all had ongoing subprojects. Settlement 4 had essentially privatized their
productive subproject of growing capim by separating the subproject equally among
all members. Each settlement family was given an equal amount of land and capim
seed (a grass feed for livestock) in the same field. If they did not want to grow the
capim, they could leave the land fallow with no negative repercussion for the rest
of the subproject participants. Each household could use the capim to feed their
own livestock or sell it to other members. Settlement 8’s tractor was owned by the
settlement association and rented to the settlers following a strict set of rules created
by the state government that accompanies this subproject. Settlement 1 had full
participation and a sense of unity that was somewhat unique among the settlements
I visited. They were optimistic about their cashew tree harvest and had even applied
to other government agencies and NGOs to learn ways of processing the fruit and
nuts and to invest in the needed infrastructure.
Settlements 3 and 7 both had irrigation subprojects. One of the main challenges
to these two subprojects was the need to provide monthly electricity payments. The
settlers were not willing to pay these charges. In both cases, the settlements were
eligible for government subsidized electricity. Neither settlement was willing to go
through the government bureaucracy to access these funds indicating a failure of the
subproject members to take on the necessary (re)organizational chores. In Settlement
3, the group as a whole decided to leave the project. The fact that members were
unwilling to either pay for electricity or to undertake the bureaucratic process of
accessing subsidized electricity might indicate some free riding. In Settlement 7, there
was persistent attrition from the subproject until the costs of electricity were too much
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for the remaining project members and they quit as well. Subproject attrition could
also indicate free riding problems. In these two subprojects, even given the desire of
other members to continue the subproject, these remaining members were unable to
do so due to the cost of electricity. These two examples show an explicit refusal by
members of these two settlements to provide monetary inputs in order to support the
subprojects.
I did not observe free riding in stage 4 because none of the productive SJA subprojects had reached that phase successfully. Settlement 1’s cashew trees were not
yet producing sufficiently to find a market. Settlement 5 had one year of honey production but had been unable to find a place to sell their honey. Soon thereafter the
drought hit and the point became moot as honey production halted. It is unclear if
they will be able to overcome this problem in the future and if free riding will play a
role.
While settlement institutions frame subproject institutions, subproject institutions do not frame settlement institutions. Most settlements had confronted free
riding at some point in either their settlement collective work or in their SJA subprojects. Free riding could present a more significant potential problem for the SJA
infrastructure subprojects because settlers cannot exclude those who do not provide
labor or monetary inputs from these subprojects. The excludable nature of the SJA
productive subprojects should make it much easier to expel free riders from the subproject.8 Yet the ability to do so depends on the implementation of subproject rules,
8

Since the settlement and the subproject are distinct entities, failure of one does not necessarily
predict the failure of the other. More concretely, the failure of the SJA subproject will have little
impact on the continuation of the settlement. In many of my case studies the subproject failed
— participants left the subproject, but because the settlement and subproject are distinct and
contributions to the settlement are different than contributions to the subproject — subproject
failure had little impact on the settlement. In addition, individual exclusion from the subproject
has little impact on individual participation in the settlement. Often settlement members decided
not to participate in the SJA subproject or left the SJA subproject and faced no repercussions to
their membership in the settlement. The failure of the settlement may lead to the failure of the
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which are often vague. It seems likely that, in the event these subprojects were to
continue into maturity and to increase production and income, they would become
more desirable. Consequently, participants might be loathed to leave, and shirking
could present a greater obstacle to the management of these subprojects. Free riding
may occur more frequently in cases where subproject rules are vague. The persistent
problems the settlement collective work faces indicates productive subprojects, with
their need for ongoing work, might also face free riding problems including shirking.

4.7
4.7.1

Discussion
The Collective Work Labor Supply Pattern

I observed a cyclical pattern to free riding in settlement collective work. This
pattern is present (to some extent) in SJA infrastructure subprojects insomuch as it
is present in those settlements’ collective work. I believe such a pattern would also
challenge the SJA productive subprojects given a longer time frame.
In settlement collective work, settlers go through periods of high participation,
effort and motivation. When for whatever reason motivation declines, settlers begin
shirking, which can beget more shirking. At this point, settlers must resolve whatever issues are affecting the collective settlement work, or it may become ineffective.
Generally, it takes significant organization and effort to re-motivate the settlers. This
is a cost incurred by the community. When successful, the effort settlers have contributed increases settler commitment to collective settlement work. Often collective
work functions well for a period thereafter. Again a shock may hit, or time may just
go by in which settlers again lose motivation, and the cycle begins again. Here we
can see the cyclical nature of free riding in collective action.

subproject if the land used for the subproject becomes unavailable or the participants are forced to
leave the region. In the larger SJII project, many subprojects occurred outside of settlements.
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The extent of free-riding differs between infrastructure and productive SJA subprojects based on their design. In both infrastructure and productive SJA subprojects
the technical agencies that designed the subprojects come to the settlements and begin
the subprojects during the Implementation Stage. The settlers provide labor during
this stage (fulfilling the requirement that they contribute 10% of project cost in either
labor or money). During this stage of the subproject, with the backing of the SDA
and technicians, subproject optimism is high and settlers are motivated. Settlers are
proficient organizers and have extensive experience working together. They quickly
and efficiently accomplish the initial labor requirements of the subproject. This can
be from constructing needed buildings to planting trees.
Here the infrastructure and productive subprojects diverge. After this Implementation Stage much less labor is required to maintain the infrastructure subprojects and
it can often be completed during settlement collective work. On the other hand productive subprojects require both this intensive ‘first’ labor during the Implementation
Stage as well as ongoing labor in the Incubation and Output Stages. In the Incubation
Stage, as time goes by and problems appear, including sporadic technical assistance
and accompaniment, settler motivation and optimism falls. People stop showing up
for group work. There is a slump in labor supply and intensity. If problems are not
resolved, and accompaniment and a rationale for motivation are not present, people
begin to drop out. Remaining participants may not be capable of carrying out the
subproject (e.g. too few people over which to spread costs) and therefore may shirk
or also drop out. In a worst case scenario, remaining participants may take what is
left of subproject resources and use them for their private production.
Thus in both types of subprojects, settlers’ willingness to participate mirrors the
pattern I observed in settlement collective work. The extent of free-riding is not
static, but variable. Collective action has peaks and valleys of participation, which
can occur even over a relatively short term. If subprojects are to be successful, they
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must find a way to either keep motivation up or re-motivate participants early in
the Incubation Stage before participants start to drop out. One of the more practical
ways of doing this is through consistent technical assistance. This technical assistance
should be directed at resolving problems facing the settlers in the subproject, as well
as assisting participants in laying the groundwork to quickly introduce subproject
production into markets in order to speedily provide income. This is essential in
demonstrating the feasibility of productive subprojects.

4.7.2

Free Riding Occurrence in Settlement Collective Work versus SJA
Subprojects

I hypothesized: If free riding presented a problem in settlement collective work
it would also do so in the SJA subprojects. I found this hypothesis to mostly hold.
Table 4.6 shows that in almost all cases when the settlement collective work had
free riding, the SJA subproject also had free riding. To some extent, this occurred
because the SJA subproject work was sometimes subsumed under the settlement
collective work time. Yet in the case of productive subprojects, Settlements 1, 3,
4, 5, 7, 8, the existence of unresolved free riding in collective work also correlated
with the existence of free riding in SJA productive subproject work in five of the
six settlements. In Settlement 3 we see that there was no free riding in collective
settlement work, but there may have been in the SJA subproject. Clearly there was
a lack of desire to apply for the government subsidized electricity or to pay for full
cost electricity but this could be due to problems other than free riding as well (for
example the settlers may not have believed the subproject would ever cover its costs
or the bureaucratic process of applying presented too high a cost). Additionally,
it is important to note that in Settlement 3, what was required was not labor but
additional funds to pay for electricity.
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Table 4.6. Free Riding in Collective Settlement Work Versus SJA Subproject Work
Settlement

Collective Work Free Riding

SJA Subproject Free Riding

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

No
No
No
No
Yes
—
Yes
No

No
No
Yes
No
Yes
—
Yes
No

Author’s data. Collective Work Free Riding refers to observed free riding during my
fieldwork. It excludes historical problems with free riding. Settlement 6 was both unable
to create the institution of collective work and had a subproject that was not implemented
fully. I exclude it here.

4.7.3

Institutions

I hypothesized that the bottom-up nature of the locally-created and contextspecific institutions would preclude free riding in the SJA subprojects. I found that
this wasn’t the case for the most part. In fact, the SJA subproject institutions were
much less robust the settlement institutions around collective settlement work. I go
into further detail below.
As I mentioned in the introduction, in the 1970s and 1980s many theorists were
cynical that collective work could function due to free riding. In the 1990s, Ostrom
and others found, via empirical work, that groups did overcome the free rider problem.
Ostrom found that institutions were essential to resolving issues of free riding. Free
riding can appear in several forms in collective work and in the CDD projects, from
shirking to non-contribution of monetary inputs to maintain the public good. Shirking
had been a challenge to many of the settlements’ collective maintenance work. Since
I choose settlements established between 1998 and 2002, all settlements had over
ten years of experience addressing this obstacle. Generally, settlers had successfully
handled the free rider problem in the collective maintenance work in large part thanks
to settlement institutions.
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Free riding presented less of an obstacle for SJA subprojects. In part, this was
because, in the case of some subprojects, subproject work was completed during the
time set aside for collective maintenance work in which the free riding problem was
(mostly) solved. Shirking subproject work tends to occur when people lose motivation.
Motivation often declines over the long term (as I mentioned above in the section on
the collective work labor supply pattern) thus the failure of some of the subprojects
in one or two years hampered my ability to identify free riding problems in the
subprojects.
The institutions of collective settlement work had been much more robust than
those of the SJA subprojects. Collective settlement work faced many problems over
the existence of the settlement and in most settlements, the settlers were able to
resolve these problems and ensure the continuation of the collective work. On the
other hand, in the SJA subprojects, when formerly participating settlement members
dropped out of the subproject, the subprojects failed. As I review the institutions
of collective settlement work and those of SJA subprojects, I will refer to the design principles Ostrom defines as important in the successful management of CPRs
mentioned in the background section of this chapter (Ostrom, 1990, 90).9 Although
collective settlement work and SJA subprojects are mostly not CPRs, I believe her
design principles are also useful when evaluating successful collective action in these
subprojects.
The settlement collective work institutions begin with the general assembly (see
Figure 4.1). The general assembly is a meeting of all settlement members held once

9

1. Clear who has access and a right to use the resource. 2. Rules of resource appropriation and
outlining provision by members must reflect local conditions and means. 3. The majority of people
using the resource also can affect rules. 4. Active monitors are accountable to the community. 5.
Graduated sanctions. 6. Rapid, accessible, low-cost conflict-resolution mechanisms. 7. The external
government recognizes community rights to create and implement rules, as well as to monitor and
sanction members. 8. Design principles are nested within the local, regional and national government
(Ostrom, 1990, p.90).
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a month and additionally when needed. This is the arena in which all settlers can
participate in creating the rules for the collective work (and for the settlement in
general) and deciding on the sanctions for members who free ride. This reflects
Ostrom’s principle three: the majority of people who are accessing the resource can
also affect the rules. The settlers monitor each other because they are all expected to
participate in settlement collective work. Settlers can easily identify people who do
not participate. Monitoring could be improved by deciding upon specific monitors in
order to reduce interpersonal conflict. Ostrom alludes to designating specific monitors
in her principle four. When members do not participate, the settlement leadership
charges them the previously agreed upon fine as a sanction. If a member continues
to fail to participate in the collective work they can be evicted from the settlement.
These sanctions have two levels so technically they might be considered graduated,
Ostrom’s principle number five, but the second level is so severe relative to the shirking
that the settlers are loathed to use it.
Figure 4.1. Settlement Collective Work Institutions
General Assembly

Rules

Monitoring

Sanctions

Problems

Step 1: Meetings

Step 2: Reorganization

Step 3: Threat

MST, Union
INCRA, CF
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Generally, there are three steps to resolving problems when fines do not prevent
non-participation and the threat of eviction also fails to motivate members to participate. These steps are outlined in Figure 4.1. In the first step the leadership can
meet both individually or in a group with the offending members to reinforce the
need for their participation (this occurred in Settlements 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8). Occasionally, these meetings uncover logistical problems that are preventing the settlers from
participating (this occurred in Settlements 4 and 5). If this occurs, the settlers may
move to step 2. In step 2, the leadership brings the obstacles that the individuals are
facing to the general assembly to problem-solve (this occurred in Settlements 4 and
5). The group may then reorganize the settlement work and modify the rules and
sanctions. This corresponds closely to Ostrom’s principle number six that calls for
rapid, accessible, low-cost conflict-resolution mechanisms.
If this still fails to resolve the free riding problem, the settlers can move to step 3.
In step 3 the settlers can appeal to the outside entities of the MST, the agricultural
workers’ union, INCRA, and IDACE10 , to reinforce the sanctions and the need for collective work (this occurred in Settlement 5). Thus, these entities serve what Ostrom
has referred to in her principle eight as ‘nested enterprises’ in that the institutions of
the settlement are nested within those of the local, regional, and state government.
In Figure 4.1 this is indicated by the circle surrounding the settlement. Furthermore,
the ability to appeal directly to entities of the government, for example INCRA and
CF, shows that the self-management rules of the community are recognized by the
government, Ostrom’s principle number seven.
São José Agrário Subprojects
10

The state agency in charge of the Crédito Fundı́ario willing-buyer, willing-seller land reform
program.
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In infrastructure subprojects, free riding presents in two ways: non-contribution
to the subproject O&M fund and shirking. Productive subprojects primarily face
free riding as shirking. Yet, the extent of shirking varies between infrastructure and
productive subprojects because of their design. Infrastructure subprojects require
one-off intensive amounts of labor during the implementation stage but much less
labor is dedicated to their maintenance.
As in collective settlement work, SJA subprojects institutions begin in the general
assembly. Many of the rules of the subprojects were decided upon by the SDA and the
WB. For example, the settlement must provide ten percent of the cost of the subproject, either in money or in labor. Entry into the subproject is voluntary, and anyone
can leave the subproject. Thus, settlement members do not face mandatory participation as they do in the collective settlement work. In all of my case studies, almost
the entire settlements had originally decided to participate, and for this reason, the
settlement general assemblies served as the governing bodies. The general assemblies
were in charge of imposing subproject rules as well as creating their own rules. The
subprojects differ to some extent from the collective settlement work in that some of
the rules are not the settlers’ own but come with the subproject and in addition tend
to be universal across subprojects. This aspect is different from Ostrom’s principle
three, in that the majority of people would not be able to change the rules that are
aspects of the project. For example in the infrastructure subprojects, the associations
were expected to collect fees, but in my case studies the associations did not collect
these. One might expect such an outcome as the good is non-excludable and the
settlers have very little cash to contribute to an O&M fund. The leadership did not
seem concerned that members were not paying the fees and had made no attempts to

112

resolve the (supposed) problem. This required rule did not seem to reflect community
values.11
Monitoring was done on an ad hoc basis by those involved in subprojects, but
again, specific monitors were not designated. Finally, there were not graduated sanctions for rule transgressions in the productive SJA subprojects. Generally, if people
violated rules or free rode extensively they could be asked to leave the subproject. I
did not find that the settlers had imposed other mechanisms to resolve conflicts. Yet,
it may be the case that they had not had major conflicts with respect to the subprojects, as there was little cost to the participants to leave the subprojects. In fact, in
the case of most of the subprojects in which several people left the subproject, the rest
followed suit thereafter, indicating that settlers were not particularly optimistic about
the subprojects’ ability to provide them with increased income or production. Infrastructure subprojects were somewhat different in that operations and maintenance
work, often repairs, occurred during settlement collective work time, and as such, fell
under settlement collective work rules. The institutions of the SJA subprojects did
not include any way to problem-solve project problems.
11

The settlement members are also required to abide by numerous top-down rules imposed upon
them as a condition of being registered settlement members. But when becoming a settlement they
also create their own rules around self-governance and collective work. There are several differences
in the reasons for which there is greater fear to break settlement rules than SJA subproject rules.
First, settlement rules are monitored by state or national authorities (very occasionally — but this
is more than in the SJA subproject. Second, they fear being evicted from the settlement. They do
not fear being excluded from a productive subproject that has not provided significant increases in
production or income.
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Figure 4.2. Flowchart 2: São José Agrário Subproject Institutions
General Assembly

WB and SDA

Rules

Monitoring

Sanctions

Problems

In the Figures 4.1 and 4.2, it is clear that the institutions of the settlement collective work are much more robust than those of SJA subprojects. Shirking in productive
subprojects in my sample tended to increase over time. Thus, subprojects with ongoing labor — productive subprojects — tend to face more shirking than those based
primarily around an implementation stage — infrastructure subprojects. For example
in Settlement 5, it was clear that some settlers who were still a part of the beekeeping
subproject were not contributing money or effort to feed the bees. The failure rate,
immaturity, and semi-privatization of subprojects made it difficult to evaluate the
free rider problem in all subprojects. However, the existence of the free rider problem
in collective maintenance work plausibly suggests if CDD subprojects survive into the
future, the free rider problem will need to be overcome. Thus, the design of the CDD
projects will need to address this issue.

4.7.4

MST and Municipal Agricultural Workers’ Unions

Third, I hypothesized that free riding would be mitigated by the presence of the
Landless Workers Social Movement and the Agricultural Workers’ Union. I expected
these groups would support and facilitate the creation of strong institutions to prevent
free riding. I find evidence to support this hypothesis.
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Collective work on the settlements and in the SJA subprojects can be difficult
to sustain and accompaniment by groups, such as the MST and the Agricultural
Workers Union, have served an important role in maintaining effectiveness. As we
saw in a previous section, Settlement 5 asked the MST for help when they were
facing free riding in collective work. Through community meetings the MST worked
with settlers on valuing of settlement collective work. Their presence also served the
purpose of reinforcing the leadership’s authority. Additionally, when the leadership of
Settlement 5 attempted to get INCRA to come to the settlement in order to deal with
non-participation in collective maintenance work, the MST lent their political weight
to the call although they were unsuccessful in gaining INCRA’s attention. Settlements
1 and 2, which were strongly linked to the MST, had community members who worked
directly with the MST, served as militants for the MST, or were studying in one of
the educational programs of the MST. These settlements appeared to have a stronger
commitment to the values of collective work. Interviews in these settlements revealed
no problems with collective work in either settlement maintenance or in the SJA
projects.
Settlements 7 and 8 were strongly connected to the municipal agricultural workers’
labor unions, each in their own municipality, Canindé and Quixeramobim respectively.
Settlement 7 had emerged out of an occupation backed by the agricultural workers’
labor union when it was more militantly inclined in 1999. Currently, this settlement
is having some issues with organization. Their link to the municipal agricultural labor union has eroded. They have had a significant turnover of households living on
the settlement, including many households that were more involved with the municipal agricultural labor union. Concurrently, the municipal agricultural labor union
became much less active in the settlements with respect to organizing. Settlement 7
is having difficulties sustaining their collective maintenance work and their collective
subprojects.
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Settlement 8 currently has several of its younger members working with the municipal agricultural workers’ labor union. Youth in the community, as well as original
settlers, were very active in organizing the community and advocating for projects.
Additionally, Settlement 8 has worked closely with a project of the International Fund
for Agriculture and Development (which in this community was strongly associated
with the Catholic Church) called Dom Helder. Dom Helder has provided the community with a multitude of collective projects. The Settlement’s relationship with the
labor union and with the long-running Dom Helder project have strengthened their
collective institutions.
In Table 4.7, I evaluate settlers’ affiliation with the MST and the agricultural workers’ labor union in relation to participation in subprojects and subproject success. It
suggests that accompaniment can be an important factor to subproject success. Settlements in which more settlers consider themselves members of the MST or members
of the municipal agricultural worker’s union tend to have ongoing subprojects. In settlements 3 through 8, I conducted a survey of all households. I asked each household
whether they considered themselves supporters of the MST, and if they were members of the agricultural workers’ labor union. In settlements 1 and 2, I interviewed
between 12 and 14 people in each (around half of each settlement). Here I only asked
if they considered themselves supporters of the MST. Supporters of the MST tend
to participate in events and may donate food or money for occupations and events.
To be part of the agricultural workers’ labor union, they must pay a small fee but
get access to retirement benefits. While certainly only suggestive, Table 4.7 does hint
that affiliation with the MST and the municipal agricultural labor unions’ is helpful
both for participation in the subproject, as well as subproject success.
When a settlement is established, the members define the settlement’s sanctions
and rules in the settlements bylaws. In settlements with a high number of illiterate
people and turnover, members may forget what was written in the association bylaws.
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Table 4.7. Accompaniment
Settlement
MST Yes
Union Yes
Participation
Subproject Exists

One

Two

Three

Four

Five

Six

Seven

Eight

100%*

100%*

Yes

Yes

92%
42%
100%
No

80%
50%
100%
Yes

74%
32%
89%
On-Hold

40%
20%
0%
No

24%
44%
92%
No

94%
65%
100%
Yes

Author’s data; * indicates that these two are from interviews of around half the settlement, all others are from census
surveys of the whole settlement. Participation indicates number of people participating in settlement collective work. This
is not a measure of participation in the SJA subproject work.

Additionally, members may come to think a particular rule is not important or does
not apply to them. In these cases, the settlement leadership must come up with
solutions. Accompaniment can serve the important role of backing up the leadership
and act as an outside force reminding settlement members of the purpose of collective
work, while the existence of modifiable bylaws ensures such accompaniment reinforces
only settlement written rules.
Government and Technical Assistance
In addition to the roles the MST and the Agricultural Worker’s Union play, I found
that technical agencies and state and national governments play an important role in
preventing free riding and fomenting subproject success. Case in point: for settlers to
evict someone from a settlement they must get approval from either INCRA or IDACE
(Instituto de Desenvolvimento Agrário do Ceará, Institute of Agrarian Development
in Ceará). Additionally, the leadership finds it helpful to have the presence of one of
these agencies to reinforce their authority in difficult cases of free riding. For example,
when a settler is not obeying settlement rules leadership may request help from these
agencies in order to reinforce to the settler that the rule is important, should be
followed, and the consequence of not doing so may be expulsion from the settlement.
Consistent technical assistance is helpful in solving problems and motivating participants. A main obstacle pointed out repeatedly by settlers was the lack of such
technical assistance, which may have contributed to free riding in the SJA subprojects.
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4.8

Conclusion

Free riding presented a challenge to both collective settlement work and SJA subproject work. It took a variety of forms including shirking, failure to provide monetary inputs, failure to participate in organizing activities and over-use of resources.
Collective settlement work was able to resolve much of the free riding through the
settlements’ institutional framework designed to support this type of work. SJA
subprojects, on the other hand, had comparatively weak supporting institutions for
resolving subproject problems.
The rules imposed by the SDA and WB did not include specific conflict resolution
mechanisms or graduated sanctions. The imposition of the rules averted the need
for settlements to create their own rules, perhaps making institutions less robust.
Furthermore, these rules were universal to all SJA subprojects and as such were
not context specific. Lastly, these rules were not always feasible to impose for the
infrastructure subprojects (such as charging a usage fee for a nonexcludable good).
Accompaniment by the MST and the municipal agricultural workers’ unions served
as a resource settlers could access when there were problems they could not resolve
in collective settlement work. As a final recourse, the ability to request intervention
from the national land reform agency (INCRA) was essential to dealing with the
gravest problems. In SJA subprojects, technical agencies were able to fill this role to
some extent, but because their accompaniment ended after one year, settlers lacked
this resource for the full duration of the subprojects.
The cyclical nature of free riding I found in collective settlement work indicates
that if a productive SJA subproject were successful in providing increased output and
income, thus appealing to the settlers, it is probable that free riding would become a
recurrent problem as the project aged. As a result, CDD project design might want
to consider free riding when designing project institutions, particularly as they move
toward a more productive focus. This study only provides a limited analysis of eight
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case studies embedded in a specific institutional environment. It would be very useful
to see additional studies address the question of free riding in CDD projects.
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CHAPTER 5
PROJECT DESIGN FLAWS: SOURCES OF SÃO JOSÉ
AGRÁRIO SUBPROJECT FAILURE

5.1

Introduction

Problems of collective action were overcome in my SJA subproject sample. Yet,
almost half the subprojects in my sample had failed. What, then, was the reason for
the subproject failure?
A main factor contributing to subproject failure of my sample stemmed from the
move from infrastructure subprojects to productive subprojects. In particular, the
design of the subprojects was not changed to accommodate the differences between
the productive and infrastructure subprojects. As a result, participants did not have
the necessary skills to apply for, implement, and manage productive subprojects without significant assistance. Dependence on those providing assistance undermines the
community-driven development goal of empowerment. In addition, such dependence
could open the space for elite capture to occur.
Subproject design uses technical assistance to fill the gap between the skills participants have and the skills they need. Unfortunately, in the SJA subprojects, the
participants relied often on private technical agencies. The private technical agencies could use the asymmetric information stemming from technical knowledge and
education inequities, as well as the power differences between the participants and
technical agency representatives, to take advantage of the participants or even engage
in corrupt practices in order to gain a larger profit. Lastly, technicians often have a
large influence on a community and can convince the majority to take on subprojects
they may not initially identify as a priority.
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Misunderstanding the causes of subproject failure can lead to faulty policy corrections. The World Bank assumes that participants self-select into subprojects based
on an accurate weighing of the costs and benefits of subproject participation. This
assumption results in perceiving significant levels of subproject failure to be the result
of participants taking on too much risk and not having enough buy-in. In contrast,
I found participants had difficulty predicting subproject costs and benefits due to a
lack of information. As such, attrition from the subproject in phases or all at once
was a rational response to updated information and not the result of moral hazard.
In addition, there were other factors that led to subproject failure, such as private
technical agencies taking advantage of participants and a lack of technical assistance
(project design flaws).
One of the State Technical Unit technicians noted that such subproject failure was
not specific to the SJA project but was a problem of the greater SJII project. Thus,
what I found in my sample appears to be representative of the project as a whole.
“And in the end, the great majority [of productive subprojects] failed. These are projects
of little reach, the structures and some of the
projects are practically idle, the infrastructure
has been built .. and nothing is working. This
was very bad for all of us that work with sustainable rural development” (Sao Jose Agrario
Technician A, 2013, Author’s Translation).

“E terminaram que esses projetos, a grande
maioria, eles fracassaram. São projetos de pequeno alcance, essas estruturas, alguns desses projetos estão praticamente parados lá, a estrutura
construı́da ... e nada funcionando. Este foi muito
ruim para todos nós que trabalhamos com desenvolvimento rural sustentável” (Sao Jose Agrario
Technician A, 2013).

Community-driven development projects have been increasingly focusing on subprojects oriented around fomenting group productive activities. “Many communitydriven development programs are also moving decisively toward greater support for
livelihood activities. Such projects tend to encompass a broad array of productive activities, including crop production and nontraditional agricultural activities, such as
aquaculture and medicinal plants, livestock, agro-forestry, fishing, and fish farming”
(Mansuri and Rao, 2012, 213, italics mine). In my case studies, I found non-traditional
to mean market-oriented livelihood production, often types which were new to the
communities and, consequently, of which they had little knowledge or experience.
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At a minimum, this signifies the communities have a difficult time evaluating the
potential costs and benefits of the projects.
The movement of the São José subprojects toward productive subprojects can
be seen in the total number of productive subprojects, as well as the amount of
funds dedicated to productive subprojects. Of the SJI subprojects, only 1% of total
subprojects were productive subprojects, in SJII 18% were productive subprojects,
and SJIII estimates that 76% of all subprojects will be productive subprojects (see
Table 5.1). Productive subprojects generally rely on access to electricity and water,
and as such become demanded after basic infrastructure has been established. In fact
initially, SJI and SJII attempted to implement productive subprojects before access to
basic infrastructure was available and ran into a demand problem. Originally SJI had
estimated that they would fund 2,380 productive subprojects but ended up funding
only 30, while infrastructure subprojects were increased from the estimate of 1,700
to 2,354 and social subprojects were increased from the 420 estimate to 673 (The
World Bank, 2001, 22). “Infrastructure investments are the great majority (77%) of
completed subprojects in Ceará, most notably rural electrification and water supply
which together account for about 70% of the total. As in other participating states,
this reflects communities’ wish to obtain the “basics” before turning to productive
and social investments” (The World Bank, 2001, 5). In SJII they estimated that
they would be able to fund 810 productive subprojects but ended up funding 531
productive subprojects. “The casualty was productive investments, demand for which
was clearly over-estimated at appraisal (of both stages) given major deficits of basic
infrastructure in Ceará and known tendency region-wide for communities to demand
water and energy before anything else” (The World Bank, 2009, 8).
As infrastructure improves, the demand and viability of productive subprojects
become greater. While SJI and SJII infrastructure subprojects focused primarily on
electricity and water supply, SJIII infrastructure subprojects are focusing on water
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Table 5.1. World Bank Funding for Community Subprojects by Type
Total Projects Total Cost
SJI
SJII
SJIII

3057
2932
585

92.9
104.5
120.0

Infrastructure Projects Infrastructure Cost Productive Projects
2354 (77%)
2391 (82%)
140 (24%)

71.5 (77%)
82.3 (79%)
50 (42%)

30 (1%)
531 (18%)
445 (76%)

Productive Cost
0.9 (1%)
19.4 (19%)
70 (58%)

Social Projects Social Cost
673 (22%)
10 (0%)
0 (0%)

Source: (The World Bank, 2001, 2009, 2012).

supply and sewage systems. Currently access to electricity is practically universal, in
great part thanks to the federal government’s program Luz para Todos (Electricity for
Everyone) and in part thanks to the SJI subprojects in Ceará. Alongside these infrastructure subprojects, has been an increasing concern with productive subprojects. In
fact, the current São José III CDD project dedicates over half of its subproject budget
to productive subprojects. The lessons learned from previous SJ infrastructure and
productive subprojects are particularly important as these projects continue into the
future.
As the subprojects move from infrastructure to productive subprojects, the infrastructure model has been adopted for productive subprojects. Yet productive subprojects require greater knowledge and access to a variety of resources that was not
necessary for the infrastructure subprojects. This creates dependence on technical
agencies, which can lead to participants being taken advantage of. The infrastructure
model also does not provide sufficient technical assistance for productive subprojects.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 presents the problems specific
to skills and literacy. Section 5.3 presents the role of the technical agencies. Section
5.4 presents case studies of the participation process and failure. Lastly, section 5.5
concludes.

5.2

Skills: Literacy, Project Elaboration and Accounting

Although many CDD projects are targeted at the poor, literacy is important to
the CDD project structure. The poor have higher rates of illiteracy and lower levels
of education. Consequently, the poor can have difficulty accessing and following CDD
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20.5 (22%)
2.8 (3%)
0 (0%)

project guidelines and carrying out subprojects when these guidelines and subprojects
require higher levels of literacy and education.
The Brazilian government divides income groups into five classes based on average
monthly income (which I converted to yearly income for ease of comparison): Class A
(equal to or above R$116,940), Class B (from R$89,700 to R$116,940), Class C (from
R$20,808 to R$89,700), Class D (from R$13,020 to R$20,808), and Class E (from R$0
to R$13,020) (Centro de Politicas Sociais, 2011). The richest income group has 99%
literacy, and the poorest group only has 85% literacy.
Table 5.2. Literacy by Income Class
Class

Total

Literate

Percentage

A
B
C
D
E

12,572
6,495
127,347
57,161
62,982

12,441
6,455
121,117
50,043
53,4189

99.0
99.4
95.1
87.6
84.8

Source: PNAD 2012, Author’s Calculations, Age 15 and Over

According to the same 2012 Brazilian household survey, the total Brazilian literacy
rate for people 15 years or older is 91%. This falls to just 82% for the state of Ceara
(Fundacao Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia E Estatistica, 2012).1 My survey of the
6 settlements that received a CDD project reveals a 71.5% literacy rate (295 people,
15 years and older), which is similar to two other surveys done of rural populations in
Ceara, Brazil, about ten years earlier, finding overall illiteracy to be 33% and finding
32% of settlement heads of households to be illiterate(Leite et al., 2004; Filho et al.,
2001). Before becoming settlers, these were landless workers and moradores, and as
such some of the poorest of the region. It follows that my sample would have a lower
than average literacy rate. The average education of my sample of all participants
eighteen and over was five years with a median of four years of education.
1

Rural poverty tends to be concentrated in the Northeast of Brazil.
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Just applying for a community-driven development subproject requires a number
of steps that could present obstacles to the poorest: accessing information about
project existence, forming a legally recognized association, and creating the subproject proposal. The communities in my studies had the advantage that they were formal settlements associated with the Landless Workers Movement (MST). The MST
disseminated the information to the settlers, crossing the first obstacle. The second
obstacle consisted of creating a legally recognized association to represent the group
(this association is how the WB channels the grants to the communities). As part
of being a legally recognized settlement, the settlers had already had to form an association. This same association served for the SJA subprojects. The third obstacle
was the design of the subproject proposal. In order to accomplish these steps, communities require a medley of resources. For example, the greater the individuals’
and communities’ connections the better their chance to learn about the SJ projects.
The SJ projects also require literacy in the application process and, increasingly, computer literacy, as these processes go online. Additionally, the projects require political
know-how in order to navigate local and state government bureaucracies.
Here, I will focus on the obstacles emanating from subproject design as the communities in my case studies did not have to deal with the first two obstacles. The
communities are responsible for creating the subproject proposal, which provides the
design details, inputs, budget, and a plan for operations and maintenance. While the
subprojects I studied came out of SJII, the SJIII WB Project Appraisal Document
has a good breakdown of what is expected to be included in the subproject proposals:
“Furthermore, proposals should include information on: (a) market
demand for product commercialization; (b) availability of and demand
for inputs required for production; (c) viability study; (d) organizational
and administrative capacity of the proposing organization; (e) logistics
and strategy for commercializing the products; (f) technical design (description of necessary works, technical specifications, budget and list of
suppliers of the required equipment); (g) operational framework and sustainability strategy; (h) environmental aspects and specific measures to
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prevent or minimize environmental impacts; (i) management plan; (j) financial and accounting management; and (k) water availability and source
(for irrigation investments)” (The World Bank, 2012, 27).
In addition to these requirements, proposals are evaluated on their ability to conserve
and use water sustainably, meet already identified regional development demands
as laid out in regional development plans, and expand technological innovations in
production (The World Bank, 2012, 26). The SJIII project has a greater emphasis
on environmental conservation, sustainability, and market integration but otherwise
is similar to the SJII project.
The World Bank recognizes writing such a subproject proposal can be a barrier
to participation in the subprojects by the poorest, both specifically in Ceará and
more generally throughout the country. “CAs [community associations] often lack
the skills or expertise needed to prepare the proposal, and therefore search for and
select outside technical assistance providers” (Coirolo and Lammert, 2009, 61). In
Ceará, they have tried to simplify and standardize the process in the past (The World
Bank, 2001, 13).
“Some States allow CAs to submit a simplified proposal — containing information about the association (e.g., location, contact information),
subproject type, cost, budget, number of families to be benefited, environmental impact, and, for productive and cultural subprojects, a simplified
business plan — for approval purposes. However, upon approval, the CAs
[community associations] still have to submit a detailed subproject proposal for technical analysis. Other States require a detailed subproject
proposal from the very beginning” (Coirolo and Lammert, 2009, 60).
Yet the quote above indicates that even the standardized version requires a significant
amount of information and skill to complete, requiring that at least some participants
in any group be literate to prepare the basic project documents. The higher the
level of education and the number of literate members, the easier it is to navigate
components of the project structure.
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São José Agrário participants did not have the necessary skills to apply for, plan,
implement and manage the SJA productive subprojects on their own. Preparing the
subproject proposal requires significant education and technical sophistication. In all
eight subprojects I studied, the communities received extensive technical assistance
in creating their subproject proposal.2 In all but one settlement, Settlement 5, the
community leaders were unable to locate either the written subproject proposal or
the subproject guidelines.
The WB also conducted four case studies of productive subprojects of the greater
SJII project. They found that the business plan3 in all four subprojects depended
on the help of outside agencies; either technical agencies, the state technical unit or
— for two of their cases — The Bank of Brasil. In one case, the business plan was
completely generated by the outside entity (The World Bank, 2009, 52).
Subproject management also presented a challenge to the settlers. Most participants had very little practical management knowledge, beyond deciding when and
what to plant. Of the 93 households I surveyed, about half the households (42 of
the 93 households) had made some type of work decision before coming to live in the
settlement. Of these 42 surveyed who had decision-making power in their previous
work, 41 had decided what to plant, 40 had decided when to plant, 1 had managed
workers, and 1 had decided who to buy from or sell to. Although important, deciding
what and when to plant is to a great extent historically and culturally determined
based around rainfall patterns. In Ceará, most small producers plant corn, beans,
and cassava. They plant following the first significant rainfall occurring between January to March. While the decisions the settlers were most comfortable with follow a
norm, experience with other types of management decisions is lacking, such as organizing workers, arranging transportation and marketing production. Such decisions
2

Such assistance did not ensure successful or, sometimes, even appropriate subprojects.

3

If the subproject proposal is approved the community needs a business plan.
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and their implementation can be particularly challenging when it is a new type of
crop or production. Going into these productive subprojects, settlers had little formal
or informal knowledge of how to accomplish these tasks.
As part of the management of the subproject, participants were also responsible
for accounting for the project funds they controlled. Such accounting was regarded as
a challenge by outside institutions and often by the settlers themselves (EMATERCE
Technician B, 2013; FETRAECE Representative C, 2013; Landless Workers Movement Representative A, 2013; President of Settlement 3, 2013; Settlement 3, Member
2, 2013; Settlement 5, Member 1, 2013). The SDA technicians consistently cited
working with banks, administering the money, and keeping financial records as problems (Sao Jose Agrario Technician A, 2013; Sao Jose Agrario Technician B, 2013; Sao
Jose Agrario Technician C, 2013). This is primarily due to a difference in standards
of accounting between the communities and the SDA regarding the organization and
completeness of the accounts. The associations received the project money in a bank
account dedicated just to this project in three parcels. In order to get the second
and third parcel, they must report and show the receipts that account for the first
parcel of money. According to the SDA, the associations often lose receipts or forget
to write them down, resulting in incomplete financial records. Some settlers also cite
this as a problem due to low levels of literacy. For example, one settlement president
said the following.
“It [keeping accounts] is a big challenge. Because of the large degree of illiteracy. Until a
person understands what keeping accounts is, understands numbers, there is a lot of difficulty”
(President of Settlement 3, 2013, Author’s Translation).

“É um desafio grande, pelo grau, pelo grande
ı́ndice de analfabetismo. Até que um cara vai entender [o que é] passar uma prestação de contas,
números tem toda essa difficuldade” (President
of Settlement 3, 2013).

Another settlement president I spoke with responded that this was not a problem
for them, and keeping accounts was simple, it only required noting down expenses
and keeping track of receipts (Settlement 7, Member 1 , 2013). When I brought
this up to one of the SDA technicians, he replied that overall for most communities
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the level of record-keeping was less than what the state offices required (Sao Jose
Agrario Technician A, 2013). Another difficulty communities faced with respect to
managing project funds was dealing with banks, sourcing equipment and supplies,
and presenting the required documents and signatures to the government officials in
charge of the project.
“Another failure has to do with management
itself, group management. The groups that we
saw were very inexperienced. They were not prepared to take on the management of the community’s infrastructure or even of the funds transferred to the community. The funds were passed
to the community’s bank account ... and the
community has to make decisions about obtaining equipment, and this was a permanent difficulty. The communities have a lot of difficulties
managing these tasks: dealing with banks, keeping accounts, keeping track of documents, and
presenting documents. [For example] there is a
very good group of Quilombolas ... good in the
sense of keeping accounts. But yesterday they
came to submit a report, already it is the third
time these people have come to submit a report
for access to funds. It is for cashews. And they
forget some simple signatures. We remind them,
return the documents, and they come back again,
but it takes them a long time to return. Then
they bring one document [when in fact] we asked
for a whole list of documents. They bring one but
forget the others. It seems that grassroots groups
still do not value documentation, they still think
that keeping accounts is something that is done
by experts. [They think] that they cannot take
on this process. In a way I think to a certain extent the institutions that work with the farmers
failed to empower and train them for this type of
activity” (Sao Jose Agrario Technician A, 2013,
Author’s Translation).

“Outro fracasso também se deve ao próprio
gerenciamento, a gestão dos grupos. Os grupos
que nós fomos ver, eles eram muito incipientes.
Não estavam preparados para assumir a gestão
de equipamentos comunitários, ou mesmo dos recursos, dos recursos repassados ... e o recurso é
repassado para a conta [bancaria] para eles e eles
tem que realizar a decisão de equipamento e foi
uma dificuldade permanente. Eles tem muitas dificuldades de operar tudo isso: de lidar com bancos, de prestar conta, de guardar documentação,
de apresentar as documentações. Tem o grupo
muito bom dos Quilombolas ... que era muito bom
no sentido de prestar contas. Mas veio ontem
fazer uma prestação, já é a terceiravez que este
pessoal vem fazer um prestação de conta aqui. É
para cajus. E eles esqueceram uma simple assinatura. E a gente lembra, retorna, volta de novo,
demora muito tempo para vir. Ai traz um documento a gente pede toda a relação de documentos.
Eles trazem um mas esquecem outros. Parece
que os grupos de base ainda tem problema de
valorizar a documentação, eles ainda acham que
prestação de contas é uma coisa que é feita por
especialistas. Que eles não não podem ser apropriar do processo. Eu acho que de uma certa
forma as instituições, os órgãos que trabalham
com os agricultores esqueceram de fazer essa qualificação e capacita-los para esse tipo de atividade”(Sao
Jose Agrario Technician A, 2013).

While the government needs this paperwork trail to ensure funds are being directed
appropriately, participants and the Landless Workers Movement perceived this list of
requirements as just so much bureaucracy (Landless Workers Movement Representative B, 2013; Settlement 1, Member 4, 2012; Settlement 7, Member 1 , 2013; Landless
Workers Movement Representative A, 2013). And in fact, it was often considered
by the participants themselves as a major impediment to successfully implementing
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the subprojects on time. Holdups in tranche releases of subproject funds — either
because the settlers were not presenting the correct documentation or because the
government was not meeting its timeline — meant settlers were sometimes beginning
new subprojects out of season. For example, in Settlement 1, there was a delay in receiving the resources in order to contract for the cashew trees. When they did receive
and plant the trees, they were planting during the dry season instead of the rainy
season (this is a subproject that does not have irrigation) (Settlement 1, Member 6,
2012).

5.2.1

Discussion

The subproject structure, in which literacy, education, and the business skills required are often beyond what participants hold when entering into the subprojects,
generates dependence on other agencies and actors. The main external agencies and
actors can include the state technical unit (in charge of the subprojects), other state
entities providing technical assistance, private technical agencies, the Landless Workers Movement, Agricultural Workers Unions, and politicians. Dependence on others
works directly against the goal of empowerment of a CDD subproject. Additionally,
within communities, it can create dependence on the more educated by the illiterate
and less educated. Lastly, dependence can open the door to the potential of elite
capture — where politicians trade subproject proposals for votes.
The goal of empowerment hinges on building the capacities of communities to
successfully gain, implement, and manage their subprojects. By controlling subproject funds, hiring technical agencies, and sourcing inputs subproject participants are
supposedly given greater agency. Unfortunately, this ignores the dependence the participants have on those same groups they are hiring, as well as the power, class and
education disparities between these groups. Such dependence creates a tension be-
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tween empowerment and the participants being taken advantage of. This is explored
further in the next section.
The project structure also makes participants with less education dependent on
the participants with more education. As we saw in the chapter on elite capture,
there is a generational difference in education (see Table 5.3). Those from 18 to 27
have a median of 10.5 years of education, while those from 28 to 47 have a median of
4 years of education, those from 48 to 67 have a median of one year of education, and
those older than 68 have a median of zero years of education.4 If projects are biased
against the less educated this means they are biased toward working with younger
members. The mean age for settlers over 18 is around 40.
Table 5.3. Years of Education
Age
18-27
28-37
38-47
48-57
58-67
68-77
78-87
88-97

Median
10.5
4
4
1
1
0
0
0

Mean
9.01
4.78
3.9
2.28
1.72
1.53
0
0

Frequency
76
46
58
32
25
17
1
4

Source: Author’s Data.

The within group dependency does two things simultaneously. First, it marginalizes the non- or less-literate members. Since less educated members have a more difficult time preparing and reading subproject documents it is more difficult for them
to serve as association leaders. Instead, they must receive the knowledge and information from other members. Second, the power differential creates (or aggravates) a
hierarchy within the group based on education, while at the same time causing the
more educated members of the group to take on more responsibility and work.
4

A high school education is equivalent to 11 years of education. In 2006 an additional year of
education was added, but it does not impact my adult population.
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Dependence on those outside of the communities to obtain, implement, and manage their subprojects, can open the space for elite capture. For example, in the larger
SJII project, politicians sometimes filled this role, particularly in helping communities
create project proposals to apply for subprojects. As we saw in a previous chapter,
one of the main criticisms of the SJII project was the prevalence of elite capture.
The structure of the settlements and the project accompaniment by the MST
mitigated these problems to some extent. First, the question of who applies and
receives the projects, which seems like it might be biased toward more educated and,
likely, more well off groups was avoided. Thus, the relatively high level of illiteracy in
the settlements is suggestive of the subprojects reaching lower-income groups. MST
accompaniment facilitated project information dissemination and the preparation of
basic documents. Together this mitigated bias against less educated and likely poorer
people.
The settlement structure can be flexible enough to allow for illiterate members
to successfully serve leadership positions. But the fact that the settlement association also serves as the community association used to direct the SJA projects can
be an incentive for more educated members to take on leadership positions. Since
less educated members have a more difficult time preparing and reading subproject
documents, it makes it more difficult for them to serve as association leaders.
Settlement 3 showed participant dependence within the communities of the less
educated community members on the more educated community members. There a
brother and sister, who are the most educated of the settlement heads of households
and spouses, held numerous positions. The 27-year-old brother had completed high
school, and he was currently the president of the association. He had previously served
as president, as well as two other leadership positions. His 33-year-old sister had
completed nine years of education and was the current secretary. She had previously
served as president and one other position. They both complained that they were
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unable to leave leadership positions because there were so few educated people in
the settlement. They said a large component of their leadership with regards to the
projects and the settlement was obtaining the appropriate documents and keeping
accounts. When Settlement 3 members were asked if they felt leadership was fairly
divided, 7 of 12 household representatives said yes, and 5 of 12 said no. When I asked
them to expand on the negative answers, respondents stated in a variety of forms
that the majority of settlers cannot read and write so those that can have to work
more in the leadership positions.
Technician A of the SJII project reported they are seeing changes in the community associations, in that many of the illiterate adults are becoming literate (Sao
Jose Agrario Technician A, 2013). In my sample, I found that a significant number of
adults were participating in the adult education classes. Of 93 respondents, 51 had
taken adult education classes, and another 17 were already literate, which means only
25 of the target group either were unable or uninterested in adult education classes.
This also shows how prevalent adult education classes have been on the settlements.
In fact, all eight of the settlements I visited had had adult education classes in the
past, and several had ongoing classes. Of the 51 respondents who had participated
in adult education classes, 28 still classified themselves as illiterate.
An additional change Technician A reported was that the young people with higher
levels of education are entering into association leadership. This opens up space for the
state technicians to work with these more educated representatives. The technician
saw this as a positive social change that increased the quality of these interventions,
“There is a significant improvement in the quality of intervention of these social actors
in this field” (Sao Jose Agrario Technician A, 2013, author’s translation). While both
access to adult education and increasing education among young people are indeed
very positive factors, they have made it easier for project technicians to ignore the
problems of illiteracy (with respect to project design). Thus, instead of making
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subprojects more accessible to all participants, subprojects can remain dependent on
educated participants.
So why is this a problem in light of increasing access and quantity of education?
While on average people are becoming more educated, illiteracy is still correlated with
poverty. Thus, CDD project structure makes it harder for the projects to reach those
most in need. These project structures result in projects biased against reaching the
poorest and least educated communities, and against reaching the poorest and least
educated within the communities.

5.3

Technical Assistance

In the past section, I established the existence of a skill gap for project participants
between the skills they need to carry out the subprojects and the skills they have.
SJA project design uses technical agencies to bridge this gap. As such, the initial
quality of the project design and the implementation plan were highly dependent on
the technical agency and the ability of the technical agency to disseminate this information to the association. The use of technical agencies presented two main problems
to the communities. First, the class differences based on education and income give
technical agencies power over the participants. This gives technical agencies, particularly private technical agencies, the potential to take advantage of the participants
leading to low-quality subprojects. It can also give technicians increased sway over
the communities’ decision-making process regarding the choice of subprojects. The
second problem for the communities was the short time-frame during which technical
assistance accompanied the productive subprojects, making it difficult for settlers to
overcome subproject problems.
Technical agencies design and implement the subprojects. They assist the settlers
in creating the subproject proposal, which also serves as the technical document for
the subproject. The technical document, often incomprehensible to the lay person
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results in asymmetric information, where the technical agencies have more information than the communities. In most of the SJII subprojects the technical agencies
that designed and implemented the subprojects were public, but in SJA many were
prepared through private agencies. The settlers (in cases where they are not working
with a public agency) had to contract the technical agency to prepare the project document. The SJII project document notes that between 6.5 and 7 percent of the total
estimated cost of the SJII project was dedicated to technical assistance and training
community associations, SDA, and other agencies that helped implement the project
(The World Bank, 2009, 35). Interviews with the State Technical Unit cited that the
private technical agencies were paid between 2% and 3% of the approved project (Sao
Jose Agrario Technician B, 2013).
If the subprojects were not approved the technical agencies would not receive any
money (Coirolo and Lammert, 2009). Accordingly, the technical agencies priority was
creating a subproject proposal that would be approved. In so much as the SDA (state
technical unit) was able to identify subprojects and reject low-quality subprojects,
approved subprojects would produce good subprojects. Yet, the state technical unit
was also subject to asymmetric information. The subproject proposals were reviewed
by the SDA technicians. If obvious problems were spotted the subproject was rejected
outright or sent back to the technical agency to be reworked. One problem with these
technical documents was the difficulty for non-specialists to read, understand, and
evaluate the quality of the documents. Thus, the SDA technicians, who paid close
attention to the documents, still missed problems. As such, problematic subprojects
were sometimes approved.
The participants had a much more difficult time spotting problems than the SDA
technicians. In a typical business situation, the participants would be the actors with
the most incentive to make sure a subproject was well designed. Yet the participants
were largely unable to pick apart the technical documents. Moreover, they did not
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have the money or connections to hire someone to do this for them. Dependence
on technical agencies became particularly problematic when private rather than the
publicly contracted technical agencies were introduced. Private technical agencies
had the capacity to use the power and information asymmetries between the agency
and the association to spend less time and resources elaborating and accompanying
the subproject in order to widen their profit margin, sometimes resulting in lowquality subprojects based on bad materials. Strengthening this potentiality, technical
agencies faced no repercussions for subproject failure once subprojects were approved
by the SDA.
One of the failed irrigation projects illustrates the many problems an ill-designed
project can face. Settlement 7’s irrigation project first ran into problems when they
dug the well for water. The well was around 18 feet deep and was filled with high
salinity water. Instead of continuing to drill to reach fresh water, or drilling a new
well, or revising the subproject, the technical agency continued on using the salty
water. The salty water caused two problems. First, the irrigation tubing diameter
was too small and salt and mineral built up inside the tubes blocked the water.
Second, the crops chosen, vegetables, banana and papaya trees, did not respond well
to salty water and died. Furthermore, the technical agency had also chosen a pump
that was too weak to push the water through the tubing to irrigate the whole area.
When a state technician visited the settlement, he said the irrigation project had
been implemented wrongly, particularly in that the tubing going to the plant root
was not in place (Settlement 7, Member 2, 2013). The former president of Settlement
7 concluded,
“... the issue I found is that so many projects
that come, the companies that win the right to
give technical assistance, they are only interested
as long as they are receiving their payment and
afterward they do not help ... not even in the
beginning. The company won the right to give
assistance, both to create a report and to outline the project correctly. This business, part of

“... que a questão eu achei assim que muitos
projetos que vem, as empresas que elas ganham
para dar assistência, elas têm um interesse só
enquanto recebe a parte delas e depois não ajuda
não para... nem lá no inı́cio né, da... que essa
empresa lá ela ganhava para da assistência, tanto
com laudo, como também vim fazer as demarcações
tudo bem direitinho. Ela, ela... ele essa, essa
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Geodata, came here very few times. It did not
followup... it did not” (Settlement 7, Member 2,
2013, Author’s Translation).

parte da Geodata mesmo, andou por aı́ poucas
vezes não. Num... acompanhamento mesmo não
deu não” (Settlement 7, Member 2, 2013).

This same sentiment was repeated by participants in Settlement 3 and by the
state technical agency, EMATERCE (Settlement 3, Member 2, 2013; EMATERCE
Technician A, 2013). In each interview, the same pattern was reported. The technician would come by to do a superficial visit — just enough to meet the requirements
of the subproject and get the access to the funds paid out by the state to the technical agencies. The settlers interpreted this pattern as evidence that the technical
agencies cared little about the subproject and mostly were using the subprojects to
get the state funds. Those settlers interviewed who expressed this opinion came from
Settlement 3 and Settlement 7, were both located in Canindé and had been recipients
of Geodata technical assistance.
The power differences between the settlers and the technical agencies based on
asymmetric information and class created not only the opportunity to take advantage
of the settlers for higher profit margins, but even the possibility of engaging in outright
corruption. It is unclear to what extent the low-quality subprojects implemented by
the Geodata technical agency in my sample (Settlements 3 and 7) were the result
of incompetence, taking advantage of the communities or outright corruption. But,
there is some evidence that many of the technical agencies in Canindé were engaging in
corrupt practices. One SDA technician reported that there had been many problems
with corruption of the technical agencies in the municipality of Canindé. According
to this technician, many of the technical agencies were actually the same agency
but with different names creating a monopoly in this industry. Interestingly, all the
subprojects in Canindé in my sample had either failed or were on hold. Three of
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these subprojects appeared to have been badly planned, implemented and managed,
Settlement 3, 6 and 7’s subprojects.5
“A assistência técnica que é gerencial no sen“The technical assistance is dedicated to accompanying [sub]project development, and to check-tido de acompanhar a evolução do projeto, de ver
ing for the existence of bottlenecks. This was an os gargalos. Que aı́ é uma questão que a gente
issue we had a lot. For example, the subpro- fazia muito. Por exemplo, eh... o projeto não esject would not be moving forward, [for example] tava andando, não era liberado, ... alguma coisa
it had not been released, or it lacked something para ser liberado. Então a gente sentava com o
that was needed for it to be released. So we would MST. Por que qual era o trabalho desses menisit down with the MST, who were responsible for nos? Esses meninos eram identificados em camidentifying the bottlenecks in the field and deal- pos gargalos. Né? Quais as limitações e o que é
ing with the following question: What were the que era possı́vel fazer? Aı́ eles chegavam, faziam
limiting factors and what could be done? Then um relatório dizendo, “Visitei comunidade tal.
they [the MST] would arrive, reporting, “I visited O projeto assim, assado, está nesse pé. Não
the community. The subproject ... is not advanc- anda porque o recurso não dá. Não anda porque
ing because it does not have enough funds. It is não foi comprado os equipamentos viabilizados.
not advancing because the necessary equipment Não anda porque não tem assistência técnica.
was not bought. It is not advancing because there Ou não anda por que foi super subdimensionado.
is no technical assistance. Or it is not advancing Então não dá. Não apareceu nenhuma empresa
because it was ill-designed. There is no company querendo”. Isso aconteceu muito na região de
that will work with them.” This happened a lot in Canindé. A região de Canindé é uma verdadeira
Canindé. The region of Canindé is a real mafia. máfia. Tinha verdadeira máfia na área de conThey had a real mafia in construction. Usually 3 strução. Normalmente era 3, 4 empresas que exor 4 companies exist .... [but in Canindé] it was istia pai, mãe, espı́rito santo. É. Era a mesma
the same company with several names. So when empresa com vários nomes. Né? E aı́ eles enthey entered a bid and won, it was masked by the travam numa licitação e ganhavam. E era mascompany name. We found this out, but there was carado pelo nome da empresa. A gente descobriu
nothing we could do. They [the technical agen- isso aı́, mas também não tinha como atuar. Aı́
cies] would get together and raise prices. And eles juntavam e botavam os preços tudo lá para
they [the subprojects] were very overpriced. A cima. Né? Aı́ era superdimensionado. Um pro[sub]project you could do for 30 thousand, was al- jeto que você podia fazer era 50 mil, mas com
ways 50 thousand on the nose ” [Author’s Trans- 30 mil dava para fazer, nesse caso era os 50 mil
certinho. Interessante é que dava exatamente era
lation](Sao Jose Agrario Technician B, 2013).6
os 50” (Sao Jose Agrario Technician B, 2013).
6

Fifty thousand USD was the exact limit of
the funds available per subproject.

Another important potential problem stems for the power differential based on
class and education between project participants and the technicians. Generally,
participants are less experienced, less educated, with a rural low-income background
compared with the technicians they contract. Participants often presume technicians
are experts and defer to them in aspects of the projects. They often feel intimidated
5

Settlement 5’s subproject (the fourth subproject from Canindé) appears to have had different
reasons for its problems, outlined below.
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to question the technicians especially when they do not have a long-term relationship
with the technicians. The outcome is that sometimes technicians are able to unduly
influence the type of subproject the participants vote for. “Project actors [technicians]
are not passive facilitators of local knowledge production and planning. They shape
and direct these processes” (Mosse, 2001).
One of example of this outcome is that of Settlement 5. Settlement 5 received the
funds of R$58,800 for an apiculture (bee-keeping) project in 2008. The settlers had
entertained possible projects such as irrigation, building a new reservoir, reinforcing
the old reservoir, raising fish, or growing fruit trees. The most popular of these was
irrigation for vegetable cultivation. The settlers were swayed toward the apiculture
subproject by an assisting technician’s predilection for beekeeping. One state level
technician mentioned that one of the municipal level technicians from Canindé was
partial to apiculture projects (Sao Jose Agrario Technician B, 2013). I checked this
with the approved list of projects by municipality. Of the total 163 projects, 10
were apiculture projects, and of these ten, five occurred in Canindé.7 The other
five were spread out over five different municipalities. Apiculture subprojects in the
municipality of Canindé made up 22% of the subprojects, in comparison with 4% of all
subprojects outside of the municipality of Canindé. This seems to confirm that there
was indeed a technician with a preference for apiculture subprojects in Canindé and
that the technician was able to influence communities to take on these subprojects.
While many of the settlers were initially intimidated by the bees they were convinced
this was the best option and the majority voted for this project.
Subproject participants’ most common complaint relating to the SJA subprojects
was the lack of quality and quantity of technical assistance. Aside from the technical
agency problems of using power to take advantage of communities and corruption,
7

Canindé is particularly well-represented municipality in that it had 23 SJA projects. This is
due to a large quantity of settlements in this municipality.
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additional principal problems were the short timeline over which the technical agencies accompanied the subprojects and the frequency of their visits. The quantity of
technical assistance, its timeline and frequency of visitation to the communities is a
problem of project design and lies with the World Bank as the funder. Productive
subprojects need extensive technical accompaniment, particularly since the projects
and necessary are generally new to the communities. Learning-by-doing is the main
way the settlers gain knowledge about how to implement, transport, market and
maintain their subprojects. The subprojects require technical assistance spanning
three or more years — a time frame which allows problems and practice to arise
organically and be dealt with in their own context. Yet, SJII and SJA accompanied
the project from its acceptance until its implementation, often less than one year.
Not only was the time frame short for technical assistance accompaniment but the
subprojects only had a small portion of their funds dedicated to technical assistance
(Sao Jose Agrario Technician B, 2013). The technical agency that designed and
approved the subprojects receives between 2 and 3 percent. Most technical agencies
did not accompany the settlers beyond the initial construction of the subproject. In
fact, the technical agencies explained to subproject participants that their percent
cut from the subproject was not enough to cover technical assistance beyond one or
two subproject visits. Since the technical agencies were often located in the capital of
Ceará, Fortaleza, they had to travel to the settlement in order to provide assistance,
making it more expensive (Sao Jose Agrario Technician B, 2013). Thus according
to this technician the private technical agencies that elaborated these subprojects
provided little actual technical accompaniment of the subproject. The following is
what one technician answered when asked why there was such a small percentage of
the subproject funds set aside for technical accompaniment.
“Actually it was not foreseen in the planning. It was thought that because there were
already technical agencies [that were collaborating], which were EMATERCE [productive sub-

“Na verdade não foi previsto no planejamento.
Se achava que como havia as entidades, ... a
EMATERCE [productive projects], a SEMTEC
[social projects], a SOHIDRA [water projects], a
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projects], SEMTEC [social subprojects], SOHIDRACAJECE (water projects), se achava que essas
[water subprojects], CAJECE [water subprojects], próprias entidades – que são as entidades que
they thought that these same agencies — which elaboram os projetos relacionadas em cada area
were the agencies that elaborated related projects —, [que] elas mesmas disponibilizariam técnicos
in each area — would provide technicians for ac- para fazer esse acompanhamento. Mas nós obsercompaniment. But we observed, for example, vamos, por exemplo, que a EMATERCE tem um
that EMATERCE has a very wide range of ac- leque de ação, um raio de atuação, muito amtivities. They are involved in several projects: plo. Eles estão envolvidos com vários projetos,
seed distribution, eradication of foot and mouth distribuição de sementes, erradicação da ... febre
disease in the state of Ceará, technical assistance aftosa do estado do Ceará, a assistência técnica a
to groups of select producers. They did not have grupos e produtores seletos, e tudo. Eles não tinenough technicians for all this. In the area of pro- ham técnicos suficientes para isso. ... Na área de
ductive [sub]projects it was more serious because projetos produtivos foi mas grave porque nós não
EMATERCE’s technicians were unavailable for contavamos com a disponibilidade de técnicos da
this. At no point did the SDA think about the EMATERCE para isso. Em nenhum momento
[sub]projects, in [having] technicians other than a SDA pensou em projetos, em técnicos outros
these ones for accompaniment. Now we have a não ser esses para acompanhamento. Agora a
deemed that for a project to be successful, it nec- gente já definiu para poder um projeto ser exessarily needs to count on the acting presence of itoso, precisa necessariamente contarmos com a
an EMATERCE technician, or if not, we will con- presença, com a atuação de um técnico da EMATERCE
tract technicians directly with the SJ Project in . Se não, a gente vai contratar diretamente com
order to place them with these groups [partici- o projeto SJ esses técnicos para alocar junto com
pating associations]. So without [accompanying aqueles grupos. E sem isso daı́ também é um
technicians] it will be a failure” (Sao Jose Agrario fracasso, né?” (Sao Jose Agrario Technician A,
Technician A, 2013, Author’s Translation).
2013).

Technical agencies unassociated with the SJA project, but which were already
operating in these communities took on some responsibility for these projects. For
example, technicians contracted by INCRA and the state (public agencies), were
providing technical assistance in the settlements, around themes specific to agrarian
reform and the creation of the settlements. These technicians were generally sensitive
to the settlers’ needs and contributed their expertise to the subprojects, but this
was not their main task and occasionally the subprojects were not in their area
of expertise. For example, EMATERCE, the state funded technical agency, was
often expected to cover when there was insufficient or needed technical assistance
— both in terms project design and in technical accompaniment. Unfortunately,
this overextended an already taxed institution and EMATERCE found it difficult
to organize resources and people to accompany these projects in a comprehensive
manner (Sao Jose Agrario Technician A, 2013).
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To some extent these lessons have been learned, SJIII has set aside more funds
for the state to hire technicians for accompaniment but only for the first year of the
project. “Technical assistance to investment operations will be provided preferably
through publicly funded Rural Technical Assistance (Assistência Técnica e Extensão
Rural, ATER) or through private-sector providers for at least the first year of execution, based on eligible business plan costs” (The World Bank, 2012, 27). Technician
A noted that it would be preferable if this was two years since the first year is mostly
dedicated to the solicitation process (Sao Jose Agrario Technician A, 2013).
SJIII will now allow participants to follow commercial practices instead of conducting a formal bidding process, in which they receive at least three bids, for the
procurement of inputs and technical agencies. The WB justifies this on the assumption that “Market forces would ensure a fair and reasonable price while competitive
markets would be the driving force leading to POs [producer organizations — same as
community associations] having efficient internal operations” (The World Bank, 2012,
50). Moving away from a bidding process, which is foreign to the communities and
presents an additional layer of bureaucracy, to a more common commercial practice
is a step in the right direction. Unfortunately, problems of asymmetric information
and lack of power will persist for the participants within the market. Goods and
inputs most commonly bought and sold may be bought by participants for market
or close to market prices. On the other hand, services — such as contracting private
technical agencies — in which the available prices may be difficult to know and which
the communities cannot infer from the peers experience, since their peers likely are
not often contracting technical agencies, may continue to be priced above market —
or the quality of the service for the price may be below what is commonly expected.
In SJIII, these problems remain. The time frame for technical assistance is too
short and the use of private technical agencies may put subproject participants at a
disadvantage.

142

5.4

Subproject Failure: Participation and Attrition

The CDD project design is based on the ability of the participants to make an
accurate cost benefit analysis which informs their decision to participate in a subproject. Project design assumes poorer individuals will organize to obtain subprojects
because their opportunity cost will be less than that of relatively wealthier individuals while the wealthier individuals would find a cost-benefit analysis unfavorable to
taking on the project. In this way, community-driven development project funds will
reach their target of the relatively less well-off. “Communities as a whole, or specific
community groups, must decide whether or not to submit a proposal for a project
based on the implied level of benefits and the cost of participation. The assumption
for targeted social funds is that the level of benefits is too low to make participation
advantageous for the better-off” (Mansuri and Rao, 2012, 163).8
The opportunity cost consists of three parts. The first part is the ten percent of
the subproject grant the participants must provide in cash or in kind (they almost
always choose in kind labor). The second part is the time and effort spent on the
subproject, often a couple of months or longer to implement the subproject. If it is
a productive subproject, this may mean an increase in daily or weekly work for the
foreseeable future. The third part is any monetary inputs the participants must make
to keep the subproject running.
The decision to participate in the subprojects assumes individuals have access
to excellent information on subproject costs and benefits. As such, individuals can
make a fairly accurate decision of whether or not to participate. Thus, following these
assumptions, subproject failure is a problem of moral hazard. Participants take on
the subprojects even when they expect them to be very risky, resulting in a high rate
8

Social funds are similar to community-based development projects and community-driven development projects (Mansuri and Rao, 2012).

143

of attrition. The policy response by the WB is to increase the cost of the subprojects
to participants to make attrition more costly.
I argue that the reason for which the participants in my case studies leave the
subprojects has little to do with moral hazard. Instead, the reasons are a lack of
information, dependence on a variety of actors and agencies willing to take advantage
of the participants, and insufficient technical assistance in productive subprojects.
Requiring additional buy-in will prohibit the poorest from accessing subprojects and
bias the subprojects against those whom they supposedly target.
From 1993 to 2007, the CDD projects in Ceará were centered primarily around
providing water, fencing, and electrical infrastructure. Communities were able to
more easily estimate their costs (only labor) and benefits (access to water, electricity
and having a fence) because they were more familiar with both the process and the
outcome of these subprojects. While the labor requirements were often significant,
they were of a short duration and, once the project was in place, it required relatively
little labor to maintain.
As the CDD project began to move toward productive subprojects, costs and
benefits to the participants became more difficult to measure. In particular, this difficulty stemmed from participants having little experience with the types of productive
subprojects available to them. The productive subprojects the communities took on
often required new types of crops, animal husbandry, and even new methods (such
as irrigation), as compared with what the majority of families are accustomed to.
Participants had little information on which to base their decision to participate in
the productive subprojects. They did not have experience with these subprojects,
and they did not have the technical expertise and education to parse the technical
subproject documents. As such they relied on advice and opinions from the state government technicians, the MST, community leaders, other participants, and largely on
their own intuition of what might be best for them given these actors’ information.
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The difference between the infrastructure and productive subprojects is outlined
in the Table 5.4. The main difference occurs in Stage 3 and 4. In these stages,
productive subprojects are still evolving. I categorize the Incubation Stage as the time
in which the subproject requires participant labor, sometimes participant monetary
contributions but does not yet have marketable output. In the Output Stage, there
is output which must be transported and marketed, again requiring participant labor
and monetary contributions. Only in the Output Stage will the productive subproject
contribute directly to income increases for the participants. An important difference
between infrastructure and productive subprojects is the difference in time between
implementation and outcomes. For infrastructure subprojects, this is relatively short,
whereas for productive subprojects the time gap can be significant.
Table 5.4. Infrastructure and Productive Subproject Stages
Infrastructure
Productive

Stage 1
Approval
Approval

Stage 2
Implementation
Implementation

Stage 3
O&M
Incubation

Stage 4
None
Output

Author’s typology.

Productive subprojects are new for the groups and they often they have little
experience with the crops, transportation of production, and marketing goods. Additionally, often these subprojects face unanticipated problems, such as crop or animal
diseases, equipment breakage, salinization, difficulty in transporting goods to market,
and difficulty marketing the product. The majority of these problems arise in Stage 3
and 4. Many of these problems require significant technical expertise, contacts, or additional resources to solve. Such problem-solving requires increased effort, sometimes
increased monetary costs, and makes output less certain.
A potential solution to these problems is long-term, public, high-quality technical
assistance. Unfortunately, while the infrastructure subprojects were provided technical assistance through their most important stage — Implementation — productive
subprojects lacked technical assistance through their equally important Incubation
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and Output Stages. This is a particular problem for the productive subprojects, in
which a large amount of the work occurs in the Incubation and Output Stages. The
duration of technical assistance in the SJA project is a holdover from the previous
CDD projects that placed greater emphasis on infrastructure subprojects.
“A major problem with donor-induced participation [this includes the
World Bank] is that it works within an ‘infrastructure template’. Donors’
institutional structures and incentives are optimally suited to projects
with short timelines and linear trajectories of change with clear, unambiguous projected outcomes. When a bridge is built, for instance, the
outcome is easily verified, the trajectory of change is predictable, and the
impact is almost immediate. Unfortunately, most participatory projects
that emerge from donor agencies are designed with the same assumed trajectory and three-to-five-year cycles as infrastructure projects” (Mansuri
and Rao, 2012, 109).9
Productive subprojects require technical assistance over a much longer timeframe
than do infrastructure subprojects. In the absence of technical assistance, the cost
and the ability to access the solutions to project problems may induce the subproject
participants to revise their participation decision and result in attrition from the
subprojects.
Analysis of CDD subprojects has not dealt with the resulting project design flaw:
the assumption that participants can make an accurate cost benefit decision to participate in a productive subproject. The result is that participants make a decision
to participate, often based on what other members decide or on what other actors
influence them to do. When they get updated information, they then leave the subprojects. In this section, I describe how this process plays out through case studies.
In the appendix to this dissertation, I present a model which show how this process
can occur and how relatively small fluctuations in participation can result in project
failure. The conclusion is that participant attrition from SJA subprojects is a rational
response to updated information, rather than a result of moral hazard.
9

The donors refer primarily to the World Bank.
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5.4.1

Case Studies

My case studies showed that half of the productive CDD subprojects I studied had
either group attrition or significant individual attrition. At a point either collectively
or individually participants decided not to continue with the subproject. Of the
six productive subprojects, two had failed outright, one is on hold, and three are
ongoing. Table 5.5 below gives a quick overview of the subprojects. As we can see in
Table 5.5 participation in the subprojects was varied. In two cases, Settlement 4 and
Settlement 8, all surveyed settlers were participating in the subproject. These also
corresponded to successful productive projects. The rest of the subprojects had 46%
to 91% participation.
I argue that the ongoing participation decision is impacted by subproject performance, problems, and prices of inputs and outputs. Since the subprojects are
voluntary and participants can drop out at any time but cannot rejoin, I can get an
estimate of attrition, which allows me to evaluate the ongoing participation decision.
I estimate attrition by using the number of eligible families versus the number of families who participated from my census survey in 2013. This can be complemented by
comparing it with the number of families who were originally part of the subproject
according to the SJA statistics (compiled between 2007 and 2010, depending on the
project start date). Since I was not able to survey all families formerly part of the
subproject, I use the number of families at the start of the subproject as a benchmark.
The primary reason I was not able to survey all households who were initially part
of the subprojects was due to households moving on and off the settlements and a
lack of records of who was initially a part of the subproject. I conducted a census
survey of all households on the settlement, including unregistered households when
members indicated they also took part in the subprojects. I have between a ninety
and one hundred percent response rate.
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Table 5.5. Participation in Sao Jose Agrario
Settlement
Settlement
Settlement
Settlement
Settlement
Settlement
Settlement

SJA Subproject
1
3
4
5
8
7

Cashew
Irrigation
Capim
Apiculture
Tractor
Irrigation

No.Fam.
At Start

Total Fam
Interviewed

Part/Eligible
Fams

Success

42
16
10
22
23
27

14*
12
10
19
17
25

14/14=100%*
10/11 = 91%
10/10 =100%
11/15 = 73%
17/17 =100%
11/24 = 46%

Ongoing
Failed
Ongoing
On-Hold
Ongoing
Failed

Number of Families at the start is the number of families officially registered in the project by the
government/MST statistics in 2007/2008. *I only conducted a sample (14 households) of the total
households in Settlement 1. Thus, this is just suggestive, and I do not have information on the
whole settlement’s current participation in the SJA project. Total fams are the total number of
households surveyed in each settlement. In Settlements 3 through 8, I conducted a census survey,
and the number of surveyed families eligible to participate is the denominator, the number who said
they are currently participating in the project is the numerator. Failed indicates the subproject did
not exist at the time of visit.

It is interesting to take a look at what happened in each of these cases. I begin
with Settlement 7 and 5 which had high levels of attrition, I then turn to Settlement
3 which had a failed subproject but high levels of participation.
Settlement 7’s productive subproject faced a number of problems outlined in past
sections. By the time the subproject was deemed a failure by the participants, Settlement 7’s irrigation project had the lowest participation rate of all the settlements
at 46%. According to the statistics collected at the beginning of the subproject by
the SJA officials, it originally had a much higher proportion of the settlers involved in
the project, 27 participating families. Yet, when I interviewed 25 of these families (of
which 24 were eligible), only 11 said they had been participating when the subproject
ended. The settlers had dropped out between choosing the subproject and when the
subproject failed. My survey revealed that households defined different main subproject problems. This indicates households dropped out at different times over the first
year of the subproject, based on identifying different problems as insurmountable.
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After a year, the remaining participants found the subproject unfeasible and ended
the subproject together.10
Settlement 5’s subproject faced two main problems. First, the settler’s had little
knowledge of bees and beekeeping and found the prospect intimidating. Settlement
5’s subproject has a fairly low participation rate of 73%. Many people I spoke to did
not want to work on the beekeeping subproject. They cited reasons such as: having
too many things to do, having another loan to pay off, because other subprojects had
not been successful, and because they had wanted a different subproject. While all
families had initially voted for the subproject and agreed to participate, four currently
living on the settlement had dropped out (and more had dropped out when they left
the settlement). Second, once the bees had successfully produced honey, the settlers
had a difficult time marketing the honey. They also did not like honey and thus did
not use their own production. According to interviews they had been unable to sell
any honey following the first year of honey production. The following years the region
faced a drought. Lacking flowers the bees had to be fed. The settlers were required
to buy sugar, make the sugar syrup, and distribute the syrup in order to prevent
the bees from dying. Even so, they estimated only half the bees were currently alive.
Only four families were currently contributing money and distributing the sugar syrup
for the bees. The subproject was on hold when I visited in 2013. The participants
had left the subproject at two points. First, when it was confirmed as a beekeeping
subproject and second, when they were unable to market the production.
Settlement 3 implemented an irrigation subproject for fruit trees, primarily bananas, in 2009 for R$9,700. The money covered paying the technical agencies that
assisted them, buying the irrigation pump, and setting up the irrigation system. They
10

Interestingly, when this happened four of the families who were part of the last group to leave
the subproject claimed the land upon which the subproject had been placed, pulled up the hoses
and planted the land as individual plots of corn and beans. This is particularly good land as it
receives more moisture than other land.
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planned to sell the bananas at the local fair. The subproject went well for about a
year. In that time they planted and watered the banana trees. The banana trees
started producing bananas, these bananas were consumed on the settlement and sold
to a middle man to take to market. At around the year point, the participants grew
disillusioned. In interviews, the participants cited the problem of the cost of electricity to run the electric irrigation pump. This was around R$250 – 300 per month
and was not covered by the subproject grant. Participants also found the low price
received from the middleman insufficient to cover the cost of electricity. Interviews
suggest that the settlers decided as a group to abandon the project. While the project
was abandoned, 90% of settlers said they participated in the subproject up until the
group decided to end the subproject. When I arrived, they had ceased to water the
banana plants and had no plans to continue in the future. Only around 10% of the
banana trees were still alive.
Settlement 3’s subproject failed because the price they were able to obtain for
the bananas was not sufficient to cover the cost of electricity. There were several
reasons for this. First, the price of bananas varies with the market. It may have
been difficult for the participants to accurately foresee the price they would obtain.
Second, the participants were receiving the price the middleman gave them, not that
the consumer pays. Transporting the product to the market and finding a market
for the output requires capital, skills, and networks the participants often do not
have. At a disadvantage, they may not be able to obtain a price that would allow
them to cash flow. Third, the settlers were paying the full price electricity, instead of
the available subsidized price. The community was aware of the option to apply for
subsidized electricity but was unwilling to apply due to the bureaucratic application
process.11 The group did not see either the application for cheaper electricity or
11

Settlement 2 had successfully organized and received the subsidized energy program for a different and ongoing irrigation project they had received through a Belgian NGO.
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the produce from bananas as sufficient to cover their costs and/or superior to their
fallback position. Additionally for the cash-strapped, monthly out of pocket costs no
matter how minimal may be prohibitive.

5.5

World Bank Response

The World Bank and the Department of Agrarian Development have recognized
that projects often fail due to attrition. To address the problem, the newest incarnation of the São José project (São José III) requires participants to provide twenty
percent of the project grant, of which ten percent must be in cash and ten percent
can be in-kind or cash. Previously in SJII, this contribution was only 10 percent of
the total, which could have been provided in-kind.
“In order to receive funds from SDA, each beneficiary will need to prove
that the equivalent of at least 20 percent of the total amount being advanced has been allocated as counterpart to the respective projects, observing that in-kind payments cannot be more than 10 percent. The
remaining 10 percent would need to be either the beneficiary’s own proceeds or other sources at his/her disposal (e.g., grants, commercial bank
financing, cofinancing, etc.). Such amounts will not be considered by
SDA when disbursements are requested under loan proceeds” (The World
Bank, 2012).
Since, these communities are poor it can be difficult to come up with cash to
provide the counterpart funding in cash or credit. The SJA subprojects went up to
USD 50,000 and the SJIII productive subprojects are expected to have an average
cost of USD 160,000 (ten percent of which would be USD 16,000). Most poor and
very poor communities will not have USD 16,000 on hand, as such the project relies
on community ability to access credit. Interestingly, the SJII project realized that
these are exactly the communities that have a difficult time accessing credit.
“Since the rural poor are generally out of the radar screen of any formal credit institution in the rural Northeast, particularly as individuals,
project matching grants for productive investments and technical assistance can be catalytic by encouraging the formation of groups, providing
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some experience in the management of financial assets and income-earning
activities, and thus making them more attractive to financial institutions”
(The World Bank, 2001).
The increased contribution requirement suggests that the World Bank and the
Department of Agrarian Development have identified moral hazard as the cause of
attrition. According to this view, the original design led participants to knowingly
take on projects that were too risky. This policy change still assumes participants
can accurately evaluate project costs and benefits.
Requiring additional ‘buy in’ will not eliminate attrition as a source of subproject
failure. In fact, it will exclude the poorest from participating in the subprojects as
they will be unable to provide ten percent of the subproject cost in cash, whereas in
many cases they can provide it in labor. For example, one can argue that participants in the previous Sáo José subprojects had already ‘bought’ into the subprojects,
having provided significant labor and in some of the productive subprojects, money
for electricity or other inputs. In my case studies, they were reluctantly walking
away from projects when they did not see any possibility of making a positive return. Rather than taking on a subproject knowing there was a high risk of failure,
participants took on subprojects assuming subproject success with little ability to
foresee subproject costs and benefits. Greater ‘buy in’ will not increase the ability of
the participants to predict subproject costs and benefits. In fact, participants gain
little from failed projects — as failure results in the death of the plants, animals, and
equipment breakage — but they lose all the time, labor, and money they put into the
project.
Thus, the problem is not one of moral hazard and the fault for subproject failure
is difficult to lay at the feet of participants, except to the extent they are faulted
for having less education, skill, power or networks. The solution here is not one of
additional buy-in. To some extent, many of these problems could be ameliorated with
additional technical assistance. Other problems may require a change of subproject
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design for productive subprojects. Or it is possible, that there may not be viable
subprojects.
In summary, CDD project design assumes that participants will self-select into
subprojects based on the type of subproject and on a decision rule weighing their
costs and benefits. In the absence of information concerning subproject costs and
benefits concurrent with the assurances a subproject will increase their production
and commitment to the group, many individuals are willing to try a new subproject.
When costs and benefits deviate from what the participants initially expected, they
may incur negative returns leading to attrition from the subproject, and in some cases
subproject failure.

5.6

Conclusion

I’ve presented a possible explanation for why projects fail, even when problems
of elite capture and free-riding are avoided. Participants leave the CDD projects
when they discover the projects have lower benefits and higher costs than what they
initially expect. The difficulty in assessing project costs and benefits derives from the
CDD project design which has promoted unfamiliar projects and technologies. The
problem is further exacerbated by providing insufficient technical assistance. As such,
when project problems appear, the settlers have few resources with which to address
them.
CDD project design assumes that participants will self-select into the projects
based on the type of project and on a decision rule weighing their own costs and
benefits. In the absence of information concerning project costs and benefits, many
participants are willing to try a new project. When costs and benefits become clearer
over time, they may not find the project to be worthwhile leading to attrition from
the project, and in some cases project failure.
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Participatory development builds from what participants know. The CDD projects
I reviewed required knowledge the majority of participants did not have. The very
structure of the project is heavily based on literacy, technical documents, and bureaucratic processes. While almost 30% of members were illiterate, even the most
educated would have difficulty deciphering the technical documents. Instead of settlers learning to rely on themselves and their knowledge, they must rely on a host of
others to complete the project. These include technical agencies, technical accompaniment, the SDA, the MST, and the younger generation. While these groups may do
their best to assist the participants, such a structure does little to empower them.
Technical assistance plays an essential role here both in the creation of the project,
accompanying the project, and disseminating information about the project to the
participants. All of which could be improved. Technical assistance should have a much
longer timeline, accompanying the projects from the initiation through a couple years
of maturity in which they are integrating into the market (if that is their objective —
and it is the objective for most of the WB projects). The technical agencies preparing
the project should provide a clearer understanding of expected costs and benefits, the
potential problems that will come up, how to deal with these problems, the prices
the settlers are going to need to receive and the quantities they will need to sell in
order to cash flow. The dissemination of such information needs to be done in a
non-technical and inclusive manner.
The CDD model could be amended in two possible ways. One way would be to
only fund projects of which settlers had intimate knowledge. The settlers would design
and implement the project themselves and would not rely on technical agencies. In
this case, the project implementers would have to divorce themselves from the typical
technical document. A proposal might be developed verbally with a simple written
document. The budget would also be simple, and accounting would be restricted to
keeping receipts and matching these with their bank account. Clearly, this would
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have to deviate from current project design and budgeting. A CDD project in this
form would have to be on a smaller scale, difficult to scale up, and more dependent
on the local intermediaries.
A second way to amend the CDD model would be to cease to think of itself
as a bottom-up strategy funding what the communities prioritize and reorganize
itself around a series of projects that have proved viable. These projects would be
standardized to some extent. Communities could apply for specific projects which
would come with extensive accompaniment through all phases of the project until the
project has reached maturity and self-sufficiency (in the best case scenario or collapsed
in the worst case scenario). In addition, as these projects are standardized they
could work with specifically trained technical agencies that have proven themselves
trustworthy. In addition, groups who have already received the same project can
work with the new groups to problem solve and create knowledge banks.

155

CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION

Participatory development takes many forms. In order for the World Bank to use
a participatory approach that can be applied globally, they have created a trajectory
of steps communities and individuals must go through. Such steps are modified to
the country, and often to the state level, but not to the individual or community
level.1 For this reason, this project-based approach can be questioned as to how truly
bottom-up it is.
The São José Agrário project studied here came out of both a project-based approach and out of a more radical approach rooted in collective action of a social movement, the MST. Agrarian settlement members organized with the Landless Worker’s
movement to occupy the state technical unit offices to demand access to the project
funds. The MST, in receiving project funds for agrarian settlements and the state
technical unit, in being willing to partner with the MST to direct and accompany
the project, created a union between the project-based and the radical approach
to participatory development. This unique union provided solutions to some of the
main problems of community-driven development, problems which also appear often
in other approaches to project-based participatory development as well. I document
the solutions these communities found to the recurrent problem of free riding and how
they prevented elite capture. While the communities were able to solve these problems, almost half the subprojects in my sample still failed. This study then identifies
reasons for subproject failure.
1

The subprojects are modified at the community level.
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The state technical unit of the São José Agrario project must be commended for
their willingness to work hand in hand with the Landless Workers Movement, as must
the Landless Workers Movement for working hand in hand with the state technical
unit. The state technical unit is obliged to document and account for the funds they
disburse by the World Bank, and as they give control of funds over to communities
themselves, they must convince and train communities to follow accounting procedures, along with other project paperwork rules. Most community members have
little experience with the bureaucratic necessities of providing documents of identity
and proof of registration in the settlement, creation of subproject proposals, managing bank accounts, keeping accounting records, and so on. From their point of
view, the process results in just a series of hoops they must jump through in order
to receive subprojects. Some of these hoops are fairly difficult for the settlers given
their education, the distance they must travel to accomplish such tasks, and the time
it takes to obtain documents. These hoops, even when they manage to jump through
them, can result in delays of subproject inputs and funds. In the sertão, such a delay
may mean you are planting in the dry season without irrigation and can result in
large losses. The practical day-to-day responsibilities of each, the state technical unit
in meeting WB goals and the MST in reaching community goals, are often at odds
making such a union difficult. Yet, together they completed the SJA project, which
may have had a higher rate of success than the larger SJII project.23
When measuring the impact of CDD projects, a common problem is measuring
empowerment. Indeed one of the main goals of the projects is empowerment. Yet it
can be difficult not only to determine a proxy for such a measure, but it is also difficult
to know the time frame over which to measure empowerment. The communities in
2

Interviews indicated this was the case, but I was unable to gain access to statistics on overall
subproject success and failure for either the SJA project or the SJII project.
3

At the time of my visit, the MST did not want to get involved in the current version of the
project SJIII, citing frustration with the bureaucratic nature of SJA.
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my study (or at least some of the participants) had become more aware and skilled at
dealing with government bureaucracies. One might conclude they had been empowered to deal with a specific set of government bureaucracies. I suspect this is not the
outcome or meaning of empowerment the CDD approach is advocating. Yet, it is not
a trivial skill to learn, particularly in the context of repeated lines of project funding.
While the CDD project documents imply communities will only receive one São José
project, communities had received a multitude of other projects. Some subprojects
were funded through the state government, some were funded through the Catholic
Church, one had been funded through the United Nations, one had a project funded
through a Belgian NGO, another project was the result of a pair of French engineering
students’ final project for their university. If indeed these communities are accessing
projects and funds from around the world, such empowerment is useful.4
Elite capture is a persistent problem of CDD projects. The larger São José II
project faced problems of elite capture, primarily in the intervention of political
elites in the project. This is unsurprising as the Brazilian Northeast is host to a
long history of patron-client relationships. The São José Agrário project was able
to overcome clientelistic elite capture via the involvement of the Landless Workers
Movement, which helped to identify and reach agrarian reform land recipients and to
ward off the intervention of politicians. Elite capture from within the agrarian settlement communities was avoided due to community homogeneity, equal distribution
of political power, and a history of collective action.
The settlement communities also overcame the free rider problem. The settlement
norms and institutions created a framework whereby problems of collective work could
be solved. I identified the institutions specific to the settlement collective work and
4

Many of these previous projects had either broken or been abandoned when I visited the communities. Yet, the communities that had historically received more projects did seem to have higher
incomes. The direction of causality is unclear — communities that were better off received more
projects or communities that received more project were better off.
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those of the São José Agrário subproject work. The institutions of the agrarian
settlement collective work were robust to emergent problems, providing routes along
which such problems could be solved. In comparison, the institutions of the SJA
subproject work provided few internal ways to solve emergent problems. The settlers
primarily solved their free rider problems in the SJA subproject by relying on the
agrarian settlement collective work institutions. This implies communities that do
not have a history of collective work and who do not already have robust institutions
may have difficulty solving the free rider problem within CDD projects.
I located project failure in problems of project design, specifically the way empowerment is operationalized, as well as problems stemming from the technical agencies
and technical assistance. Project participants are expected to be empowered through
choosing, implementing and controlling subproject resources. The project assumes
that participants have the greatest interest in their subproject succeeding, and thus
assumes giving them free reign to contract input suppliers and private technical agencies will result in the participants getting the highest quality products at the lowest
price. This assumption disregards the power differences between participants, and
suppliers and technical agencies. Such power differences result from class, education
and urban versus rural divisions. Participants, instead of becoming empowered in
their dealings with these actors, can be taken advantage of by the input suppliers and
technical agencies, who sometimes provide low-quality inputs and implementation in
pursuit of their profit motive.
Another main problem my study identified was the duration of technical assistance. Technical assistance is of too short a duration for productive (livelihood)
subprojects. This is a direct result of adapting the CDD structure from the infrastructure subprojects to the productive subprojects. Productive subprojects are
ongoing projects, in which equipment breaks, crop and animal diseases occur, participants must learn how to market their goods, and find ways to transport their goods to

159

a market. One year or less of technical assistance is hugely insufficient for productive
subprojects.
There are limitations of this study. It accurately represents the communities included in the sample, and the sample represents the population per my selection
criteria, but this led to a very small population. One cannot generalize empirically
beyond the case studies investigated here. The structures and outcomes of the SJA
subproject implemented in larger settlements (which can have hundreds of households) would most likely be different.5 It cannot be generalized to address the larger
SJII project, as many communities selected for subprojects in the SJII project were
not agrarian settlements. The study did not attempt to measure the overall rate of
success and failure of the whole SJA project. Instead, this study provides keys as to
how a particular project and group of communities overcame problems of collective
action but also provides insight into reasons for subproject failure. It identifies some
weaknesses of project design in this context and some ways in which these weaknesses
were addressed.
The strength of this study was in providing an account of the processes of these
eight subprojects implemented under ideal conditions for a CDD subproject to succeed. The settlements are fairly homogeneous regarding background and place of
birth. The members are relatively similar in terms of income and assets. The communities are fairly small and allow everyone who desires, the chance to take on a
leadership position. All people are expected to participate in decision-making processes. Small-size and the inclusion of most community members facilitate community
organization. The settlements have a history of collective action and collective work.
This experience provides a solid base from which to engage in CDD subprojects.
5

The subprojects themselves would still be limited to around 10-30 families. So the whole settlement would not be taking on the subproject but rather a smaller group within the settlement.
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In this study, I have said that four of the subprojects had succeeded. My criteria
for success was that the subprojects continued to exist when I visited the settlement,
3-6 years after the subproject had been implemented. Yet, I found that even in these
successful subprojects they had done little to directly increase the consumption or
the production of the settlements. These included two fence subprojects, a tractor,
a cashew plantation, and a capim (feed for cattle) field.6 The fence projects and
capim production may have decreased cattle loss and perhaps increased cattle weight,
thereby indirectly increasing income. The cashew plantation takes five to seven years
to mature. The settlement had not yet been able to sell the fruit or the nuts in the
market. The drought had stressed the trees and they were dealing with some tree
diseases. But the settlement had also found another source of funding to a build
cashew processing plant that would enable them to process and sell the nuts, a soda
and a sweet made from the fruit. If they were able to treat the crop disease, they
had placed themselves in a position that may lead to increased income, given they
can transport and market these goods effectively. The community that received the
tractor, due to soil erosion worries and the fact that the settlements themselves have
many state and national restrictions on the expansion of framing plots meant the
settlers were unable to increase the amount of land they farmed. They did rent out
the tractor to other communities, but the income was minimal and was saved for
tractor repairs. Overall, these subprojects are not transforming recipient’s lives.
If such subprojects cannot provide significant increases in income or production
in such communities, as in my case studies, it seems unlikely they would be able to
do so in less ideal circumstances. As such, it raises questions regarding the viability
of the CDD approach, particularly with respect to productive subprojects.
6

This adds up to five because Settlement 4’s subproject included both a fence and planting a
capim field.
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I identified several problems of project design, based on my analysis and observations, as well as what community members, the social movement, and the project
technicians described. To those working with the subprojects, many of the problems
I have identified are most likely obvious. This raises the question: Why haven’t the
WB and the SDA resolved these problems, particularly when the WB and the SDA
have been working with these subprojects in Ceará for twenty years?
The WB and SDA have only in the last ten years had a significant number of
subprojects become productive subprojects. As such, there has been a new round
of learning-by-doing. This process has identified the following problems: insufficient
technical assistance, access to markets, and transportation of goods to the market.
The WB and the SDA have tried to resolve many of these problems in the newest
SJIII project. Unfortunately, the steps taken place the onus to solve the problems
in the communities. For example, in the subproject proposals for SJIII, communities
must have a marketing plan to ensure once they have a product they can sell it.
Thus, the very communities that are finding entry into markets a major obstacle
to subproject success are now tasked with finding entry points prior to even taking
on the subproject. From a technical standpoint, this would be a rational approach
when dealing with capacitated communities with access to resources and networks.
Practically, they are making the communities responsible for the very problems they
have the most difficulty overcoming. Instead of facilitating entry into markets via
some type of support (e.g. public technical assistance), the new project design requires
the problem to be resolved before applying for the subproject. As such, this may make
the entry of poorer communities into these subprojects, either even more dependent
on the quality and implementation of the technical proposals created by the technical
agencies, or create an additional obstacle to subproject entry.
The lack of technical assistance, a problem identified by all actors in the subprojects, has only been increased to around a year. This is still not sufficient to deal with
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the myriad new problems facing the productive subprojects. Many crop diseases and
equipment breakages will occur following the initial year. The problems of transporting goods and accessing markets will also most likely be occurring following the first
year. As such, technical assistance will not be available to support the communities
when many of the problems identified above occur.
Additionally, they have raised the community counterpart funding of the subprojects to 20% (of which 10% must be provided as funds) of the subproject cost.
Raising the entry fee into the subprojects also indicates the World Bank has identified moral hazard as a problem leading to project failure. I have argued that this is
not the case. In fact, the communities have little information with which they can
predict subproject risk, subproject benefits, and subproject costs. They are only able
to calculate such factors after becoming involved in the subprojects. Additionally,
the many obstacles the participants face, the few resources, networks and limited
technical assistance they have access to limits the success of their subprojects. By
increasing the entry fee, poorer communities will be excluded from the subprojects.
Together I expect these changes to make the subprojects more difficult for the poorest
to access.
As mentioned before, this is only a small case study of the São José Agrário
project. A more comprehensive survey of the rate of success of the SJA subprojects
would be helpful to confirming or rejecting these results. In addition, a study of the
SJIII productive subprojects would be illuminating. It would also be interesting to
compare the incomes of those targeted under SJII, SJA, and SJIII, as well as the
productive subproject outcomes across these three projects.
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APPENDIX A
THE ONGOING PARTICIPATION MODEL

I separate the initial decision to participate in SJA projects from the ongoing
decision to participate in SJA. The initial participation decision is a collective decision
by the participants to apply for and carry out the project. Participants can withdraw
from the project at anytime, although they cannot rejoin the project. As such,
participants make individual ongoing decisions to continue participating.
I model the individual’s continuation or non-continuation in the project as a decision rule, which is based on an individual weighing of the expected costs against
the expected benefits. I take the initial participation decision as given. As would
be expected, participants continue participating when they expect the benefits to
outweigh the costs. As such I theorize ongoing group participation as a collection of
individual decisions. This assumption is similar to many formal models of collective
action (Oliver, 1993).1 While this does resemble a utility function, I want to emphasize that I am not attempting to measure the total utility of the project to the
individual. Rather, I am attempting to model a possible way the participants decide
whether or not to participate in a livelihood activity.
The context for the SJA projects is unique in that organized settlements came
together through collective action both in their original process of becoming a settlement and secondly under the umbrella of the MST in order to gain access to the SJII
1

There is an extensive literature criticizing cost benefit analysis (Sen, 2000). The cost benefits
here are theoretical and should be interpreted as the way an individual makes a livelihood - business
decision. Not as an explicitly quantified summing up of costs and benefits across individuals, as cost
benefit analysis is typically designed particularly in the case of public goods decisions.
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funds. In the standard CDD project design, potential participants are expected to
come together based on the project they would like to undertake. This assumes they
would face similar costs (including opportunity costs) and benefits. Thus, in these
projects the community is flexibly defined — it is those who wish to take on a project.
The settlement as a whole was offered a subproject and individual households on the
settlement made their own decision of whether to participate. As such, individuals
within the settlement communities may have had a larger range of opportunity costs
as they did not self select into a subproject but rather self-selected into a group and
then the group decided on the subproject. The projects are voluntary and, as such,
not all members of the settlement have to participate, and any member can drop out
at any time. The decision to participate in the project is an individual decision but
is also influenced by the group.
I assume that the settlers’ value group well-being, collective work, and solidarity
based on their extensive prosocial behavior. While the settlers prosocial behavior
would be assumed to be above average in general, it may vary in intensity. For example, settlers entered into the settlement through different avenues. I follow (Sen,
1977) and term this prosocial behavior, commitment. Sen defines commitments as
something a person believes in or values, upon which they will act (1977). Sen’s commitments are most easily identified when a person, not cognitively impaired, takes a
decision which makes their own well-being worse off but reflects their commitment(s).
It is possible that commitments will align with what makes one better off, yet they are
difficult to identify in this case. Bowles subsumes commitments under his formulation
of endogenous preferences (Bowles, 1998). Here commitments (or more generally values) influence one’s preferences.
Since I am not trying to measure utility I do not try to identify or rank all the
participants preferences. As such, I find Sen’s conception of commitment adequate to
the task. My decision rule holds two explicit preferences: 1) the participants would
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like the project to make them better off, either through greater income or greater
production and 2) they have a commitment to the collective. Since participants have a
commitment to the group as observed in their participation in the settlement, I assume
if an individual is neutral (or in some cases even somewhat skeptical) concerning their
costs versus benefits, their commitment to the collective would cause the individual
to participate.
There are reasons to expect the ongoing cost benefit postulation of their participation decision is valid. First, because the group has little information about the
project initially, it may be unclear if the project will be beneficial to them in the long
run. Second, as mentioned earlier, participation in the project is voluntary. When
it becomes clearer what the actual costs and benefits of the project are the participants may drop out of the project. Lastly, the participants, through their initial
participation in the settlement, general assemblies, and collective work indicate some
commitment to a group project.
I model the benefits as the total expected project profits divided by the number
of people participating π e /np .2
The production function for the project follows:

q = anαp

(A.1)

where a is a technical coefficient, 0 < α < 1 is an exponent showing diminishing
marginal returns to labor. Obviously, this is a short run production function. Since
the project grant provided the capital, and the settlers are both monetarily and
credit constrained, they will be unable to expand via capital until they have sufficient
output.
2

Most, but not all, productive CDD projects are targeting production for a market. In two of my
cases capim, and the tractor, these are inputs for marketable production rather than the marketable
production itself. These are reviewed further in the following section.
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I model costs as τ /np + ei . The monetary cost of the project, τ , is divided
among all participating members, np , plus the effort of the individual, ei , where
ei > 0. Monetary inputs include the monetary costs of the project that have not been
covered by the project grant, such as electricity. Effort is the individual’s participation
in the project’s labor requirements, in its organization, and in meetings. Labor in
the projects can be divided between the organizing aspects and the actual physical
labor on the project. The organizing aspects, such as serving as a president of the
group and/or problem solving are not divided equally. Physical labor tasks are, in
general, divided equally, but people can put in different amounts of effort in order
to accomplish these tasks. Thus, I take effort as specific to the individual rather
than equally divided among the group members. Effort can vary depending on an
individual’s distance from the project, participation in the organizational aspects
of the project, physical well-being, and the intensity of their labor contribution. I
exemplify this in Case 2, by looking at distance from the project as an indicator of
effort. As a shorthand I assume ei , to be equal to the number of hours over which the
project tasks are engaged in by the hourly wage of rural agricultural workers (where
the daily wage is divided by eight hours).
I also assume that participants have a commitment to the collective project that
lead them to participate mi , mi ≥ 0. In Case 3, I allow the magnitude of mi to vary.
I consider commitment to the project to vary by individual.
In sum, individuals make the decision to continue participating by weighing the
project benefits: expected profits (which includes the monetary costs of the project)
divided by the number participating plus their individual commitments to the collective project, with their individual project cost: effort.3 This assumes that all costs of
the initial participation decision (such as effort and occasionally monetary inputs) are

3

Effort is not included directly in τ because it exists with respect to an individual fallback position
and is determined individually.
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considered sunk costs. As such, they are excluded them from the decision to continue
participating in the project.

µi = [(πe /np ) + mi ] − ei

(A.2)

The expected profit function for the collective project is given below by substituting in the production function.

π e = θ((anαp )p − τ ) + (1 − θ)(−τ )

(A.3)

Profits are given by the quantity times the price less any monetary costs the project
might have incurred. Since the projects are set-up with grant funds, and participants
are not remunerated in cash, the only monetary costs are those that come up during
the production process. Additionally, since it is not known if the projects will succeed
or not, settlers’ gauge the expected value of the project on the basis of a hypothesized
probability of success denoted by θ. To simplify θ is assumed to be equal to np /n,
where n is the total number of people who originally decided to participate in the
project. The logic behind this assumption is as follows. First, these projects are
designed for a certain number of participants; as such they may function better with a
greater percentage of the possible participants. Second, threshold models of collective
behavior have been proposed in which the participation of some people depends on
the participation of others (as well as the connections between participants), and
small declines in the number of participants can cause a large number of people to
drop out (Granovetter, 1978). I hypothesize that under the conditions of uncertainty
and little information, participants base their own expectations of project success on
the participation others — which acts as an index of confidence in project outcomes.
I substitute the equation for profits into the decision rule, and simplify to find the
reduced form of the equation.
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θ((anαp )p − τ ) + (1 − θ)(−τ )
µi =
+ mi − ei
np


(A.4)

The reduced form is below.

µi =

apnαp
τ
−
+ mi − ei
n
np

(A.5)

The reduced form allows us to graph the equation. In this model there are three
different ways in which individual participants can vary with respect to their decision
rule; they can have different fallback positions/opportunity costs, they can put in
different intensities of effort, or their level of commitment can vary. In the following
three cases I will show how these might affect the ongoing participation in the project
Case 1: Differing Fallback Positions
Participants may have different fallback positions. For example, many individuals
work off the settlement. They work a variety of jobs, with both differing pay rates
as well as quantity of work. Thus, instead of just giving up work on their own crops,
they may be giving up paid daily work off settlement. Another example is that they
may plant more or less acres of crops. Additionally they may have different types
of crops. In general, irrigated vegetable crops will bring a greater return than solely
planting beans and corn.
In figure A.1 the expected utility at the start of the project is µe . The proportion
of people participating is θ and the fallback position is Z. I break the participants into
two groups. Those with a high fallback position, Z h , and those with a low fallback
position, Z L . If (expected) costs increase or (expected) benefits decrease µe will shift
0

down to µe . At this point we can see that those with the higher fallback position
will now obtain greater personal benefit from putting their time into their fallback
position rather than the project, so they may decide to leave the project.
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If we expect that 30% of the participants have a high fallback position and drop
out, we see that the decision rule for those with the lower fallback position is positive
and most likely they will continue in the project. Thus, all else the same, there could
be a stable equilibrium with 70% participation. On the other hand if we expect 70%
of the participants to have a high fallback position and drop out, we see that the cost
benefit decision for those with the lower fallback position is now negative, given the
70% attrition rate. As such, all participants would drop out. The model exemplifies
that depending on the parameters, even a small amount of attrition from the project
could potentially cause project failure.
Figure A.1. Case 1 - Differing Fallback Positions
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Case 2: Differing Effort
Here I evaluate what the possible consequences of participants contributing differing amounts of effort. For example, distance to the project could vary on a settlement
in which homes are scattered over the settlement. In this case, effort could depend on
both distance to the project and available type of transport. Main modes of transport
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are walking, bicycles, and motorcycles. In the case of settlement 5, some participants
had to walk 2-3 miles to get to the project.
In figure A.2 I split the participants into two groups, those that live closer to
the project, µc , and those that live farther from the project, µd . If costs increase
or benefits decrease both decision rules shift down. The fallback position is Z, and
the proportion of people participating in the project is θ. Similar to the previous
case, depending on the number of participants belonging to one group or another
there will be different outcomes. Given the shift, those who live farther away from
the project will stop participating. If the project is composed of seventy percent
or more participants who live closer than the project will continue with just those
who live close. If there participants who live close to the project make up less than
seventy percent of the project participants all participants will find it non-beneficial
to participate.
Figure A.2. Case 2 - Differing Effort
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Case 3: Differing Commitments
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Participants may have a greater or lesser commitment to the collective project.
One might expect that those with a greater commitment to the collective project
to bear a more unfavorable cost to benefit ratio than what an analysis excluding
commitments would predict. I base this assumption on two factors. First, all the
participants have previously joined a group project - the settlement. Second, most
of the participants have participated in collective action or collective work outside of
the project. Thus, in all cases I would expect a positive commitment to the group
project. Yet, it may be that some members are willing to make more sacrifices than
others for the group project. An example of why this might be the case is the way in
which people came to be members of the settlements. Once the organizers were given
the legal go ahead to establish a settlement they were required to include as members
those who had historically been living on the land as moradores. It is probable that
the moradores wished to continue living on the land rather than move, but felt less
commitment to the idea of the settlement itself.4 On the other hand, those that
organized the settlement, those that came from farther away, and/or made greater
changes in their lives to be a part of the settlement may have a greater commitment
to the collective.
Commitments can take the following three forms in an individual’s decision to
participate in a collective project. One, the project is obviously beneficial to the
participant and the group. The individual would participate regardless of their commitment to the group. Two, the project is so costly to the individual they will not
participate even after taking their group commitment into account. Three, the person is somewhere in between these, perhaps their expectations are neutral or even
doubtful regarding the project, yet their commitment to the group causes them to
4

Of course the moradores received many benefits by becoming part of the settlement, such as
access to credit and grants to build homes, as well as the ability to run livestock. Running livestock
as a morador on the landowners land was forbidden.
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participate. As the project continues new information, project problems, or external
shocks can cause such a participant to leave the project.
In this case I allow some variation in mi and divided the participants into two
groups; those with a greater commitment to the collective and those with a lesser
commitment to the collective.
The analysis and graph is very similar to Case 2, except that I divide the two decision rules into those with a greater commitment, and those with a lesser commitment.
Again if costs (benefits) were to increase (decrease) then the decision rules would shift
down (up). Apart from the definition of the two decision rules the results would graph
essentially the same as Case 2. Thus we can see how we could get a movement to
a stable equilibria with partial group participation or how the non-participation of a
part of the group could cause a total exodus from the project.
Figure A.3. Case 3 - Differing Commitment
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APPENDIX B
SURVEY
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Study
Jessica Carrick-Hagenbarth
University of Massachusetts Amherst
Numero de Assentamento: _____________
Numero de Entrevista: ________________
Informações Gerais Familiares
1.
Detalhas da Familia
Idade
Genero
Raça

2.
3.

5.
6.
7.

Serie de instruçao complete

Por quanto tempo você morou na municipio antes de entrar no
acampamento / assentamento?
Quantos anos você já trabalhou como produtor rural?
a.
Se sím trabalhou, em que posicoes?

b.

4.

Ler e escrever

Você tomava desições ou participava na tomada de desiõoes
de como administrar a fazenda em seu trablhou antigo?
i.
Que tipos?

Tem outras familias do assentamento que são seus parentes?
a.
Se sim, quantos?
Em que ano você entrou no assentamento?
Você se sente satisfeito com o assentamento?
As condições de vida mudaram para você e sua familia
comparada com como era antes?
Melhorou
E o Mesmo
Piourou

Renda
Casa
Transporte
Alimentação/Comida
# de horas trabalhadas
Controle sobre seu trabalho
Outrou
8.
Porque voce se juntou com o MST para a aquisição das terras?
Porque voce optou pelo Credito Fundiario para a aquisição das
terras?
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Relaçionamento com o chefe da familia

a. Always
b. Number of years ____________
a. Trablahdor Rural Volante
b. Parente do proprietario
c. Proprietario
d. Posseiro (Ocupante – sem formalização ou
litigioso)
e. Arrendatario (lease rent)
f. Meeiro ou parceiro (sharecrop)
g. Concessionario- cedido pelo proprietario
Sim
Não
a. O que plantar
b. Quando plantar
c. Gerenciando trablahdores
d. Decedindo quando vender
e. Decedindo para quem comprar ou vender
f. Obter credito
g. Outra
Sim
Não
Sim
Sim
Comentarios

Não
Não

9.

Você se considera parte do MST?

10.

Voce paga alguma coisa para o MST?
a. Se sim, quanto e com que frequencia?

11.
12.

Você é um miembro do FETRAECE?
Você paga alguma coisa para o FETRAECE?
a. Se sim, quanto e com que frequencia?

13.

(só Credito Fundiario) Quanto você tem que pagar por ano no
emprestimo da terra?
(só Credito Fundiario) Voce esta com os pagamentos em dia?
(so Credito Fundiario) A sua condição de vida mudou desde que
voce començou a pagar o emprestimo?
a. Se Sim, como?

14.
15.

Production
16.
Quanta terra você tem?
17.
Quanta terra você planta?
18.
Quanta terra você usa para os animais?
19.
A area da pastagem é suficiente para as animaís?
20.
Qual e a qualidade de sua terra?
a.

21.
22.
23.

Se media o ruim, quais problemas tem sua terra?

a. Militante
b. Apoiador
c. Simpatizante
d. Não
Sim
Não
Quanto _____________________
Que Frequencia ______________
Sim
Não
Sim
Não
Quanto _____________________
Que Frequencia ______________
Sim
Sim
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NA
NA
NA

Sim
Não
a. Boa
b. Media
c. Ruim
a. Acidez
b. Solo fraco
c. Carência de nutrientes
d. Arenoso
e. Rochoso
f. Solo raso (shallow soil)
g. Topografia acidentada (rugged)
h. Sem água
i. Água de baixa qualidades
j. Outra ______________________
# de horas por dia ___________________________
# de dias por semana _________________________

Quantos horas por dia você trablha em sua produção individual?
Quantos dias por semana você trabalha em sua produção
individual?
h. Só Familia
Quem trabalha com você?
i. Outros membros do assentamento
j. Trabalhadores contratados
Practicas na sua terra individual
Sim

Trator
Traçao animal
Queimada
Rotaçao de culturas
Descanso do solo para recuperação
Agrotoxico
Controle Biologico para praga e doencas
Adubaçao quimica
Adubaçao natural/organico
Plantio direto (No till), voce mexa/ara a terra todos veces
Rotaçao de pastagem
Suplemento mineral
Calcário
Inseminaçao artificial das vacas
Sementes Transgênicas

Não
Nao

NA

# ____
# ____ # ____
# ____
Não

(polyculturas) 2 or more crops in the same field
Irrigação
Drip irrigation/ irrigacao por gotejamento
Rainwater harvesting/ Coleta agua da chuva
Reutiliza agua da casa/ chuviero o da pia/tornera
24.
Bens da Produção Agrícola
Bens
S/N Indivudual/Coletivo
/ Prestado/ Alugado
Trator
Microtrator
Grade
Roçadeira (mower)
Beneficiador (corta para mandioca)
Forrageira (para silagem)
Pulverizador (passar veneno)
( ) tração animal
( ) tratorizado
Plantadeira (seeder)
( ) tração animal
( ) tratorizado
Capinadeira (mower, clear land)
( ) tração animal
( ) tratorizado
Arado
( ) tração animal
( ) tratorizado
25.
Acesso ao Credito
Acesso Credito
Sim
Banco Particular
Banco Estatal
Micrócredito
Cooperativa
Emprestimo pessoal
Pronaf
26.
Fatores para o não conseguir prestimo

Bens
Carroça (puxado por animal)
Carreta (puxada por trator
atrais do caminhão)
Bomba de irrigação
Canos, mangueras, asperses e
filtros de irrigacao
Gerador eletrico
Gerador diesel
Curral

30.
31.

Indivudual/Coletivo/
Prestado/ Alugado

Galinheiro
Chiqueiro

Voce esta com os pagamentos em dia?
Sim
Não

Não

Medo de ter dividas
Nao precisou
Falta de garantia pessoal
Dividas anteriores
Nao sabe como obter
Sem resposta
27.
Quais dificuldades enfrentam por nao possuir o titulo de
posse da area?

28.
29.

S/N

Voce participa da produção coletiva?
Voce recebe renda, comida, ou bens da produção coletiva?
a. Se sim, quanto recebeu no ano pasado?
Quantos horas por semana voce trabalha na produção
coletiva?
Voce trabalha mas que os outros no trablho coletivo?
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NA
Sim

Não

a. Nao enfrento dificuldades
b. Nao consigo empréstimo
c. Sem segurança para investir
d. Sem segurança para planos futuros
e. Area sujeita a conflitos
f. Outros
g. NA
Sim
Não
Sim
Não

Sim

Não

Não Sei

32.
33.
34.

35.
36.

Voce acha que trabalho coletivo esta divida justamente?
a. Se não, Porque não?
Que faz se alguem não esta fazendo o trabalho exigido?
Os moradores sao rigorosos com os que faltam aos trabalhos
na area coletiva hoje?
Você tem um quintal?
Quão importante é produzir sua propia alimento de uma
escala 1 to 5, onde 1 e menos importante e 5 e muito
importante?
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Sim

Não

Não Sei

a. A maioria e rigorosa e cobra as faltas
b. Poucos sao rigorosos e cobram as faltas
c. Ninguem cobra as faltas
d. Nao ha trabaho coletivo
Sim
Não
1

2

3

4

5

37.
Produção
Cultivo
(a) Coletivo
(b) Individual

Area plantada (ha)

Quantidade
produzida
Autoconsumo

Destino da
producao
Quantidade
(und)
Valor medio
(R$/und)
Cultivo

Vendida para
atravessador

Vendida ao
consumidor

Vendida para
industria

(a) Coletivo
(b) Individual

Area plantada (ha)

Quantidade
produzida

Destino da
producao
Quantidade
(und)
Valor medio
(R$/und)
Cultivo

Vendida para
atravessador

Vendida ao
consumidor

Autoconsumo

(a) Coletivo
(b) Individual

Area plantada (ha)

Quantidade
produzida

Destino da
producao
Quantidade
(und)
Valor medio
(R$/und)
Cultivo

Vendida para
atravessador

Vendida ao
consumidor

Autoconsumo

(a) Coletivo
(b) Individual

Area plantada (ha)

Quantidade
produzida

Destino da
producao
Quantidade
(und)
Valor medio
(R$/und)
Cultivo

Vendida para
atravessador

Vendida ao
consumidor

Autoconsumo

(a) Coletivo
(b) Individual

Area plantada (ha)

Quantidade
produzida

Destino da
producao
Quantidade
(und)
Valor medio
(R$/und)
Cultivo

Vendida para
atravessador

Vendida ao
consumidor

Autoconsumo

(a) Coletivo
(b) Individual

Area plantada (ha)

Quantidade
produzida

Destino da
producao
Quantidade
(und)
Valor medio
(R$/und)

Vendida para
atravessador

Vendida ao
consumidor

Autoconsumo

Vendida para
industria

Vendida para
industria

Vendida para
industria

Vendida para
industria

Vendida para
industria
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Teve Assistencia Tecnica
Sim
Alimentação de
anamais

Não
Outra

Teve Assistencia Tecnica
Sim
Alimentação de
anamais

Não
Outra

Teve Assistencia Tecnica
Sim
Alimentação de
anamais

Não
Outra

Teve Assistencia Tecnica
Sim
Alimentação de
anamais

Não
Outra

Teve Assistencia Tecnica
Sim
Alimentação de
anamais

Não
Outra

Teve Assistencia Tecnica
Sim
Alimentação de
anamais

Não
Outra

Animal

(a) Coletivo
(b) Individual

Quantos

Destino da producao
Quantidade (und)
Valor medio (R$/und)
Animal

Vendida para açouge

Vendida o consumidor

(a) Coletivo
(b) Individual

Quantos

Destino da producao
Quantidade (und)
Valor medio (R$/und)
Animal

Vendida para açouge

Vendida o consumidor

(a) Coletivo
(b) Individual

Quantos

Destino da producao
Quantidade (und)
Valor medio (R$/und)
Animal

Vendida para açouge

Vendida o consumidor

(a) Coletivo
(b) Individual

Quantos

Destino da producao
Quantidade (und)
Valor medio (R$/und)
Animal

Vendida para açouge

Vendida o consumidor

(a) Coletivo
(b) Individual

Quantos

Destino da producao
Quantidade (und)
Valor medio (R$/und)
Animal

Vendida para açouge

Vendida o consumidor

(a) Coletivo
(b) Individual

Quantos

Destino da producao
Quantidade (und)
Valor medio (R$/und)
Animal

Vendida para açouge

Vendida o consumidor

(a) Coletivo
(b) Individual

Quantos

Destino da producao
Quantidade (und)
Valor medio (R$/und)
Animal

Vendida para açouge

Vendida o consumidor

(a) Coletivo
(b) Individual

Quantos

Destino da producao
Quantidade (und)
Valor medio (R$/und)
Animal

Vendida para açouge

Vendida o consumidor

(a) Coletivo
(b) Individual

Quantos

Destino da producao
Quantidade (und)
Valor medio (R$/und)

Vendida para açouge

Vendida o consumidor
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Teve Assistencia Tecnica
Vendida para industria

Sim
Autoconsumo

Não
Outra

Teve Assistencia Tecnica
Vendida para industria

Sim
Autoconsumo

Não
Outra

Teve Assistencia Tecnica
Vendida para industria

Sim
Autoconsumo

Não
Outra

Teve Assistencia Tecnica
Vendida para industria

Sim
Autoconsumo

Não
Outra

Teve Assistencia Tecnica
Vendida para industria

Sim
Autoconsumo

Não
Outra

Teve Assistencia Tecnica
Vendida para industria

Sim
Autoconsumo

Não
Outra

Teve Assistencia Tecnica
Vendida para industria

Sim
Autoconsumo

Não
Outra

Teve Assistencia Tecnica
Vendida para industria

Sim
Autoconsumo

Não
Outra

Teve Assistencia Tecnica
Vendida para industria

Sim
Autoconsumo

Não
Outra

38.
Projeto
Projeto:
Esse é o projeto que você queria?
Ele supre suas nesecidades?
Porque ou porque não?
Você ajudou a escolher esse projeto?
Você trabalhou no projeto
O que faz?
Você ja participio de outra forma no projeto?
O projeto amentou a sua renda familiar?
O projeto amentou sua produção de alimentos?
O projeto amentou seu bem-estar?
Se sim, em qual maneira?
O projeto é/foi bom para a comunidade?
Projeto:
Esse é o projeto que você queria?
Ele supre suas nesecidades?
Porque ou porque não?
Você ajudou a escolher esse projeto?
Você trabalhou no projeto
O que faz?
Você ja participio de outra forma no projeto?
O projeto amentou a sua renda familiar?
O projeto amentou sua produção de alimentos?
O projeto amentou seu bem-estar?
Se sim, em qual maneira?
O projeto é/foi bom para a comunidade?
Projeto:
Esse é o projeto que você queria?
Ele supre suas nesecidades?
Porque ou porque não?
Você ajudou a escolher esse projeto?
Você trabalhou no projeto
O que faz?
Você ja participio de outra forma no projeto?
O projeto amentou a sua renda familiar?
O projeto amentou sua produção de alimentos?
O projeto amentou seu bem-estar?
Se sim, em qual maneira?
O projeto é/foi bom para a comunidade?
Projeto:
Esse é o projeto que você queria?
Ele supre suas nesecidades?
Porque ou porque não?
Você ajudou a escolher esse projeto?
Você trabalhou no projeto
O que faz?
Você ja participio de outra forma no projeto?
O projeto amentou a sua renda familiar?
O projeto amentou sua produção de alimentos?
O projeto amentou seu bem-estar?
Se sim, em qual maneira?
O projeto é/foi bom para a comunidade?

Sim

Não

Comentarios

Sim

Não

Comentarios

Sim

Não

Comentarios

Sim

Não

Comentarios
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Technical
39.
Tem acesso a assistencia tecnico no assentamento?
40.
Usou assistencia tecnica no assentamento?
a. Se não, porque não?

b.

Se sim, quais são os tipos de assistencia tecnica que voce
recebeu

a. Se sim, quem proveu a assitencia tecnica?
b. Se sim, com que frequencia voce recebe assistencia
tecnica?
c. Se sim, como se classifica?
41.

Recebeu assistencia tecnica ou treinamento sobre o uso de
adubo, agrotoxicos, o controle biological de doenças?
a. O trenimento foi em favor de productos quimicos ou
productos organicos?
b. Qual organicação fez ou treinamento?

Governo
42.
Qual é o cargo que você ocupa na associação?

43.
44.

Você ja teve no pasado algum posição de liderança?
a. Se Sim, quais foram?
Como são tomada as desições na assoçiação?

45.

Quantos reuniões teve nas ultimos 3 meses?

46.

Dessas, quantos reuniões você foi?
a. Em quantas dessas reuniões você falou?
Outros membros de sua familia atenderam as reuniõens
também?
a. Se Sim, Qual?
b. Quantos?
No seu assentamento há muitos desentendimentos entre os
moradores?
Quando há desentendimentos as lideranças da comunidade
ajudam a resolve-los?

47.

48.
49.
50.

Em geral como você classifica o trabalho dos líderes no
assentamento?

51.

Com que frequencia os moradores de sua comunidade
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Sim
Não
Sim
Não
a. Não queria
b. Não precisava.
d. Não tinha dinheiro para contratar
e. Não existia
a. Elaboracao de projecto
b. Gerenciamento da unidade produtiva
(comercializacao, compra de insumos)
c. Orientação tecnica para produzir individualmente
d. Orientaçao tecnica para produzir coletivamente
e. Outro
a. Uma Vez
b. Periodicamente: com qual frequencia_________
c. Infrequentamente
d. Com frequencia mas sem dias marcados
a. Boa
b. Media
c. Ruim
Sim
Não
Quimico

Organico

a. Nenhum
b. Presidente
c. Vice-Presidente
d. Tesoureiro
e. Vice-Tesoureiro
f. Secretário
g. Vice-Secretário
h. Conselheiro
i. Outro _____
Sim

Não

a. Com a participação da maioria
b. Sem a participação da maioria
c. Não sabe
d. Outro ____________________________________
# de Reuniões ______________
Não lembrou _______________
Sim

Sim

Não

Não

a. Ajudam resolver a maioria deles
b. Ajudam resolver alguns deles
c. Não ajudsam a resolve-los
a. Bom
b. Medio
c. Ruim
a. Muita

52.
53.
54.
55.

ajudam as familías que passam por situações de necessidade
(perda de safra ou doença grave na familia)?
Com que frequencia voce se junta aos outros moradores para
resolver problemas da comunidade (manter a estrada de
acesso, concertar a bomba de agua)?
Quanto confiança você tem nos outros membros da
comunidade?
Você trablaha mas dos outros nos comites os outros posicões
de liderança?
Você acha que o trablho de liderança é dividido de forma
justa?
a. Comentarios

Renda
56.
Renda do trablho for a do assentamento no ultimo mes
Relaçionamento
Tipo de Trabalho
Dias Trabalhados
com o chefe da
renumerado
Valor Total por mes
familia
1
Dias Trabalhados Por Mes

b. Pouca
c. Nunca
a. Muita
b. Pouca
c. Nunca
d. Muita
e. Pouca
f. Nennhuma
Sim

Não

Não Sei

Sim

Não

Não Sei

Carteira de Trabalho
asinado S/N

Comentarios

Valor R$
2

Dias Trabalhados Por Mes
Valor R$

3

Dias Trabalhados Por Mes
Valor R$

4

Dias Trabalhados Por Mes
Valor R$

5

Dias Trabalhados Por Mes
Valor R$

6

Dias Trabalhados Por Mes
Valor R$

57.
58.

Sim
Não
NA
Você paga o Carné INSS?
Alem do trabalho, sua familia teve outras fontes de renda monetaria sem ser com produção agricola nos ultimos 12
meses
Fonte
N
R$/Mes
No. de meses
Aposentadoria
Pensoes
Bolsa Família
BPC (Benefício de Prestação Continuada)
Bolsa Cidadã
Prog de erradicação de trabalho infantil (PETI)
Cesta Basica
Seguro desemprego
Garantia a safra (Seguro Safra)
Bolsa Estiagem
Doaçoes

60.
Bens

Bens da Casa

Quantidade

Bens
Antenna parabólica (satellite)

Telefone Fixo

184

Quantidade

Celuar
Fogão
Geladeira
Freezer/Congelador
Liquidificador
Ventilador
Máquina de lavar
Máquina costura

Televisão
Video Cassete/DVD
Radio/Aparelho de Son
Bicicleta
Moto
Carro
Caminhão ou caminhonete
Outro

Education
61.
Agora seus filhos vão a escola?
62.
Tem uma escola no assentamento
a. Se a escolar não esta no assentamento, qual é a distancia
de aqui até a escola?
63.
Quantas series tem na escola?
64.
Agora, no assentamento, a educação para seus filhos é melhor
ou pior?
65.
66.
67.
68.

Saude
69.
70.

Qual é a importancia da educação para crianças de um escala
de 1 a 5, onde 1 e menos importante e 5 e muito importante?
Você participa dos programas de educação para adultos?
Você tem planos de participar dos programas de educação
para adultos?
Qual é a importancia da educação para adultos de um escala
de 1 a 5, onde 1 e menos importante e 5 e muito importante?

Agora você tem acesso a um posto de saude no assentamento?
a. Sim não, Qual é a distancia você tem que viajar para
chegar ao posto de saude?
Agora, no assentamento, seu acesso e qualidade ao
atendimento de saude é …
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Sim
Sim

Não
Não

NA
NA
NA
NA
NA

a. Melhor
b. O Mesmo
c. Pior
1
Sim
Sim

a. Melhor
b. O mesmo
c. Pior

3

4

Não
Não
1

Sim

2

2

5
NA
NA

3

Não

4

5
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